



ALVISON

1845



1845


ALVISON


1845





**THE ADVENTURES OF
THE FOURTEEN POINTS**





Photographed by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

THE AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT IN PARIS

Entrance to the Hotel de Crillon, a famous landmark on the Place de la Concorde. The east wing of the building, called the Hotel Coislin, was also used by the Americans

THE ADVENTURES OF THE FOURTEEN POINTS

VIVID AND DRAMATIC EPISODES OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE FROM ITS OPENING AT PARIS TO
THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

BY
HARRY HANSEN

"I am doubtful whether any body of men with a difficult task have worked under greater difficulties —stones crackling on the roof and crashing through the windows, and sometimes wild men screaming through the key-holes."— DAVID LLOYD GEORGE,

ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS



NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1919

11047
H3

Copyright, 1919, by
THE CENTURY CO.

Published, October, 1919



NOV 26 1919

\$2.50

©Cl.A535866

TO
RUTH

. . . “ Yes, indeed, you may use anything and everything you have ever written for us.”

VICTOR F. LAWSON.

Thank you, Mr. Lawson, for this, and for the many other unusual privileges that have come to me in the service of *The Chicago Daily News*.

HARRY HANSEN.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

- I am admitted to the Hôtel de Crillon and visit the sacred precincts of the American mission to negotiate peace — I attend a consultation over the Fourteen Points, and learn something about their strange ailment 3

CHAPTER II

- The Place de la Concorde and the Quai d'Orsay on a sunny January morning — I become interested in the last word of kings and the balance of power . 19

CHAPTER III

- Concerning the relative importance of a peace conference and a foot-ball game, and how it feels to survey the great of the earth through a doorway . . 32

CHAPTER IV

- How President Wilson went across the seas with his formula for peace, and found that Europe had a few ideas on the same subject 48

CHAPTER V

- M. Clemenceau becomes the victim of an assassin's bullet, and proves that his physique is as strong as his will is firm 71

CHAPTER VI

- An invitation to tea lures me to the Hôtel Lutetia, and I learn how 40,000,000 human beings fare on the other side of the world 84

CHAPTER VII

PAGE

- A dip into President Wilson's mail-bag and what I found there — Also throwing light on what happened when the smaller nations heard of self-termination 101

CHAPTER VIII

- How the Prince of the Hedjaz pitched his Arabian tent in the apartments of a Parisian hotel, and how he disconcerted the plans for a Jewish Palestine and a French Syria by his modest request for the empire of the califate 117

CHAPTER IX

- The story of a little town called Fiume, and how the amazing unanimity with which all parties concerned applied the Fourteen Points almost disrupted the Peace Conference 136

CHAPTER X

- Conference days in Paris — Jottings from a note-book in the year of the great peace 180

CHAPTER XI

- How Belgium set about to get a brand-new parchment for a tattered scrap of paper, and what came of it 194

CHAPTER XII

- The eighth point wins a splendid victory, and then comes the Saar basin, and the whole fourteen suffer an eclipse 211

CHAPTER XIII

- The President prepares a garden party at Principo, and the invited guests drag out the family skeleton 239

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER XIV

PAGE

Walks in the Paris of the conference, and how they led
to haunts of another day 270

CHAPTER XV

“Nach Paris!” said the Germans, and how they
finally got there. Also showing that the German
sometimes not only gets what he wants, but also
what is coming to him 284

CHAPTER XVI

A pilgrimage to the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, and
how it recalls the founding of an empire forty-
eight years ago 306

CHAPTER XVII

How Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau made use of his
fifteen days, which were pretty dark, and his fif-
teen nights, which were just as dark 323

CHAPTER XVIII

The story of the twenty-eighth of June, and how Ger-
many found peace at the end of a long, long road
in Versailles 345

CHAPTER XIX

President Wilson leaves France with two treaties of
peace, and the United States Senate gets the stage
at last 360

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The American State Department in Paris	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	FACING PAGE
The American Mission to Negotiate Peace	24
The Opening of the Peace Conference in Paris, Janu- ary 18, 1919	40
The Commission on the League of Nations	52
The Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference	88
The Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference	92
Two Leaders of the British Delegation	112
The Emir Feisal, Son of the King of the Hedjaz	128
Four Leaders in the Negotiations on Fiume	140
The First American Troops to Enter Fiume	160
The First President of the United States in Paris	224
Ignace Paderewski	248
The Two White Houses of Paris	272
The Great Windows of the Palace at Versailles	312
Germany's Representatives in Versailles	328
Germany Signs the Treaty of Peace	352

**THE ADVENTURES OF THE
FOURTEEN POINTS**

THE ADVENTURES OF THE FOURTEEN POINTS

CHAPTER I

I am admitted to the Hôtel de Crillon and visit the sacred precincts of the American mission to negotiate peace — I attend a consultation over the Fourteen Points, and learn something about their strange ailment.

THE lad in khaki at the entrance to the Hôtel de Crillon gave the revolving glass door a shove, and I percolated inside. Straight ahead were the stairs and two elevators. I headed for the latter.

“Stop!”

“*Arrêtez!*”

“Just a moment, please!”

So there were three of them. Very well. I halted, and looked them over. One was a soldier in O. D. About his left sleeve he wore a broad band of blue on which was embroidered in white the scales of Justice surrounded by a garland. It was his badge of honor — the insignia of service at the Peace Conference. The second might have stepped off the floor at Field's or Lord & Taylor's. He wore a black cutaway, with a kerchief in the pocket, and striped trousers. The third was a French functionary pure and simple. No need to describe him; he was like the rest of that great tribe whose motto is “Stop! Sit down! Wait!”

“What do you want?” asked the American floor-walker.

"I want to see the peace commission," I replied.

"The American Mission to Negotiate Peace does n't see any one," began my interrogator; then he hesitated, looked me over, and added, "unless —" You never can tell, was his thought. Paris is full of presidents, premiers, and princes of the blood in "civies." This lanky fellow might be somebody — "Unless," he resumed, "you have an appointment."

"I am a newspaper man," I said irrelevantly.

The soldier fell back to his place beside the door. The floor-walker executed a half-circle, and then gazed dreamily through the large glass panel. The Frenchman passed his arm quietly through mine.

"*S'il vous plaît,*" he remarked, and deftly piloted me into the carpeted and mirrored anteroom to the left of the door.

"*S'il vous plaît,*" he repeated, and procured a slip of paper that was evidently to be filled out for the statistical section of the Census Bureau. It was printed in two languages, like this:

Pass	Paris.....1919
Permis No.....	
This pass entitles	
Ce permis est delivré à.....	
Representing	
Représentant	
To visit room	
Pour se rendre a la chambre.....	
And must be surrendered to guard at main entrance on leaving the building.	
Ce permis doit être rendu au soldat de garde en quittant l'hôtel.	
	Officer in charge of building.
	Officier responsable.

After all, it was elementary. It did not ask half so much as did the American passport office in Washington, or the British bureau to retard well-meaning travelers at Southampton, or the French madhouse of statistical information at the prefecture of police in Paris. It did not ask for my mother's maiden name, my wife's birthday, or whether my neighbors kept chickens. It was getting easier every day to see the office boy of the tenth clerk of the fourth secretary. I filled it out.

"*Asseyez vous, s'il vous plaît,*" said the Frenchman.

I sat down. Numerous others were also sitting down. I could tell by the nonchalance with which they studied the hangings, the mirrors, the red carpet, the furniture, and lastly myself that they also were observing the magic formula, "Wait!" One man was inclined to stoutness. He wore a striped shirt with soft cuffs, a plain bow tie, a watch-chain across his chest, and an Elk emblem in his coat-lapel. Another wore a check suit, a white four-in-hand, and had long, grayish hair that curled up under the brim of his hat. Under his arm he held a packet of manuscript and the year-book of the American Board of Foreign Missions. A third man had a fair skin, a neatly curled Vandyke beard, silk gloves, and a red ribbon in his buttonhole. A fourth —

But the Frenchman had returned. He handed me the slip.

"*Merci,*" he said. "*Le premier étage.*"

"Thank you," I replied. My honest purpose must have shone forth in my countenance. The Triple Al-

liance had approved me. I was admitted. I started briskly for the first floor.

Here was the corridor leading to the rooms of the American mission. It was filled for the most part with rather young-looking Americans, men who averaged about thirty years of age. At a table near the head of the stairs sat several doughboys, evidently acting as orderlies; before the doors leading to the conference-room of the mission stood other orderlies. Potted palms looked sad and forlorn in great vases of glazed white porcelain. The walls were of grayish stone, the doors and woodwork were enameled white, and the door-panels contained mirrors.

Presently the door would open to these men and to the world. That, at least, was my thought, for these were newspaper men and they were here to see and hear for the American public. They must be, I judged, men who had reached the pinnacle of their profession. What they wrote in the morning was carried by the cables to the American people at noon, and soon after the printing presses would be grinding out their stories and the newsboys would be hawking them in the streets. I walked over to a group. There was Paul Scott Mowrer.

"Well, I'm in," I said.

"Did you get your pass?" asked Mowrer.

"What pass?" I asked.

"Your card of identification. You can't come here day after day without a card. Of course I can get you in to-day, but if you came alone, the detectives might not pass you. Go to the top floor of the adjoin-

ing building, the Coislen. There you will find the photographers of the signal corps. They will photograph you. A day later you will get your card with your photograph from the major of infantry in the press bureau. Then on the card you will put your signature."

"And thumb-prints?" I asked.

"Not yet," he replied.

A buzzer sounded.

"All right, gentlemen," said an orderly. The men turned toward the doors and slowly passed into the antechamber. At the door stood a dark-haired, slightly built man wearing a soft felt hat. He had bright, pleasing eyes, and as we passed, they rested for an instant on each face. Some one whispered that he was from the White House. He had a wonderful memory, they said, for faces.

The newspaper men filed into the room, and stood about in groups talking and laughing. The members of the peace mission had not yet arrived, so that I had a minute, to look about me. We had entered an imposing room, wide and high, well lighted by great double windows that opened out on the Place de la Concorde and through which I could see the columns of the Chamber of Deputies and the lantern over Napoleon's tomb in the Hôtel des Invalides. A wide Persian rug, superimposed on a red velvet carpet, covered most of the floor. It was a typically French interior, with the walls done in white enamel on wood and mirrors used liberally, especially in the door-panels. But just like the Bourbon kings who gave this style of decora-

tion to the world, the architects had not been satisfied with simplicity; they had added heavy moldings, rich with gold-leaf, and had brought out in high relief on the ceiling strange figures and garlands and implements of warfare. The eye was drawn at once to the wide gilded cornice that had four eagles at the angles of the room, with wings outstretched as if to hold up the very roof of the world. I would have considered them at least symbols of our republic amid all this imperial splendor, had I not reflected that the eagle is no homing pigeon; he has served with equanimity on the standards of the Roman legions, the Napoleonic armies, the arms of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg, and yet he appears most contented on the great seal of our own republic across the seas.

Of the men who filled the room many had names that were well known in the United States. There was Ray Stannard Baker, for instance, who was the officer of *liaison* between the American mission and the press and was perhaps closer in touch with the President during the conference than any other man. Then there was William Allen White, with his rotund face wreathed in smiles, and Abraham Cahan, oracle of New York's great East Side, the center of an attentive group of young writers. Herbert Bayard Swope of the New York "World" was lifting his voice high above the others in a good-natured effort to down Laurence Hills of the New York "Sun" in argument; and others gathered round about included Mark Sullivan of "Collier's," Arthur D. Howden Smith, who wrote "The Real Colonel House"; S. S. McClure, John Edwin

Nevin, David Lawrence, Richard V. Oulahan, Lincoln Steffens, Simeon Strunsky, and Jay Hayden. There, too, I saw Edward Hood, Washington correspondent of the Associated Press, whom I learned to esteem more and more as the days went on for his quiet manner, his calm speech, his direct, and yet polite, interrogation, and for his unusual knowledge of American affairs, which went back as far as the Alabama case, one of his first assignments.

A memorandum blank on a marble-topped table bore the title "The American Mission to Negotiate Peace." A bit meticulous, I reflected, and yet probably prompted by the circumstances. I wondered if the same formal style was observed one hundred and thirty-seven years ago by our first peace mission to Paris — by John Jay, John Adams, and plain, blunt old Benjamin Franklin.

One of the big mirrored doors at the end of the room swung back, and the members of the American mission entered. First came Robert Lansing, secretary of state, well groomed, well poised, nodding in a friendly way, with the end of his mouth curled into a bit of a smile. Since 1892, when he became associate counsel in the Bering Sea arbitration matter, he had been in intimate touch with the foreign relations of the United States. Then came Henry White, a tall, solidly built man with white hair, who walked forward with a bit of stoop and peered sharply through his glasses. Colonel Edward M. House followed, a most unassuming man for the part he had played in American political life. Lastly came General Tasker H. Bliss, with the rugged features of an out-of-doors army man, wearing

the uniform of his rank, with a badge of colored ribbon on his breast. General Bliss strode forward with the air of a busy man, sank into a comfortable leather chair, and began to examine a sheaf of papers as if no one else were in the room.

Technically, of course, these men were not representatives of the United States Government at all, but the President of the United States, who alone was empowered to negotiate peace. It was said by his opponents that although the American mission had five members, it had in effect only one mind, and that this mind moved the other four as puppets tied to strings. No doubt the President was the dominating member, but it would have been unjust to say that these men were mere agents. It might have been better expressed by saying that the policy of the United States at the Peace Conference was directed by one man, and that the members of the American mission presented a united front under his leadership.

That the President was thoroughly cognizant of his power to assume full responsibility for the United States in the peace negotiations is clear from the following paragraph in his book, "Constitutional Government in the United States":

"One of the greatest of the president's powers I have not spoken of at all: his control, which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign affairs, which the president possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely. The president cannot conclude a treaty with a foreign power without the consent of the senate, but he may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be

made if the faith and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete and when in any critical matter it is completed the government is virtually committed, whatever its disinclination, and the senate may feel itself committed also.

These, then, were the men who were to make peace with Germany. On my way to Paris I had already become convinced that making peace was not likely to be so easy a matter as it seemed on November 11, 1918. Although I had regarded the basis of peace virtually settled with the adoption of the President's Fourteen Points by the Allies and by the Germans, I was to learn that somebody had sprinkled tacks plentifully on the road to be traversed by the peacemakers. And what opened my eyes more than anything else to the fact that the conference might not have smooth sailing was the interrogation of the American mission, which now took place.

Secretary Lansing actually invited the deluge. He might have avoided it, poor man, but he did n't. He adopted an easy pose, with his legs slightly apart, and said:

"Well, gentlemen, what can I do for you to-day?"

I think it was Herbert Bayard Swope who led the chase,—at least, he was well in the van,—and the first question was something like this:

"Is it true that no one is to be admitted to the Peace Conference except the delegates and that all the work is to be done in secret?"

Secretary Lansing replied —

At this moment a friend whispered in my ear. "You

know, of course, that you cannot quote the secretary," he said.

"Why not?" I asked.

"Impossible; it's against the agreement," he said.

"The mission meets the newspaper men only on condition that its members are not to be quoted."

"Then what are we here for?" I asked.

"For our guidance," he replied.

So I am compelled to omit what the secretary said. But nobody was under any obligations not to quote the questions that were asked him. So I give herewith the questions, and leave the secretary's answers blank. Some day in the future, perhaps fifty years from now, the ban may be lifted, and the answers given to a waiting world. Who knows?

"Will nobody be admitted to the conference?"

"....."

"Won't the newspapers be admitted?"

"....."

"Won't the public be admitted?"

"....."

"Who is responsible for this decision, the President?"

"....."

"Did n't the President tell Senator Borah that the treaty would be negotiated in public?"

"....."

"What has become of the point about 'open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understanding of any

kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in public view? ' ' "

"....."

The secretary is a diplomat of the first order. His answers prove it. I made a mental note that the first of the Fourteen Points was limping badly. The *George Washington* seemed to have had a tempestuous voyage across.

At that moment some one wanted to know whether it was true that President Wilson had agreed to let the British protect the freedom of the seas. It was said that Colonel House himself had fathered point two, which dealt with the freedom of the seas, and that at one time he held the view that the high seas should be free for all vessels, neutral or belligerent, during war, and that combats should be limited only to war-ships. The phraseology of this one of the Fourteen Points seemed to bear this out, for it began: "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war." But there was this qualifying clause, "except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants." The President appeared to have had in mind action by the League of Nations.

Secretary Lansing himself was on record with regard to the freedom of the seas. In communicating to Germany the decision of the Allies to make peace on the basis of the terms laid down in President Wilson's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, he said that "they [the Allies] must point out, however, that clause

two, relating to what is usually described as freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference."

It appeared that none of the correspondents knew just what the President meant to submit to the Peace Conference on the subject of the freedom of the seas; and it also appeared that, whatever it was, the American mission was either not ready or not in a position to define it. The term "freedom of the seas," which had been loosely used by the Germans for anything that would hamper Great Britain's sea power, seemed to have undergone numerous attempts at definition; and now, on the eve of the peace, it appeared to mean, "Hands Off!" At least that was the purport of what M. Clemenceau, Premier of France, said he had agreed to in a conversation with Mr. Lloyd George, Prime Minister of England, and before the Chamber of Deputies he related that he had repeated this conversation to the American President, who had replied: "I approve what you said to Mr. Lloyd George. What I have to submit to the Allied governments will change nothing in your replies to Mr. Lloyd George. Each one will retain his freedom."

"By the way, Mr. Secretary," came a voice from another quarter,—the voice of a man who, strange to say, represented an American newspaper that had a German name,—"when is the American army going to evacuate Russia?"

At this there was a titter of amusement. I did n't

know why at the time, but I was to learn later that the evacuation of Russian territory was one of the stock questions. It appeared that the evacuation of all Russian territory also had been agreed to as one of the Fourteen Points, and that in view of landings of Entente troops in Arkangel and Odessa the evacuation seemed to have become rather crab-like. Paris resounded with appeals for and against evacuation. There were members in the Chamber of Deputies who professed to receive reports from soviet Russia that everything was going well and that the Allied troops might better be withdrawn. There were other groups in Paris, both French and Russian, who were keeping the printing-presses busy turning out stories of the most horrible atrocities committed by the Bolsheviki, and who demanded that the Allies send a great army against soviet Russia at once. Meanwhile from across the seas echoed the speeches of senators and congressmen in Washington who wanted to know when the boys were coming home.

It was clear that point six of the fourteen was somewhat frost-bitten, though there was still time for the application of first-aid measures before the conference opened. Perhaps by then the points we had discussed and any of the rest that might be ailing would be able to sit up and take nourishment. I expressed my views to a friend.

"If the conference does n't make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points," I said, "what in the name of Talleyrand will it do?"

"Maybe it will fall back on the ten commandments,"

he said. "But whatever it does, it will put the rollers under the Germans. That's what we're here for."

The meeting broke up at this moment, and the men prepared to pass out. We stopped for a moment to shake hands with Henry White, one of the members of the mission who found ample opportunity to make use of his powers of diplomacy in Paris. Mr. White was the oldest of the American commissioners, being sixty-eight, but at that only three years the senior of General Bliss. His long service had given him rich backgrounds and a wealth of information that now made him invaluable. He had been ambassador to Paris and Rome and had filled American diplomatic posts in London, Vienna, Buenos Aires, and Valparaiso. Just as Louis XVI asked the representative of the United States in Paris to guard his personal interests when the French Revolution broke out, so Mr. White was one of those who had been called upon during the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune to help represent the diplomatic interests of Prussia and to do kindly acts for France, and I recall the anecdotes of how he and the little staff at the American embassy of that day, in humble quarters and undermanned, as always, were besieged by the throngs of German citizens who had been caught in Paris by the war and who clamored for passports and papers giving them a safe conduct home. He was in Paris when France signed the ignominious preliminary peace at Versailles in 1871, at a time when he could hardly have suspected the part he was to play in an-

other peace at Versailles many years later. Mr. White had also represented America at the Algeciras Conference, and this proved an advantage to-day, for it turned out that France asked a revision of the act of Algeciras at the Peace Conference, and this was finally included in the terms of peace.

We passed out of the anteroom and into the corridors of the Crillon. We met old friends and made new ones. There was a buzz of talk on all sorts of topics; publicity, the Fourteen Points, what France wants, what Italy wants. Already the Peace Conference was taking on the aspect of an American political convention. I felt that the other men, like myself, were having difficulty in "orientation," that wonderful European word. At the foot of the stairs I met John T. McCutcheon.

"We were there at the start and now we're here at the finish," said Mr. McCutcheon. "Is n't it a wonderful time?"

Then we passed out of the Crillon and formed a little group under the dark stone arcades of the ancient mansion. Some one was imparting more inside information.

An American soldier approached. Unlike the doughboys in Paris, he wore the wide-brimmed felt hat that the boys at the front discarded for the overseas cap. A big revolver hung loosely from his belt, and there was a blue band around his sleeve bearing the letters "M.P." He was the first military policeman I had seen in Paris. We looked at him curiously, and he looked back at us. Then he made a quick gesture.

“ Move on ! ” he said. “ Don’t stand around here ! ”

No, this was not New York or Chicago, but Paris in the year of the great peace.

CHAPTER II

The Place de la Concorde and the Quai d'Orsay on a sunny January morning — I become interested in the last word of kings and the balance of power.

BEYOND the arcades of the Hôtel de Crillon the January sun was shining down on the broad pavements of the Place de la Concorde as if it were a morning in May. A big brown touring-car marked with the numerals of the American Army turned a semicircle and drew up before the *hôtel*. A well-groomed man in the long blue ulster of the navy, with a wealth of gold braid on his cap, stepped briskly out and passed into the *hôtel*.

"Not a bad pose," said a voice behind me, and I turned to see a photographer in the uniform of the Signal Corps folding up the tripod of a motion-picture camera.

"Who was that?" I asked.

"Grayson," he replied, "Rear-Admiral Grayson. Keeps a man busy watching for the gold braids nowadays," he added.

"Then you do this all the time?" I asked.

"Pretty often," he answered. "You see, we have to get all the big boys for the government records. So I'm working in Paris now. Was up at Coblenz last week and took a lot of army pictures. Come on out

to Vincennes some time and see the American plant. We're with *Pathay Frères*," he added.

"Thanks," I replied.

A score or more motor-cars were parked in front of the Crillon like yachts in a harbor. One of them carried on its wind-shield a red card with four white stars, the insignia of an American general. Diminutive Paris taxicabs were hooting their way across the *place*. I picked my way carefully among them, and sought refuge on an "island."

From their mighty seats the eight dowagers in stone who represented the great cities of France looked impassively down on the *place*. Strasburg, decorated for well nigh half a century with mourning garlands, sat unadorned, now that she had been gathered back into the fold. Below them, almost wheel to wheel, were ranged hundreds of guns that once had been the pride of the house of Friedrich Krupp. At the first glance they seemed a most impressive proof of the victory of the Allied arms; then the eye tired of these rust-covered breeches and shattered barrels, and the whole collection looked more like a gigantic junk-pile. The obelisk had a cordon of heavy mortars and tall marine rifles; on every available spot stood broken 77's, the German imitation of the French 75's. Rolled back against the stone balustrades were cannon of all caliber, every conceivable kind of formidable weapon, including the tank *Elfriede*. Some of the guns still bore splotches of green and tan paint for camouflage, but most of them had accumulated a thick coating of rust, and their weight had caused the wheels to sink deep into the as-

phalt pavement. Boys were clambering over the heavier mortars, trying to operate the mechanism; a post-card-vender came forward with his twenty-five inevitable views of Paris. I walked carefully across the *place* to the obelisk that had come from Egypt in days when self-determination was not yet heard of.

Two doughboys on leave were minutely examining a tall marine rifle that had been cast in Essen. One of them wore the colors of the rainbow in the segment of a circle on his left shoulder, the insignia of the 42d Division. The other wore the mark of the 77th, the Statue of Liberty in white on a blue background.

"Looks as if they'd fired that bird for the last time," said the first doughboy, "but I guess it did enough damage in its day."

"There's some writing on the barrel," said the other; "there's a crown and a monogram." He scrutinized it carefully. "W — II," that's what it is. That must be for William the Second. And then there's some more. '*U-l-t-i-m-a R-a-t-i-o R-e-g-u-m,*'" he spelled out slowly.

A visiting-card from the War Lord! "The last word of kings," the motto that Louis XIV caused to be engraved upon his guns in the days when war was still the pastime of the autocrat. And here it was encountered again in Louis' old capital, but this time as a memento of the last king who had dared use this argument. It was pleasant to speculate that its presence here proved that the word of the people had been of more weight than the last word of the king. It was, so to speak, the conclusive evidence of failure.

Truly to-day the Place de la Concorde was the very hub of the great wheel that encompassed all the activities of the conference. It was a strange coincidence that this square, which had witnessed such remarkable scenes in an earlier convulsion of the peoples, should again be the center of a momentous event in the history not only of France, but of the whole world. Both the tragedies of 1792-93 and the deliberations of 1919 had their place in the struggle of the peoples toward more democratic government, and none could say but that this Peace Conference might prove the more significant event of the two. Certainly it opened most auspiciously; surely both in Europe, in America, and in the more remote parts of the earth men who aspired to a greater measure of liberty and freedom looked toward it with eager, longing eyes.

It is easy to touch hands with the past. Here on January 21, 1793, Louis XVI gave up his life that the wrath of the people might be appeased. Close your eyes as you stand here and you can see the tumbrils laden with the condemned coming slowly toward the *place*. Those very buildings that are so distinctly a feature of the square, the hôtels de Crillon and de Coislén, and the ministry of marine, dating from 1770, stood there then as they stand to-day, and the Greek façade of the Madeleine looked down upon the tumbrils as they turned into the Rue Royale from the Rue St. Honoré just as to-day it still completes the picture at the end of this street. Near this obelisk, too, was placed the guillotine. Those terraces and gardens to the east are the Tuileries Gardens, where the Bourbon


princes played, and within their confines was the Manège, or riding-school, where met both the Constituent Assembly and the National Convention, and where the republic was proclaimed on September 21, 1792. There is not a street or by-path within a stone's throw of this *place* that cannot tell a tale of the Revolution or of the First Empire or of the Commune of 1871.

And to-day the activity of the conference centers here. Follow the Rue de Rivoli, and it is but a step to the Hôtel Continental, where the Prince of the Hedjaz lives with his suite; to the Hôtel Lotti, on the Rue Castiglione, where the Belgian delegation has its headquarters; to the Place Vendôme, where the Hôtel Bristol houses the Japanese delegation, while royalty stops down at the Ritz; to the Meurice, headquarters of the single, solitary, and unrecognized envoy of Montenegro.

The noble Avenue des Champs-Élysées stretches out to the west until it reaches the arch of triumph at the Place de l'Etoile. Great chains that hang across the front of the arch are still unbroken, waiting upon the men who have met here to fashion a treaty of peace, for not until peace is signed may the soldiers of France pass under the arch. This great avenue and its tributary streets also bear evidence of conference activities. Close at hand, not far from the Place de la Concorde, are the British embassy and the Elysée Palace, where lives the President of the French Republic. Just beyond the Grand and Petit Palais is the Avenue Montaigne. The committee on public information has been occupying a house there, and a short distance beyond, toward the Seine, is the Plaza Athenée hôtel,

which is used by delegations from two distant lands, Brazil and Liberia. At No. 77 of the Avenue des Champs-Élysées is the headquarters of the Rumanian delegation; No. 80 is the luxurious Maison Dufayel, built by a picturesque Parisian *nouveau-riche* merchant for his home, and now leased by the French Government for the use of the newspaper men of the world as a club. The American Army occupies the Hôtel des Champs-Élysées, and close by the arch is the Hôtel Astoria, which, with the Hôtel Majestic, constitutes the headquarters of the British delegation. Serbia and Portugal have found quarters on the Avenue de Friedland, not far distant, and the Polish delegation is at 11 Avenue Kléber. It is in this neighborhood, too, in an obscure hotel on a side street, where the rooms have iron beds and old, cast-off furniture, that the spokesmen for Armenia send forth their appeals for the independence of their martyred homeland.

I left the Place de la Concorde and proceeded across the bridge over the Seine to the opposite bank. The river was high this month, the trees along its banks were in water half-way up their trunks, and the swift current rushed with a subdued roar under the arches. Stones of the Bastille are in those arches, which have withstood the ravages of the flood for well over one hundred years. Opposite the bridge is the Chamber of Deputies, where the government orators make resounding speeches to the deputies, obscuring rather than elucidating their policies. And this wide street is known the world over as the Quai d'Orsay, a name as familiar as Downing Street and Wilhelmstrasse; for



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

THE AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

with General Wood
Tucker H. Bliss



one block to the west, in the direction of the bridge of Alexander III, stands the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gives the *quai* its significance.

In the history of the conference this building will always take rank with the Palace of Versailles. Here the great Peace Conference of 1919 began; there it ended. For this is the seat of the plenary sessions and of the meetings of the council of ten, and within its walls gather many of the subsidiary commissions, as well as the cabinet of the French Republic. It is here also that M. Stéphen Pichon, the adroit minister for foreign affairs, directs the external policies of the French Republic — policies that have been the most direct and well defined of any of the Allies and have been adhered to with hardly a variation.

In the course of the conference I came into close contact with M. Pichon. He was one of the most accessible of men, and in his frequent meetings with correspondents I used to watch his clever manœuvres to hide what he did not wish to disclose, and yet give the appearance that he was acting with perfect frankness. We used to meet him in his *cabinet de travail*, close by the hall of the plenary sessions. You entered the room by a door that seemed set into a wall fully two feet thick — rather two doors that were connected by a mechanism and opened simultaneously — and when they closed upon you, not a sound reached you from the room without, nor were voices in M. Pichon's office audible outside. The room itself was decorated sumptuously. On its walls hung reproductions in tapestry of the Rubens series of paintings on the life of Maria de'

Medici, works of priceless value. The room seemed to belong to an age when a Richelieu held in his hand the affairs of France. But M. Pichon was always the democrat. He never sought to impress, he rather deprecated his knowledge of affairs. He described himself as a journalist; in France many men in political office have at one time or another written for, and even edited, a newspaper. At this time he was sixty-two years old and was filling the post of foreign minister for the fourth term. Like his chief, the president of the council, M. Clemenceau, he had long been associated with the public affairs of France, and it was an interesting fact, though not at all singular, that he was in Peking as the representative of the French Republic when Germany laid the basis for obtaining her leasehold of Kiao-chau and her concessions in Shantung.

These two men, M. Clemenceau, Premier of France — or, as the French call him, president of the council of ministers — and M. Pichon, minister of foreign affairs, had sounded the keynote of the French position at the Peace Conference just a few days before my arrival in Paris. As I looked over this building and thought of the history that was to be enacted there, my mind ran back to the significance of these two speeches in the Chamber of Deputies. I was in London on December 30, when they were delivered, and I remembered that the newspapers quoted M. Clemenceau in big black type because he had dealt with the question of the freedom of the seas. Later, in Paris, Paul Scott Mowrer, careful student of French affairs, directed my at-

tention to them again, and one evening at his home he went step by step over them and pointed out their unusual significance.

M. Pichon had spoken before M. Clemenceau, and because he stated the French demands so clearly, I repeat them here in the order that he gave them. They, as much as anything, are a key to the whole French diplomacy of the Peace Conference. He said:

France accepts the idea of the League of Nations.

France asks no annexations, except for a rectification of the Lorraine frontier. [This was taken to mean the inclusion of the Saar basin in the French lines.]

France asks the disarmament of all German military establishments on the left bank of the Rhine and for thirty kilometers east of the right bank.

France asks full reparation for damages done, full satisfaction, and penalties for wrongs committed.

France actively supports the new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugo Slavia, which she helped to revive.

France opposes the union of German Austria with Germany.

France declares Bulgaria shall give full satisfaction to Serbia, Greece, and Rumania.

France asks recognition of her interests in Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia, Palestine, and Armenia.

France asks a share of the German colonies.

France asks that she be given a clear field in Morocco and that any hampering conditions of the act of Algeciras be removed.

France supports the secret agreement with England of 1916.

France supports the policy of anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia, and has landed a division at Odessa and sent General Berthelot to reorganize the Rumanian Army. She will endeavor to help organize an offensive with purely Russian troops.

France will support full publicity for all agreements reached by the Peace Conference.

M. Clemenceau's address was even more significant. It was in reality an answer to an interpellation on the policy of the ministry. M. Franklin Bouillon, chairman of the foreign affairs commission and leader of the

radical party, was one of the men who sought information on the Government's policies at the conference, and because the radical party controlled a majority of the votes in the chamber, his views had weight. Ernest Lafont, socialist leader, was the other speaker, and what he said dealt principally with Russia from the point of view of the Socialist party, which considered the Government to be dealing with reactionaries. To these men M. Clemenceau said in substance:

The question of peace is a terrible question, one of the most difficult which has been submitted to the nation.

In a few days there will meet in Paris a conference of political men who are going to settle the fate of nations of all parts of the world.

France is in a particularly difficult position. It is the country nearest Germany.

America is far away and took time to come in. Great Britain responded immediately to the call of Mr. Asquith. And during this time we toiled and suffered and fought. Our men were mown down, our towns and villages were destroyed.

Every one agrees in saying that this must not begin again.

France will accept from an international organization, regarding which, however, no light has been shed, additional guaranties for France, especially if they enable us to diminish the sacrifices incurred by military preparations.

There is an old system which seems to be condemned to-day, but to which I remain faithful at this moment. The nations are organizing their defenses and are striving to have good frontiers and armaments and what is called the balance of power.

The system seems now to be condemned; but if such a balance of power had preceded the war, if Great Britain, America, France, and Italy had agreed to say that whoever attacked one of them would be attacking the whole world, this atrocious war would not have taken place.

This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, shall be my guiding thought at the conference if your confidence sends me to it, so that there can be no separation in peace of the four powers which have fought side by side.

The balance of power!

The phrase appealed to me as a historical reference. It evoked images of bygone times. I called up a picture of five men in velvet coats and knee-breeches and powdered wigs sitting with their heads close together in a little room near the palace of the Hofburg in Vienna, cutting up a map of the world with a pair of shears. They were the progenitors of the balance of power. I thought of another picture. It was that of an army of lithe, sinewy young men in khaki, marching forward with swinging gait and a song upon their lips. They were crusaders — crusaders against the evil that had been wrought by Europe's makeshift system of political readjustment. President Wilson had spoken of them in his scathing arraignment of the balance of power at Manchester just a few days before:

They fought to do away with an old order and to establish a new one, and the center and characteristic of the old order was that unstable thing which we used to call "the balance of power," a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in on the one side or the other, a balance which was determined by the unstable equilibrium of competitive interests, a balance which was maintained by jealous watchfulness and an antagonism of interests which, though it was generally latent, was always deep-seated. The men who have fought in this war have been the men from the free nations who are determined that that sort of thing should end now and forever. It is interesting to me to observe how from every quarter, from every sort of mind, from every concert of counsel there comes the suggestion that there must now be not a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set up against another, but a single overwhelming powerful group of nations who shall be the trustees of the peace of the world.

That was the construction President Wilson placed upon the balance of power. And yet almost at the time that he was speaking in Manchester, Clemenceau,

the "tiger" of France, had addressed the Chamber of Deputies in these memorable words:

"There is an old system much decried nowadays but to which, I am not afraid to say, I still hold, and that is the system of the balance of power."

All Paris was ringing with these words. At the Crillon, at the Astoria, at the French foreign office, and in all the numerous and complex bureaus that had sprung up like mushrooms in the night around the Peace Conference, men commented upon these two apparently antagonistic statements and speculated upon their import. Did they foreshadow a clash between the ideals of the New World and the practices of the Old? Had the capitulation of Europe to the ideas expressed in President Wilson's Fourteen Points been made with mental reservations, and were the Fourteen Points to become an issue at the peace table? President Wilson had proclaimed them on January 18, 1918, as the basis for making peace; Great Britain had accepted them with a reservation and France had given her assent. Italy, too, adhered to them; and the other belligerents, and lastly Germany, had acquiesced in their terms. The last point declared that the nations of the earth must join in a league that must guarantee the peace of the world. Like an afterthought it had first been published to the world; but now, through the assiduous spreading of the gospel by the President both at home and in his speeches throughout the Allied countries, it had become one of the issues of the conference, and for weeks men had looked forward to this new system that should replace the old,

“ We have the right,” said “ Le Temps ” on January 1, “ to found peace on something else than a hypothesis. Sureties are required.”

“ Peace will not be real,” said “ La Liberté ” at the same time, “ if it does not give France tranquillity.”

Peace and tranquillity — those were the ends men sought, and to attain them they used many different means. What would be the outcome in Paris? What would the nations of our own time agree upon to keep the peace of the world?

I retraced my steps by the way I had come and reached again the Place de la Concorde. The big marine gun arrested my attention. Like a great warning finger it seemed to point skyward. Would the world ever again have recourse to “ the last word of kings ”?

CHAPTER III

Concerning the relative importance of a peace conference and a foot-ball game, and how it feels to survey the great of the earth through a doorway.

A COMPANY of buglers was drawn up just inside the tall iron fence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Behind them stood a guard of honor of blue-coated *Poilus*. A black limousine rolled through the open gates. It contained a man of smooth-shaven countenance, wearing a high silk hat, and two women. At the front of the car flew a small blue flag, with the American eagle embroidered in white. The man alighted and walked up the steps of the ministry. The buglers put their instruments to their lips and blew a fanfare. The *Poilus* stood at salute.

A second limousine drew up, containing a man and a woman. The man had a slight, rotund figure, and wore a white Vandyke beard. Their car, too, flew a flag — the tricolor of France. Again the buglers blew; again the *Poilus* came to a salute. From the crowd outside the iron fence rose a mild, polite cheer.

The President of the United States and the President of the French Republic had arrived, and the greatest peace conference in the history of the world was about to open. It was January 18, 1919.

I stood outside the tall iron fence and looked not at

the notables as they alighted within the inclosure, but at the crowd that waited more or less respectfully before the gates. At most there could not have been more than five hundred persons, men and women, well attired, many probably business and professional men. Here and there American doughboys on leave leaned against the plane-trees and smoked cigarettes complacently. American girls, wearing the long blue capes of the Y.M.C.A., walked by in pairs and stopped to scrutinize the building. A nurse girl pushed her perambulator up and down before the fence and peered interestedly inside as if wondering what was interfering with her afternoon's walk on the Quai d'Orsay. There were no demonstrations; there were no shouted commands to keep order; there were no lines of rope or files of gendarmes.

I had sat in the rain with thirty thousand persons who became hysterical when one man kicked a football across an open field. I had waited with countless other thousands in the burning August sun while two aëroplanes performed simple evolutions overhead. I had witnessed one hundred thousand men on parade, and I had forgotten what event it was that called them forth. And I had come to this Peace Conference in Paris with the conviction that it was perhaps the most important gathering of influential men in one hundred years, that it would affect the fortune of hundreds of millions of white, black, and yellow men, and lay the foundations for the future development of half a world. No wonder that the crowd arrayed on the Quai d'Orsay this January afternoon disappointed me by its size.

Yet the error in judgment was mine, and the public had followed only its natural impulse. Paris would go to the races at Longchamps by tens of thousands to share in the exhilaration of a contest, but because the plenary session offered nothing more than a glimpse of two score or more men in ulsters and top-hats alighting from automobiles, Paris remained at home, where it could debate the decisions of the conference at leisure. The mental reaction which the conference afforded Paris would get from its newspapers, from the speeches in public, and from the eventual "big scene" — the signing of the treaty of peace.

While I was standing outside the ministry Baukhage of the "Stars and Stripes" came up.

"Going in?" asked Baukhage.

"I think I will," I replied.

"I hear they are very strict about admitting any one," said Baukhage. "Have you a pass?"

"Nothing but my card of identification," I replied.

"Well, maybe I've got a meal-ticket about me," said Baukhage. "Let's try it."

There are two formal entrances to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one at each end of the façade that faces the Seine. The entrance toward the west was for the delegates to the conference; the one to the east for the press. We took the latter door. The pleasant young man who had guarded the anteroom of the American mission at the Hôtel de Crillon was there; he nodded, and we passed inside.

Who should and who should not enter the sacrosanct quarters of the Peace Conference had been debated for

several weeks before this session, and this despite the fact that the first of the Fourteen Points on which the Allies, the associated powers, and the enemy had agreed to sign the armistice declared unreservedly for "open covenants openly arrived at." When the conference was about to open and it was learned that the world would be shut out from the deliberations, there was a great wave of protest, but it seemed to have no effect on the leaders of the four great powers. The newspaper men immediately made publicity an issue of their own; the Americans sent resolutions of protest to the President and to the American mission; the British placed their protests in the hands of Sir George Riddell for action; Italian, Belgian, French, and Serbian newspaper men took exceptions to the rule. The result was an announcement by the chiefs of the conference that although the detailed work would have to be done in private, plenary sessions would be held from time to time, at which the larger results of the work would be acted upon and to which the press would be admitted. M. Clemenceau, who was pointed out as one of the principal opponents to publicity, made an explanation of his stand in the Chamber of Deputies the day before the opening session. He said that publicity for debates was generally favored, but that there was one point on which secrecy must be observed. It must not be said that the head of one government had put forward a proposal that was opposed by the head of another government. It was essential that the decisions of the conference as a whole should go forth as agreed upon unanimously, despite the "friendly discussion" that might precede

them. It turned out later that even the leaders were unable to keep the world in ignorance. Delegates with a grievance were only too glad to give interviews and information anonymously in order to influence public opinion in their behalf, so that despite the alleged precautions and the reports of secrecy, everything the conference did sooner or later saw the light of day.

We passed through several rooms, and then into a long gallery which looked out upon the garden of the ministry through high double windows on one side, and on the other had three large doorways in which hung portières of heavy, wine-colored damask. The room was already filled with men, and most of them, standing on chairs and tables, were trying to look through the three doorways into the room beyond, a hazardous feat not at all easy, and which led to much jostling and many expressions of disappointment and disgust. These men represented the world outside the Peace Conference; these three doorways were the windows through which they were to be permitted to view the august personages in session, and through which they were to be allowed to hear, if they could, the discourses that fell from the lips of the rulers.

The hall beyond was the *Salon de l'horloge*, the hall of the clock, a room of which the imperialists had been unusually proud in the reign of Louis Napoleon, but which went badly with the professed aims of a body of democratic leaders. The ministry was not an old building,—it had been erected in 1853,—but the Bourbons at Versailles never perpetrated greater decorative banalities than those contained within this room. The

carpets and hangings were from Gobelin's; there was enough marble and white enamel and gold leaf to satisfy the average middle-class appetite for imperial trappings. On the large white marble mantel was the marble clock which gave the room its name; above rose a statue of Liberty holding a torch, which bore the signature, "Pollett, 1860." Amid these gorgeous surroundings democracy had come to dictate peace.

Through one of the doorways I watched the leaders as they took their seats: President Poincaré at the head of the big U-shaped table; President Wilson at his right, in the neat attire of the American business man; on the other side of the President of France, Lloyd George, Balfour, and Bonar Law. The American mission sat at the right of President Wilson, facing the assemblage, with the exception of Colonel House, who was absent through illness. Beyond the Americans, and at right angles to them, came the French delegates, M. Clemenceau, the most powerful member of the group, looking more like a bulldog than a tiger; M. Pichon; Marshal Foch, a man with a handsome, kindly face, and the firm lips of a great leader; M. Klotz, M. Tardieu, and M. Jules Cambon. Then came the representatives of Italy; Sonnino, Salvago-Raggi, Premier Orlando, Salandra, and Barzilai; and corresponding to their position, on the other side of the hall, the representatives of the British dominions and the delegates from Japan, the latter including the Marquis Saionyi, Baron Makino, Viscount Chinda, M. Matsui, and M. Ijuin. These completed the major powers, for it had been decreed that Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy,

and Japan should have five delegates each, and the British dominions two each for Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India, and one for New Zealand. Long hours had been spent in the allocation of seats, and much importance was attached to them, and it might well be said that a nation could gage its own rank and position in the world by the treatment accorded its representatives at the conference. The result had not been accepted without protests, and I could well imagine that there were heart-burnings even now among many of the able statesmen who had come to Paris as representatives of nations not classed as major powers.

Three seats each had been given to Belgium and Serbia for their martyrdom in the war, and to Brazil in recognition of its important place in South America. Two had been given China, Greece, the King of the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, Serbia and the Czecho-Slovak republic. One seat each had been given Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama. The five great powers were designated "belligerent powers with general interests," which were entitled to take part in all sittings and commissions. The others were called "belligerent powers with special interests," and were expected to take part only in sittings at which questions affecting them were discussed. In addition one seat each was granted to Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, which were called "powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy," and also were expected to appear only at sittings which specially concerned them.


There was definite objection to the allotment of some

of the seats. For instance, the newly organized Jugo Slav kingdom, which professed to have incorporated Montenegro, was not recognized by the conference; but Serbia was granted seats, and Montenegro was promised one representative, who should take his place when the political situation in Montenegro had been cleared up. King Nicholas, who had been an exile in Paris for the greater part of the war, declared that the Serbs had taken advantage of his absence and occupied his country by force, and Italy sustained his contention. The French press inquired why seats had not been awarded to Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria, when the British dominions were represented by nine delegates. The Russians in Paris were plainly nonplussed because they were not asked to act for the former Russian Empire; but the heads of the British, American, French, and Italian delegations, who arranged the procedure of the conference, were not convinced that these men possessed a mandate from the Russian people. Despite this, the Russian embassy in Paris became the headquarters of a working committee of the three anti-Bolshevist governments represented here — that of Omsk, for which Prince Lvoff was the spokesman; that of Ekaterinodar, for which M. Sazonoff, minister of foreign affairs under the czar, appeared; and that of Archangel, represented by M. Tchaikovsky. Yet Russia was not represented in any of the negotiations leading up to the treaty of peace with Germany.

One needed only to glance over this assembly of men to become impressed with the tremendous changes brought about by the upheaval of the World War.

There sat an American President, one of the dominating factors of a European conference. For the first time, too, the self-governing dominions of the British Empire were represented, for the most part by their prime ministers, as Sir Robert Borden for Canada, W. M. Hughes for Australia, and W. F. Massey for New Zealand. The delegates from India, the Maharaja Ganga Singh and Sir S. P. Sinha lent a picturesque touch to the assembly by their colorful costumes. For the first time, too, Hedjaz, the Arabian kingdom ruled by Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, was represented. Near by the quiet, self-possessed Mongolian delegates gave proof of the tremendous changes that had come about in the Orient, while the seat reserved for Liberia indicated that the black man, who had been recognized as a human being only after great argument at the Congress of Vienna, had gained admittance to the most august political body in the world in the course of one hundred years.

When the conference was formally opened, it was almost as if the board of directors of a corporation had agreed to sit down and talk of business affairs, there was so little ostentation about it all. The President of France rose, and read his address from manuscript, naming each of the states represented at the conference by name and speaking of the work that each had accomplished in the war, giving special attention to the fact that "America, the daughter of Europe, crossed the ocean to wrest her mother from the humiliation of thralldom and to save civilization. . . . The intervention of the United States was something more, some-



(C) Underwood & Underwood

THE OPENING OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS, JANUARY 18, 1919

David Lloyd George has just finished his address of welcome and Lloyd Montauy is translating it into English. M. Clemenceau sits

thing greater, than a great political and military event. It was the supreme judgment passed at the bar of history by the lofty conscience of a free people and their chief magistrate on the enormous responsibilities incurred in the frightful conflict which was lacerating humanity." He spoke in a careful, concise Gallic summary of the League of Nations that these men had determined to establish:

You do not intend this international association to be directed against anybody in future; it will not of set purpose shut out anybody: but, having been organized by the nations that have sacrificed themselves in defense of right, it would receive from them its statutes and fundamental rules; it will lay down conditions to which its present or future adherents will submit, and, as it is to have for its essential aim to prevent so far as possible the renewal of wars, it will, above all, seek to gain respect for the peace which you will have established, and will find it less difficult to maintain in proportion as this peace will in itself imply greater realities of justice and safer guaranties of stability.

But perhaps no sentence spoken by the French President reached its mark so quickly as this:

This very day, forty-eight years ago, on the eighteenth of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Château at Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus vitiated from its origin, and by the fault of its founders. Born in injustice, it has ended in opprobrium. You are assembled in order to repair the evil that it has done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world.

What happened then was another proof of the changing world. President Poincaré had spoken in French; Lieutenant Mantoux now rose and read the president's speech in English. It came about later that men spoke also first in English and that their address was then

translated into French. A new language for diplomatic intercourse had won equal honors with that which was recognized as essential throughout centuries.

When M. Poincaré's speech had been read, the President rose and the conference rose with him, and stood until he had left the hall. And then a quick, nervous little man slipped from his place among the French delegates to the chair that M. Poincaré had just vacated. He had bright little eyes that shifted now this way, now that; his head was bent forward as if to get closer to the object of his scrutiny, and the expression on his face led one to think that he had a remarkable witticism in reserve and meant to tell it at the first opportunity. It was M. Clemenceau, come to act as chairman while the Conference effected its organization.

Both President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George spoke extemporaneously on behalf of making M. Clemenceau permanent chairman of the Conference, the former in his quiet, scholarly manner; the latter with a good deal of emphasis, and with a merry twinkle in his eyes, calling the premier "the grand young man of France," a phrase that proved a puzzle even for Lieutenant Mantoux when he came to translate it into French, for "*le grand jeune homme de la France*" fails to convey the signification in French that this phrase has in English. When you looked at M. Clemenceau you felt that he must be a very old man; in fact, his old-fashioned, round white cuffs and his gray silk gloves seemed to put him back into the seventies and eighties of the last century, but when he laughed and nodded his head vigorously, you knew that he was ex-

actly as young in mind and spirit as Mr. Lloyd George said he was. And after Baron Sonnino had seconded the nomination on behalf of Italy, M. Clemenceau rose and put the question, and, hearing no nays, made a short, rattling speech. In fact, it sounded a great deal as if a schoolmaster were admonishing his pupils, for he spoke in short, sharp sentences, flinging his phrases at his audience in a businesslike monotone, refusing to adopt the postures or the inflections of the conventional French orator. M. Clemenceau presided at the election of a vice-president for each of the five great powers, and announced the order of the day: first, responsibilities of the authors of the war; second, punishment of crimes committed during the war; and third, international legislation on the labor question. Were there any objections? The chair hears none. Has any member a question to put to the chair? We must be in absolute accord. No member must keep to himself any remark he may have to make. If no one asks for the floor, the session is closed.

What was our impression of the conference as we looked through the three big doorways, as we jostled one another for places, and climbed about on the costly damask upholstery of the chairs with the gilded legs? That it was the performance of three men at the most, with two others in the background. As for the representatives of the smaller powers who sat inside the council chamber, they were, after all, spectators like ourselves, knowing as little of what was to come about as we who tried to interpret this meeting for the world. No one raised his voice in opposition to the program; no

one could have carried his point had he chosen to do so. That became patent at the next plenary session of the Peace Conference only a week later, on January 25, 1919, when the great work of preparing the draft covenant for the League of Nations was formally entered upon.

This second session had before it a motion for the creation of a committee on the League of Nations and a resolution which read as follows:

The Conference having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(a) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the associated nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international coöperation to insure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

(b) This League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

(c) The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conference.

The Conference therefore appoints a committee representative of the associated governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.

M. Clemenceau declared the resolution to be before the conference. President Wilson made a speech. Mr. Lloyd George made a speech. Signor Orlando made a speech. M. Léon Bourgeois made a speech. The delegates who were not in the sacred circle of the five great powers did what they were expected to do — listened. The exception was Mr. W. M. Hughes of Australia. He impressed one as being a man who believed in getting all that was coming to him. And it

was not really what he said that made the five great powers look at him with curiosity, but the way he said it; for his words were simply these:

"I assume that we shall have an opportunity to discuss the scheme when it is finished."

"Without any question," replied M. Clemenceau in English.

M. Hymans of Belgium likewise had something to say that was not on the "agenda," as the conference called its order of business. M. Hymans asked for an explanation of the concluding paragraph of the resolution. M. Clemenceau replied that it had been determined that the five great powers were to name two representatives each on the committee, and the other powers were to elect five representatives in common.

"But," objected M. Hymans, "that gives only five delegates to the nineteen powers that are conveniently called 'powers with special interests.'" And then he drove home his arguments:

"The only committee on which Belgium is adequately represented is the committee on reparation of damages.

"Belgium should be represented on the committee on the League of Nations because of her special international situation and her historical and geographical position.

"Belgium should be represented on the committee on labor legislation because, before the war, Belgium was a very important industrial and commercial country, ranking fifth or sixth in the list of industrial powers.

"Belgium should be represented on the committee

on ports, railways, and waterways because Antwerp is the first Allied port on the Continent, and the Belgian railways are important.

"Belgium should be represented on the committee on crimes and responsibilities because some of the worst crimes were committed on Belgian soil.

"I appeal to the fair play of the conference and of the chairman."

Evidently there were other nations that had objections to make to the prearranged program. One after the other their representatives rose and asked for places on one or more of the committees.

Senhor Calogeras spoke for Brazil; M. Trumbitch for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; M. Venizelos for Greece; Senhor Garcia for Portugal; M. Benes for Czecho-Slovakia; M. Bratiano for Rumania; M. Lou Tseng Tsiang for China; M. Dmowski for Poland; and finally M. Bidadh Kosha for Siam. It was evident that the representatives of the five great powers had overlooked something.

M. Clemenceau allowed each of the delegates from the "powers with special interests" to have his say. Then he rose to reply.

There was no mystery, he said, about the fact that the delegates from the five great powers were meeting together by themselves.

"The five great powers, I am obliged to say, are in a position to do so. At the time of the armistice they had together 12,000,000 men under arms on the battle-fields. Their dead can be counted by millions.

"If the idea, that great idea of the society of nations,

was not above the whole of our work here, it would have been possible for us, the five great powers, to consult only ourselves in the settlement. That would have been, after all, our right. Well, that has never been our thought. We have asked all the nations interested in the settlement to meet us here."

M. Clemenceau said he favored small committees because this expedited the work. He said that any power might be heard at any time, before any committee. But he wanted the great questions of the conference to come before the bureau of the five powers.

"And to give my reason frankly," said M. Clemenceau, "it is because I could not, we would not, agree that any committee should have the right to dictate to the five great powers."

That closed the incident. It was as if the minor powers had acted on the suggestion that "if you want to know who is boss around here, start something."

The great powers had 12,000,000 men under arms when the armistice came, M. Clemenceau had said. The five great powers would not have needed to consult any one had they wished. "That would have been, after all, our right."

Which was, of course, sufficiently clear to all. The basis of victory was force, and the basis of the negotiations was force. The place that each nation took in the conference was determined by its size, its influence, and its military strength. And when the truce with Germany was made permanent, it would again have to be the force mustered by the five great powers that would become the backbone of "a just and lasting peace."

CHAPTER IV

How President Wilson went across the seas with his formula for peace, and found that Europe had a few ideas on the same subject.

LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C., ran his long, lean fingers up and down the seam of the green table-cloth and studied it intently. His figure, too, was long and lean, and when he spoke he bent forward as if to get close to his audience. He was facing a table arranged in the form of a hollow square; there were blotting-pads at regular intervals, and an incandescent-light globe swung down over each of the pads. Lord Robert's class on the League of Nations had transformed the finest salon of the Hôtel Astoria into a school-room.

"The Monroe Doctrine?" Lord Robert was saying. "Well, now, the Monroe Doctrine cannot really be incorporated into the constitution of the League of Nations. No, indeed. What will happen is this: when trouble breaks out on the Western Hemisphere, the league will naturally appoint the United States to take care of it, of course."

"But will the constitution of the league specifically name the United States for this duty?" asked one of the "pupils."

"No, I do not think it will; but of course no one would think of appointing any other nation than the United States to do that work."

“And will the league interfere with immigration, Lord Robert?”

“Not at all. Immigration is an internal matter. The league will not interfere with any legislation on immigration that the United States sees fit to pass.”

This was a class in which the pupils did the asking and the schoolmaster did the explaining.

“And will there be an international army and navy? Or will the league be able to order any army and navy to fight? Will the league be able to order the British Navy to fight?”

“The British Navy? Of course not. I do not consider an international army and navy practical. Nor can the league order any army and navy to fight. The league will ask one of its members to apply force where it is needed. But that member directs its own army and navy.”

Lord Robert Cecil was the chief lecturer for the British Empire on the League of Nations. He discussed its constitution, its membership, its powers, its possibilities. He described hypothetical cases and gave practical examples of its administration of world affairs. At the same time M. André Tardieu spoke early and often on the attitude of France. In formal interviews M. Léon Bourgeois outlined the absolute essentials for the organization of the league. At the Hôtel Lutetia the American Peace Association issued bulletins and manifestos. Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts had so many thoughts on the subject that he published them in pamphlet form. C. J. Doherty, Canadian Minister of Justice, prepared a detailed memorandum. Oscar

Straus spoke in glowing terms of a roseate future under the league. Norman Angell coached from the side lines. Paris was a veritable Chautauqua.

But at the Villa Murat silence, and at the Hôtel de Crillon only a whisper now and then from Colonel House — a disconcerting whisper.

On November 4, 1918, seven days after Colonel House began his conferences with the Allied premiers in Paris on the subject of signing an armistice with Germany, the Allies formally accepted the principles of President Wilson as the basis for peace. America acclaimed them. All Europe was ostensibly in full accord. Germany agreed to them in her correspondence with the President, and in admitting her readiness to sign the terms of the armistice. And one of the fourteen principles of President Wilson, the fourteenth, in fact, was this:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

Almost like an after-thought it seemed to have been incorporated in the Fourteen Points. But it was not an after-thought. It had lingered for a long time in his mind. When on April 2, 1917, President Wilson asked Congress to declare war against Germany, when he said that the world must be made safe for democracy, he also declared:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of in-

ner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its heart.

As time went on, the President elaborated upon his theme. On July 4, 1918, he said that one of the aims of the war was

. . . the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right, and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit, and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.


And as every one was agreed, the Peace Conference placed the League of Nations first in its order of business. It was inseparable, the President had said, from the treaty of peace itself. On January 25, 1919, the Peace Conference in plenary session voted the nomination of a commission on the League of Nations, to be composed of fifteen members, two from each of the five great powers, and five from the powers with special interests. On January 27 the smaller powers chose Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia to name one representative each on the commission, and on February 6 the conference leaders permitted Greece, Poland, Rumania, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic each to name a member, on recommendation of the commission itself. So that, when its organization was finally completed, the commission included these notable men: President Wilson and Colonel House for the United States; Lord Robert Cecil and Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts for the British Empire; Léon Bourgeois and M. Larnaude for France; Premier Orlando and Senator

Scialoja for Italy; Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda for Japan; Paul Hymans for Belgium; Epitacio Pessoa for Brazil; V. K. Wellington Koo for China; J. Batalha-Reis for Portugal; Milenko Vesnitch for Serbia; Eleutherios Venizelos for Greece; Roman Dmowski for Poland; M. Diamandy for Rumania, and Karel Kramarcz for Czecho-Slovakia.

The most remarkable thing about the League of Nations was the unanimity with which the powers welcomed the idea. They may have said quietly and without emotion that they were in favor of the Fourteen Points, but when it came to the fourteenth, they shouted their approval from the housetops. Their views were unanimous on another matter — that the German colonies must not go back to Germany.

This was in keeping with point five, which provided for “a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”

It happened that just before the commission on the League of Nations got under way the representatives of the five great powers — the council of five — took up the subject of the disposition of the German colonies in the far East, the Pacific, and Africa. President Wilson thereupon suggested that they be “internationalized,” by which he meant that guardianship of the German colonies and the dependent lands of the Otto-



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

THE COMMISSION ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Seated, from left to right: Vincent Childs, Robert M. La Follette, Jr., Woodrow Wilson, and others.

man Empire should be vested in the League of Nations. The league might appoint other nations to administer these colonies, but the league would be the final authority, and the inhabitants of these lands were to have the right to develop unhampered.

The suggestion had the effect of a bombshell. Delegates from several nations who had quietly contemplated raising their own flags on the German colonies, poured out of the hotels in a frenzy and began dashing madly up and down the Avenue des Champs-Élysées in taxicabs. European and other statesmen, who were wedded to the principles of democracy, began to talk about a betrayal of their interests.

Japan demanded the possession of the Caroline Islands, including the Pelew and Mariana islands, a group east of the Philippines and north of New Guinea, between five and ten degrees north latitude. Japan likewise claimed the Marshall Islands, also known as Micronesia, a group of thirty-three small islands between four and fifteen degrees north latitude. As early as 1917 Japan had obtained the promises of her allies, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, that they would support her claims upon the German islands north of the equator.

Australia, through Mr. Hughes, its prime minister, asked for the extensive island possessions of Germany in New Guinea, including the Bismarck archipelago and the Solomon Islands, approximately 94,200 miles in extent. Mr. Hughes objected with great determination to President Wilson's plan, even though the President suggested that Australia be given a mandate for

these islands by the league. He directed attention to the fact that public opinion in Australia fully expected these possessions as Australia's share in the settlement. The acting prime minister, Watt, sent a cable message to Paris saying that this view was unanimous.

The Union of South Africa wished to extend its administration over the contiguous German territory in German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa also was expected to come under British rule. General Botha, acting for the Union, was particularly opposed to the President's scheme, and spoke at length against it.

France looked forward to extending its sovereignty over Kamerun and Togoland. Kamerun was occupied by French and British forces during the war, and an agreement was made with Britain whereby France administered five sixths of Kamerun, including the port of Duala, and the British held a strip adjoining Nigeria, including the district of Chad. The two nations agreed that in the event the Allies took this colony from Germany, this administrative arrangement should become permanent.

President Wilson wished the application of his principle to be general. Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, Minister of Defense for the Union of South Africa, had suggested a similar plan in a pamphlet published on January 10 in London, in which he took a stand against annexation of any territory of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, saying that if sovereignty was changed in any part of their holdings, the lands should be administered by the powers under a

mandate from the league, loyally and justly, with a view of observing the right of the people to dispose of themselves, the form of government to be based on the consent of the governed. But General Smuts was not willing at first to apply this system to German holdings in Africa.

Interest centered on the attitude of the delegation from Great Britain. At first its members supported the pretensions of the dominions, although they declared that they were willing to accept a mandate for German East Africa. On January 29 the British Imperial War Cabinet accepted the President's proposal despite the opposition from the dominions. The decision was far-reaching in its consequences. It made victory for President Wilson certain. It swung the dominions over to his idea. It compelled Japan to relinquish reluctantly her claims for territory and to support the mandatory principle. Within the next day all gave their adherence. Australia held out the longest, declaring that the possession of New Guinea was necessary for strategic reasons. When the decision was announced, there were delegates who declared that it struck at the very foundations of the British Empire. On the other hand it was also said that Great Britain would be much more able to solve her difficulties in Asia Minor under the system of mandates than by annexation.

When the council of five agreed upon the mandatory principle, they took the League of Nations out of the realm of fiction and made it a vital and necessary thing. The league now had its reason for existence. It had extensive territories to supervise, and the well-being

of millions of human beings, many of them not yet far advanced in civilization, to watch over and protect from exploitation. The commission on the league might now go forward with the conviction that a real business organization must be effected.

It is this commission which, sitting under the chairmanship of President Wilson, prepared the document that we now know as the covenant of the League of Nations. The covenant passed through two stages before it was incorporated in the treaty of peace. The first stage was from the time of the appointment of the commission until February 14, when it reported the first draft of the covenant to the Peace Conference in plenary session. During this time ten meetings were held. The task of receiving suggestions for a revision of the covenant was then taken up, and five more meetings were held. A committee of the commission gave two days to representatives of thirteen neutral states. The outcome was the revised draft of the covenant, which was presented on April 28 to the Peace Conference, and adopted on motion of President Wilson.

The neutral nations were heard by Lord Robert Cecil, Colonel House, M. Bourgeois, M. Hymans, M. Vesnitch, and M. Venizelos. The states sending representatives were Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela. The discussions brought out some interesting points of view. Denmark proposed that armaments be limited as soon as possible, that the control of the limitation of armaments be as complete as possible, and that the manufacture of war

implements by private firms be prohibited. Switzerland asked that its neutrality be conserved in the league. Denmark also proposed that no neutral state be expected to furnish military aid, and that its territory be inviolate. Lord Robert Cecil suggested that a neutral be expected to join in restrictive economic measures, if necessary. Sweden insisted upon the right to armies of defense for small states even under the league. The meetings were important because they showed the interest of these nations in the league.

The story of what took place in these meetings lays bare all the elements that control the progress or inspire the ambitions of nations. The commission met in a large room in the suite of Colonel House on the third floor of the Hôtel de Crillon. The delegates came together whenever they could get the time, morning, afternoon, or night, and there were several occasions when the President toiled until midnight on the league after a hard day with the council of four. The delegates spoke in French or English, as they pleased, and interpreters translated their remarks as they went along, whispering the words to those who did not understand both languages. Every day the secretaries placed before each delegate a memorandum telling exactly what progress had been made the day before. Amendments were submitted in advance, and were in the hands of every delegate before the discussion began. No detailed stenographic records were kept, and the President encouraged an informal flow of conversation, keeping it well within bounds. At one moment when the commission had entered upon a discussion of what might

happen far in the future the President remarked: "Gentlemen, I have no doubt that the next generation will be made up of men as intelligent as you or I, and I think we can trust the league to manage its own affairs." The drafting committee was composed of Messrs. Larnaude, Venizelos, Vesnitch, and Lord Robert Cecil. The covenant was set up and printed by American soldiers attached to the mission, to whom President Wilson expressed his thanks in a graceful letter just before he sailed for the United States in February.

There were days when it seemed as if the League of Nations would be nothing more than a resolution of good will between the nations. There were reports of stormy debates, of threats to leave the commission, of charges that the vital interests of nations were being trafficked away. Opponents of the league idea began to spring from all sorts of odd places, giving out interviews showing that the league was the impracticable dream of an idealist; either that, or the well-calculated scheme of the Anglo-American interests to checkmate the legitimate ambitions of all other nations and place the world in bondage. President Wilson was called by turns a crank, a dreamer, an obstructionist, a visionary, an idealist, and the greatest friend of mankind. The nations of the world were ready to enter into an agreement to keep the peace, but each wanted its own kind of agreement and its own brand of peace.

It is safe to assert that without President Wilson there would have been no covenant of the League of Nations. Day in and day out he held steadfastly to his idea,

which was that of a league as nearly remote from selfish aims as could be fashioned in an imperfect world. More and more marked, too, became the adherence of Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Robert Cecil, and the other members of the delegation from Great Britain. Critics of the President's motives found in this fact ample scope for biting invective. The shrewd Britons, they argued, recognized in the league an instrument to preserve the British Empire from external aggression and internal upheavals. The President, they said, had traded off the freedom of the seas for British help to build the league. And yet no one disputed the fact that the President had back of him the great body of public opinion not only of America, but of the European Allies.

The American mission proved especially sensitive to suggestions and criticism that came from the United States. Several times its members told me that they would gladly coöperate with leaders of thought in America if the chasm caused by political considerations could be bridged. The remarks of William H. Taft, Elihu Root, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge were carefully perused and studied. It was felt that political animus entered more sharply into the speeches of Senator Philander C. Knox and other senators who used the league as an opportunity to attack the President. No doubt the President was much to blame for the gulf that separated him from the Senate, for he had greatly antagonized its members by making the league more a personal than a national matter. His habit of keeping his own counsel, of conferring with no one when he did not consider it necessary, and of making no compromises

with public opinion was at the bottom of much of the animus. It was not long, however, before other members of the mission were in personal touch by cable with leaders in America.

It then happened that the United States, which had believed that all nations should make sacrifices to realize the great idea of the league, refused to compromise its own interests in view of the experimental character of the international body. The first stumbling-block was the Monroe Doctrine. It was patent that if the world peace was to be guaranteed by a central organization of all the powers, there would be no need for any one power to set aside any part of the world for its special field. America, which came to Europe and recognized that the oceans no longer effectively separated the continents, could not tell Europe that the Western Hemisphere was its ward. Obviously, if that could be done, Japan was entitled to set up a Monroe Doctrine for the far East, and Great Britain could assert the same guardianship over most of Africa. But the American people were not convinced that Europe had undergone a change of heart by the mere organization of the league, and although conceptions of the scope and effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine differed, there was something particularly vital to our national life in President Monroe's declaration that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power," and that any attempt to infringe on the independence of American governments would

be viewed as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The American argument prevailed; the President accepted the suggestion and placed it before the commission; Europe agreed because it could not afford to antagonize America, and Japan assented likewise, and in the final draft of the league covenant was inserted Article XXI, which says that "nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

Another American criticism was that the league might have to decide whether or not the immigration legislation of the United States was justified. The United States felt that the control of immigration was a sovereign right, no matter if it involved discrimination against the people of other nations. This point also affected the wishes of Australia, and for the very same reason, for both the United States and Australia wished to limit the immigration of undesirable Asiatics, and this might well endanger international comity, particularly in view of Japan's assertion that this branded the Japanese people as of an inferior race. Would this become a subject for international investigation? Again the President forced the issue, and a new paragraph in the covenant provided that "if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and

shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."

Withdrawal from the league was another American suggestion, and led to a provision that any member might withdraw after giving two years' notice, provided that it had fulfilled all of its obligations. The charge that the British were able to outvote all other nations in the council was met by the explicit provision that in the council each nation should have one representative and one vote, and that all decisions must be unanimous in both the council and the assembly, with the exception of votes on procedure. This was an improvement, but not yet satisfactory to all interests. Although it made the one vote of the United States equal to the six votes of the British Empire, the British group still had a veto power of six to our one. Besides, although Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa were properly self-governing dominions, this was not true of India, which had its foreign affairs ruled from London. The term "British Empire" for one of the memberships in the league also was misleading, as it would appear to cover the dominions as well as Great Britain, thus giving them double representation. The British, however, felt that the time was near when London could no longer represent the dominions in foreign relations. The Peace Conference was the first instance of their becoming signatories to an international convention on their own behalf, and as Viscount Milner, secretary of state for the colonies, said, it marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the British Empire.

Objection to having the United States obligated to ad-

minister the affairs of colonies in other continents when it was not willing to do so was met by the provision that mandatories shall be given to countries that are willing to accept them. A definition of justiciable questions was also added. Nearly all these suggestions came from Mr. Elihu Root and Mr. William H. Taft. The American delegates, however, were unable to obtain a clause providing for compulsory arbitration, another of Mr. Root's points.

American leaders also objected to having the military and naval forces of the United States placed at the disposal of the league, or of abrogating any of the sovereign rights of the United States over its armed forces and their disposition for national defense. There is, however, no provision for ordering out any army and navy without the consent of the nation itself, and it is expressly stated that the council shall "recommend" what effective military and naval force shall be contributed to protect the covenants of the league.

There remains, however, Article X, against which much criticism has been directed because it provides that "the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." It was argued that the nations might be compelled to support a member in putting down the legitimate uprising of a subject people. The word "external," however, effectively indicates that aggression must come from without. At the same time it is believed that in practical operation the other machinery of the league, including investiga-

tion, arbitration, and hearings before the court of international justice will force a just consideration of all grievances arising out of misgovernment. It was the contention of President Wilson and the other framers of the covenant that Article X must be read in connection with other articles which safeguard the liberty of action of members of the league.

France, frankly and openly, visualized the League of Nations as an instrument of protection for France. The members of the French mission made that their sole aim. They became enthusiastically in favor of the league when they believed that it would build a wall against German aggression in the future; they grew gradually lukewarm when they felt that the safeguards were insufficient. Over and over again France stated her case: secure boundaries, adequate military protection, instantaneous action against aggression.

To bring this about, France, through Léon Bourgeois, submitted to the commission on the league two amendments. The first amendment (to Article VIII) read as follows:

The high contracting parties being determined to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of armaments, their military and naval programs, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes, have appointed a committee for the purpose of ascertaining so far as possible the above information.

The second amendment (to Article IX) read:

A permanent organization shall be constituted for the purpose of considering and providing for naval and military measures to enforce the obligations arising from the high contracting parties

under this covenant and of making it effective in cases of emergency.

M. Bourgeois, who had devoted a great part of his life to projects for the maintenance of peace, and who had represented France at the peace conferences at The Hague, fought for these resolutions from the moment the commission began its work. He declared that the mere intention of the governments to give information to one another was not enough, that the "instrument of verification" was lacking. Article IX read simply: "A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military and naval questions generally." M. Bourgeois felt that means should be taken to make action effective without long debate. He contended that a system of "mutual control and mutual guarantees" of armaments gives offense to no one, when the system is universally applied. He indorsed the views of Mr. Elihu Root on the mutual control of armaments. "What is most important if we are to succeed is not to allow those who are willing to resist the league to have force in their hands. Therefore the most important point to us is the limitation of armaments." The objection to the first amendment is believed to have come principally from the British. The second amendment is the one that became known as the "international general staff" amendment. M. Bourgeois denied that it organized such a staff.

The amendments were not adopted, to the great disappointment of M. Bourgeois and the French delegates, who thereupon turned to M. Clemenceau's favorite idea

that, after all, alliances are the best guaranties, and began helping France to form a defensive alliance with Great Britain and the United States, of which more will be said later.

Another important amendment to the covenant, which also failed of acceptance, was presented by Baron Makino on behalf of Japan. The presentation of this amendment is one of the important events of the Peace Conference — one which may well have far-reaching consequences in the future. It was meant by Japan to remove the implied stain of inferiority from the Mongolian people. It read:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the high contracting parties agreed to accord, as soon as possible, to all aliens, nationals of states members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It was common belief in conference circles that this amendment was meant by Japan to pave the way for diplomatic action against the United States and Australia to end discrimination against Japanese who desired to make their home in those countries.

Baron Makino first presented this amendment to the commission on February 13, but it was not placed in the covenant in time for the plenary session on February 14. It was said in reply that the very presence of the Japanese at the conference proved that they were given equality of treatment. Baron Makino said that he would bring the subject up again. On April 11 he proposed the amendment to the commission. It re-

ceived a majority of the votes cast, but President Wilson ruled that unanimous consent was necessary, and that the amendment had therefore failed of adoption. At the plenary session on April 28 Baron Makino again repeated his effort, without success. The argument of the Japanese representative was clearly and excellently stated. He closed with these words:

I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long standing grievance, the demand that is based upon a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in future.

The defeat of this amendment may properly be laid at the door of the United States. Australia and New Zealand were strongly against it, but the United States might have forced its passage. It was a strange anomaly that the nation which typified democracy and liberty to most of the oppressed peoples of the earth was not able to countenance a clear statement of principles enunciated in its Declaration of Independence and in its Constitution. Practical considerations intervened. The Japanese amendment, even though Baron Makino said that "the immediate realization of the ideal of equality was not proposed," was so ostensibly intended to lay the basis for what Americans would consider as interference in their right to regulate immigration that its adoption by the league proved inadvisable. Moreover, the Japanese made no secret of their ultimate aim. As one of the men associated with the Japanese mission in Paris informed me; "It is not only that

we object to the fact that our working classes are barred from the United States. Our professional classes would like to go there. They comprise men of culture and training; lawyers, dentists, physicians, scientists, and technicians, who see no reason why they should be barred from the United States when that is a field where they could progress and be happy, and when America places no barrier in the way of Europeans who are no better than illiterates."

Two interesting proposals were made at this time. One was that French should be the official language of the league. The other was that Brussels should be its seat. President Poincaré of France proposed the first. He pointed to the fact that French has been the accepted language of international intercourse and that the qualities of the language make it well fitted for documents of a legal character. He said that French was the official language at the Congress of Vienna; at the negotiations of 1871, when Germany was the victor; at the Congress of Berlin in 1878; at the Madrid conference on Morocco in 1880; at the Algeciras conference and the two peace conferences of The Hague. The choice of the language was finally left to the league itself.

The second proposal threw an unusual light on the attitude of European governments toward the league. The movement to win the league for Brussels began early in the year and led to the adoption of resolutions and the writing of numerous letters to Paris. Brussels decided that the Egmont Palace was most suitable for the league, and plans were discussed for its furnishing.

Paul Hymans, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on April 11, presented the request that Brussels be named. President Wilson objected strongly to this choice and felt called upon to give his reasons. He said that there could be no reconciliation between the peoples of Europe if the woes of Belgium were to be shown to the Germans every time the league met. The league, which would include Germany as well as Belgium, could not meet in "a city which incarnates the enmity between the races — a city which has been wronged, but which makes reconciliation distant because of these wrongs." The two conceptions of the league — American and European — stood in sharp contrast. By a vote of twelve out of eighteen the proposal of M. Hymans was defeated and Geneva was chosen. Great Britain in this instance, as in that of Japan's amendment, voted with the United States, and France voted with Belgium. The remarks of President Wilson led to a bitter attack on him in the Belgian and Parisian newspapers.

The second draft of the covenant of the League of Nations was adopted at the plenary session of April 28 and was then ready to be incorporated in the treaty of peace. Although many of the nations had made concessions to the points of view of others, all pledged their adherence to the league. Many of the concessions had been made to retain the good will of the American people, for without this all Europe knew that the league would fail. The covenant was now ready for the study of all the world, for the governments of most of the world would need to adopt it to make it effective. And that Europe would approve it was a

foregone conclusion. The eyes of all the nations turned to the country from which this new charter of liberties had come. What would be the verdict of the American people?

CHAPTER V

M. Clemenceau becomes the victim of an assassin's bullet, and proves that his physique is as strong as his will is firm.

"THIS morning at 8:45 o'clock," begins a French news report for February 19, in the year of the great peace, "just after he had entered his automobile and started for his bureau M. Clemenceau was . . . shot!"

Could any announcement have proved more electrical in its effect on the Peace Conference, Clemenceau, president of the council and minister of war,—“the tiger of France,” they called him,—the man who had virtually exercised the powers of dictator since November, 1917, when the French people called for his iron hand and his indomitable will — Clemenceau, the victor, had been shot!

Truly the Peace Conference of Paris was fated to have its share of highly colored, dramatic incidents.

When word reached me the deed had only been committed a few minutes before. The day was still young as days go in Paris. The diamond tradesmen on the Rue de la Paix were slowly winding up the great iron window shutters that they put down every night in expectation of riot or revolution. Clerks, stenographers, and salesmen were still pouring out of the “Metro” station at the Opéra like a flood, and flowing out into the streets that radiate from the *place* like spokes of a wheel from the hub. Lieutenant Vallee

Appel of the 109th Infantry had just come in to tell me how rotten it feels to be transferred to the faculty of law of the A.E.F. university at Beaune when your division has been ordered to sail. Tough luck! And then a friendly Y.M.C.A. man rushed in breathlessly with the news.

"Let's go!" I cried to Appel, and in a jiffy we bolted down the stairs and into our car, and at once the chauffeur headed for the Ministry of War. Down the Boulevard des Capucines, down the Rue Royale, across the Place de la Concorde we went at breakneck speed, with just time for a glance at Old Glory flying over there on the roof of the Crillon. And the flags on the ministry of marine were still at full staff.

"Thank God!" I said to myself, "It's not a murder — yet." Then I reflected that even if it was, the ministry might not yet have heard of it, nor could the news have reached these Parisians on the *place*, going so unostentatiously about their business.

The Ministry of War occupies one of those old formal French homes that was long the domicile of men associated with the political fortunes of France. Built in 1714, it still retains its ancient paved forecourt and its formal main entrance. Marshal Richelieu, grand-nephew of the famous cardinal, lived here once, as also did Lucien Bonaparte, and now it serves the state equally as well as it served the titled folk of other days.

There were soldiers with bayonets fixed standing guard before their little toy-houses on each side of the great gate, and just within gold-braided attendants at-

tempted again to exercise their time-honored function of retarding the inquirer; but this time "journalist" proved to be the password. A blue-coated official directed me not to the offices of M. Clemenceau in the ministry itself, but to a little one-story building in an adjoining court, just around the corner from the concierge's house. It was a little plaster structure, huddled close to its larger neighbor, with tiny windows, and overgrown with vines. The whole group was a sort of military storehouse, but the little house proved to be a *bureau*, and within I found half a dozen representatives of the newspapers of Paris seated around a long table. They were listening intently to the communication being repeated to them by a man who stood at a telephone at one end of the room and emitted his information in short, sharp barks. It was indeed true: Clemenceau had been shot.

At 8:45, yes. Had left his home in the Rue Franklin en route to the ministry. Entered his limousine, as always. The car turned the corner for the Rue Delesert. Here was a little raised "island" in the center of the street. On it stood a man. The chauffeur observed him, passed on. The man raised his hand. He pointed a revolver at the car. He fired. Once. Twice. Running after the car, he fired point-blank again and again. Ten times, ten bullets. They lodged: seven in the tonneau; three at the right side, where sat the president of the council. The car turned, sped back to the Rue Franklin. The premier dismounted. "It is nothing," he said. "It is nothing." The examination showed a bullet-wound in the right

shoulder-blade, hit from behind; a flesh wound near the lung.

There was not a sound in the room but the voice of the man who snapped out his remarks in short, broken phrases. Then came quiet, disturbed only by the sound of pencils moving across the white and yellow pads of paper.

Clemenceau — "*Père de la Victoire*," the victim of an assassin, and yet these men, Parisians and Frenchmen, sat quiet and imperturbable at their work. The legend of the excitable Frenchman died there, if it had not already breathed its last in the war.

The assassin was a lad of twenty-three, an immature youngster; Emile-Jules-Henri Cottin, a worker in wood, member of a communist federation, and known to his intimates as "Mildou." He was a lad who listened intently and took seriously the whispered words of men who gathered of evenings in a communist club and spoke of the injustices in life, who advocated the abolition of all authority as the remedy for an imperfect distribution of the world's goods, and the destruction of the ruling element in much the same manner that a privileged class had been destroyed in France 120 years before.

"I am a Frenchman, an anarchist," said Cottin.

" 'The animal shoots well,' I thought when I first heard the bullets," M. Clemenceau explained to the President of the Republic, M. Poincaré, twenty minutes after the assault. " 'He shoots too well,' I said when I found myself hit. And then I thought, 'At

least my enemies will no longer be able to say that I have n't ballast in my head — lead ballast! ’ ’ ”

The hatred of men who differ in political thinking from men in public office sometimes urges them to commit violence. They see misrule in all authority, in every ruler an oppressor. Too often the blood of political leaders has flowed upon the soil of France. Within the memory of living men attempts have been made against the lives of men like M. Germain Casse, deputy of the Seine, who was attacked on December 9, 1886, by the sculptor Baffier, who thought Casse had been unfaithful to his duty as a democratic deputy; Jules Ferry, who was attacked on December 10, 1887, in the Chamber of Deputies by Aubertin on the supposition that Ferry was allied with Bismarck; Sadi Carnot, President of France, who died June 25, 1894, from a wound inflicted by the Italian anarchist Caserio. Presidents Félix Faure, Emile Loubet, and Fallières, were all the objects of attacks that did not prove fatal, and finally Jean Jaurès, the pacifist socialist leader, was shot to death on August 1, 1914, proving that neither conservative nor radical is spared.

“The condition of the president of the council is satisfactory,” said an official bulletin issued at the bedside by the physicians, Tuffier, Gosset, and Laubry. The bullets of Cottin had not made a mortal wound.

But what if they had? Did France reckon with that contingency? Was there a leader prepared to carry out the aims for national expansion that M. Clemenceau had advocated so well? Was the delegation of the republic, moved and directed by M. Clemenceau, able to

continue the far-reaching policy of its leader? Who would fight for France at the peace table with that bulldog tenacity of his — the fight for a strong, independent, fearless, and greater France, a France that should progress without the threat of invasion hanging like a shadow over her national life?

All through his career he had fought with the hitting power of a Roosevelt. He came to Paris from the Vendée in 1860, in the days of the glory of the Second Empire. His political life really began with the war in which the Prussian host first trampled upon the fields of France. He had visited the United States as a young man, taught school there, and translated John Stuart Mills's "August Comte and Positivism," and married. Then he returned to France. He gained his first public office in 1870 as mayor of the Montmartre district of Paris. He supported Gambetta, and signed the famous protest of fidelity to Alsace-Lorraine when these provinces were torn from France. He was always a patriot, he spoke always for the integrity of France. He tried to reconcile the government at Versailles with the commune at Paris, and in 1871, as a radical member of the National Assembly from the Department of the Seine, he voted against the ignominious peace treaty. He served in the municipal council of Paris, and by 1875 had become its president. In 1876 he became conspicuous by pleading for amnesty for the communards. He was courageous, he was brave, he was sincere. Strange that in these early days this man, now laid low by the bullet of an anarchist, had been the leader of the extreme Left in the chamber! But

the Left of those days, radical though it was, was far removed from anarchy.

When he reached the age of forty he was a power, and as he grew in years and experience ministries trembled when he mounted the tribune. Grévy, Jules Ferry, Freycinet felt his tremendous hitting power. Boulanger rose and fell as Clemenceau gave and withdrew his confidence. Through it all he was a confirmed supporter of the republic. Defeated eventually in 1893 for reëlection to the chamber, principally because of his opposition to an alliance with Russia, he decided to devote his whole time to journalism.

Many of the great political leaders of France have spoken daily to a large public through a newspaper. Clemenceau reveled in his opportunity. It is significant to note that associated with him in his earliest ventures were Alexandre Millerand, whom he has just made Governor-General of Alsace-Lorraine; Stéphen Pichon, now minister of foreign affairs; and Georges Langerre. In 1880 he had founded his political daily, "La Justice." In 1900 he founded "Le Bloc" as a weekly, and edited it until 1902. Again elected to the senate, he found himself able to work with the socialist radicals. In 1903 he took charge of "L'Aurore" and began the two great fights of his career, one for the revision of the sentence of Dreyfus, whom he believed innocent, and the other for the separation of church and state in France. He succeeded in both. In 1905 he warned France of the German menace in Tangiers in a series of noteworthy articles. In 1906 he became minister of the interior. Taking

the responsibility for quelling a strike of miners in the Department of Pas-de-Calais, he showed his determination by calling out the military and putting down disorder by force. This act caused the enmity of the socialists. He was never again a radical leader.

In 1907 he became president of the council, Premier of France. For two and a half years he served in this office, and one result was the growing cordiality between France and England, political enemies up to this time. Slowly they came together in that *entente* that was to prove the salvation of France when the great blow was struck in 1914. That it would come eventually M. Clemenceau saw as well as any one and better than most men. In 1912 he had already begun his fight for the law to enforce three years of military service, in order to give France a larger number of men ready for instant action when the hour struck. There were many who questioned the expediency of his plan, but none his motives.

Long before 1914 he had laid down his portfolio. In May, 1913, he was an editor again, "a free lion," as he said once, publishing a daily newspaper entitled "L'Homme Libre,"—"The Free Man." When the war came, he unlimbered his guns for victory. He demanded that every inch of the frontier be guarded by a French bayonet. He pounded home the need of a comprehensive program for the manufacture of munitions. One might have expected him, grown old in public service, to defend antiquated methods, to be a stickler for things as they were. On the contrary, he spoke

for radical changes in military and civil organization. He sacrificed all to an end — victory.

Not all that he wrote found favor with the heads of the Government. The censor's pencil eradicated much of his excellent argument. His newspaper appeared with large white spaces. Resourceful to the last, he turned the laugh on his critics by calling his journal "L'Homme Enchaîné,"—"The Man Enchained." And when all the more moderate and temporizing leaders had failed and the discontent that followed the campaign of 1917 forced them out of office, the nation turned to M. Clemenceau, whose gifts had been only partly made use of as head of the commission of external affairs. Again he became minister of war and president of the council.

When he took office they asked him what policy he would pursue. Remember his answer in that memorable November, 1917?

"*Je fais la guerre*," he said. "I make war."

It fell to him, redoubtable fighter, seventy-seven years old, not only to make war, but peace. The peace that France wins out of the negotiations is the peace of Clemenceau, the best possible peace from the point of view of a confirmed nationalist, a believer in the material growth of France, a diplomat of the old order, who demands security against aggression, strong boundaries, reparation for damages, and who believes that no crime should go unpunished. In the discussions of the modern liberals who believe in the forgiveness of international sins he takes no part; he has felt too deeply

the suffering of 1870 and 1914, and all the years of German browbeating that lie between.

Paul Scott Mowrer once characterized the four great leaders of the Peace Conference in a sentence. Lloyd George, he said, represented the liberal imperialism of Great Britain; Orlando, the anxiety and uncertainty of Italy; Wilson, the idealism of America; and Clemenceau, the fear of France. The fear — and the hope.

Those were anxious days in Paris. As the X-ray examination proceeded, and the wounds of the premier were found to be a trifle more serious than the first bulletins had led the public to believe, Paris experienced a sensation that reminded many of those dark days in 1917. At the Hôtel de Crillon Americans who had watched the tactics of the aged leader spoke of the effect his absence would have on the conference. To them he represented an antagonist of no mean talents, for he was fighting to gain a position of strategic advantages for France. Americans disagreed to some extent at least with his views on clear, explicit punishment of the enemy, and on his theory that Germany should be made to pay a sum to be determined from time to time in the future, as the amount of the damage and the assets of the German nation were more clearly visualized. America disagreed with his view that the armies of the Allies should be ready to come to the aid of France the moment an enemy appeared on the horizon. Not that America meant to deny aid to an ancient friend, but because no one in Paris could pledge the American people to a future program that involved the making of war. All these were points of conflict

between the American commissioners and M. Clemenceau, and yet they honored the man and expressed hope for his quick recovery, so that no other hands would need to take up the portfolio that he held.

After his first visit to the home in the Rue Franklin, Secretary Lansing said that the condition of M. Clemenceau was so favorable that important questions might easily be referred to him in the event his vote was needed. Besides, he gave his opinion that the work of the conference had been so well organized by M. Clemenceau and had progressed to such an advanced stage that most of it was in the hands of committees who could continue consideration of the problems before them without interruption. M. Clemenceau had been a driving force, seeking to expedite the work. He himself declared after the shooting that he hoped it would act as a spur upon the other members of the conference, so that they might more quickly come to a settlement of all outstanding problems.

Heads of states, members of the Conference, went out of their way to show their sympathy for the stricken leader. The American President spoke of his horror at the deed in a wireless message from the U. S. S. *George Washington*, then nearing New York. King Albert of Belgium, King George of England, King Alphonso of Spain, Sir Robert Borden, prime minister of Canada, King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, and Pope Benedict were among the first to send messages of sympathy. The members of the American mission in Paris expressed their resentment at the deed, and added that "they rejoiced in his providential escape and con-

gratulated the people of France that in the settlement of peace and in the rehabilitation of France they are to continue to receive the benefit of that valued patriotism and seasoned statesmanship which your excellency so strenuously and successfully exerted in their interest during the travail of war."

Their hopes were to be fulfilled. Two weeks later M. Clemenceau had overcome the dangers of both hemorrhage and infection and was back at his post. As he breezed into the conference-room on the first day back, he met his old friend and diplomatic colleague of other days, Henry White of the American mission.

"Well, young fellow," exclaimed Clemenceau, whacking the American representative heartily on the back with the flat of his hand, "have *you* got a bullet in your body?"

It came about that Cottin was duly placed on trial and found guilty, and the verdict of the court was death. And a short time later Villain, who shot Jean Jaurès, the famous socialist and pacifist, on the eve of the war in 1914, was acquitted. There was subject matter for socialist demonstrations!

It is true that there were extenuating circumstances in the case of Villain which would have suggested clemency. He had been in prison four and one-half years. He was believed to be mentally deficient. But an acquittal had not been looked for.

"How is it possible," commented the "Lanterne," "not to make this comparison which stupefies the people: Cottin for having put M. Clemenceau for three

days on the sick list is sentenced to death; Villain, who lodged a bullet in M. Jaurès' head, is absolved."

A few weeks later M. Clemenceau addressed the court asking that the sentence of Cottin be mitigated. And it was done. A sentence of imprisonment for life replaced that of death.

CHAPTER VI

An invitation to tea lures me to the Hôtel Lutetia, and I learn how 40,000,000 human beings fare on the other side of the world.

AFTER all, it was only an innocent invitation to a tea-party. It came unannounced, an engraved card in pleasing English script, saying that Mr. Lou Tseng Tsiang requested the pleasure of your company at tea on Tuesday, March 4, from 4 to 6 o'clock, and adding, in smaller letters at the lower right hand corner, "Chinese delegation, Hôtel Lutetia."

What could it mean but a cup of fragrant tea and a pleasant chat with the scholarly alumni of American universities who represented in Paris the interests of the Chinese nation? And yet it might have been said that tea-parties are not without significance. There was that little event in Boston Harbor, for instance, which began with tea, and ended with another treaty of Versailles. And Mr. Lou Tseng Tsiang, China's minister of foreign affairs, and his scholarly delegation were men entirely too valuable to their country, one must admit, to permit them to while away their time at tea-parties. The invitation suggested many possibilities.

And so it came about that a goodly company gathered on the designated afternoon in the spacious parlors of Hôtel Lutetia, on the Boulevard Raspail. Hardly a Parisian atmosphere this, for there were polished, self-effacing Chinese *portiers* at the doors, and Chinese

valets in livery in the corridors and in the anterooms. And in the salons we found those men who, if true inbred courtesy had won kingdoms, would long have ruled the world. Diplomats from the other side of the earth, immaculate in European afternoon attire; generals of the armies of China in their attractive light-blue uniforms; admirals and officers of the Chinese navy—all were a study in correct deportment and bearing.

The chroniclers who told of the gaiety of Vienna in 1814 wrote much about the brilliant receptions, the colorful salons, the gay social life that went hand in hand with the gifts of cities and the theft of provinces. The peace-conference side of Paris had developed but little colorful social life so far, and no one had even pretended to settle the fates of kingdoms and empires at a luncheon at the Meurice or a formal dinner at the Ritz. But when the social side of the Paris conference comes to be mentioned in future, no one can well afford to pass by this modest function at the Lutetia. Some of those who "assisted," as the French say, will recall it for its unique combination of political and social discussion; others will remember the wide tables that extended along one entire side of an immense room, loaded down with confections sufficient for a regiment of hungry men—confections that in a Paris devoid of pastries and bonbons seemed like the cargo of Solomon's ships come from Tarshish.

What it should be remembered for is that it was China's first formal plea to the world for release from the fetters that bound her national existence—a plea

that later was to play an important rôle in the proceedings of the conference.

Stepping into the middle of the salon, Mr. Lou Tseng Tsiang, our host, clapped his hands and beamed upon the assembly. In that wide circle he beheld the faces of men who to-morrow would carry his words to the ends of the earth. He rose masterly to his opportunity. It was indeed charming, he said, that his guests had deigned to accept the invitation which went forth in his name to meet the Chinese delegation. He spoke of the friendly relations that existed between China and the nations represented here. He touched lightly on China's position at the Peace Conference, suggesting that perhaps her wants and needs were a sealed book to the nations who dwelt in the West. It was a most happy occasion for the delegates to acquaint their guests with the aims of China. Would they listen a few moments until Mr. Chenting Thomas Wang could speak more in detail on these aims?

The minister bowed, and Mr. Wang, who has held the portfolio of agriculture and commerce, stepped forward, a quiet, self-possessed man, with well-defined Western traits, and with the key of Phi Beta Kappa at his watch-chain as ample evidence of where he got them. It was Mr. Wang, versed in the art of saying a great deal in a few words, who placed succinctly before us China's "case."


What Mr. Wang told us covered the whole field of the Chinese question. It dealt not alone with the relations of China and Japan, which presumably was close to the heart of a Chinese diplomat, but touched on all the

foreign influences in China. Mr. Wang introduced these subjects on the ground that the Chinese question was one of the few great problems that the Peace Conference must solve if it aimed to prevent or minimize the chances of war, and that, "stripped of its minor features, the Chinese question may be said to center on the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China, which has been guaranteed in a series of conventions and agreements concluded severally by Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States with Japan." Because China was a peaceful state and not a war-making state, Mr. Wang said that it was, and still is, a prey to the kind of imperialism asserting itself in territorial aggrandizement and in the creation of preferential rights, interests, and privileges in the great Chinese regions like Shan-tung, Manchuria, Mongolia, Fu-kien, and elsewhere in the rich mineral areas of the Yang-tse valley. "The solution, therefore, of the Chinese question involves the liberation or redress of China from the burdens and conditions imposed on her in the interests of an aggressive imperialism. . . . Within this category of burdens is included the system of imperialistic rights, interests, and privileges which Germany established in the province of Shan-tung in 1898 as compensation for the death of two German missionaries."

Shan-tung! Let us here leave Mr. Wang as he continues his discourse on the position of China during the war, and examine more in detail the claims that the Chinese delegation presented to the Peace Conference. For it may well be said that the arguments given to the

world at this innocent little tea-party continue to be heard in all quarters of the globe, and that out of the presentation of China's claims and the conference action thereon has arisen a controversy that may easily be the prelude to a larger diplomatic struggle.

Germany had long been on the lookout for a naval base on the Pacific coast when the killing of the two missionaries in the prefecture of Tsao-chow-fu, in Shantung, in November, 1897, gave her a pretext for forcing her demands on China. The convention of March 6, 1898, signed by Li Hung Chang for China and by Baron von Heyting for Germany, gave the latter: (1) a zone of fifty kilometers around the bay of Kiao-chau for the passage of German troops and a lease of ninety-nine years on both sides of the entrance to the bay of Kiao-chau with certain islands; (2) the concession to construct two lines of railway in Shantung and to develop mining properties located within fifteen kilometers on each side of the railways, both railways and mining enterprise to be developed by Chino-German companies; (3) compelled the Chinese Government to agree to make the first offer to German manufacturers and merchants whenever foreign assistance of whatever nature was needed in the province. This led to the building of the Tsing-tau Tsinan railway, 434 kilometers long, opened in June, 1904, and the Yang-tse and Tzechwan collieries and the Chinglingchen iron-mines. The mining interests were transferred to the railway corporation in February, 1913. On December 31, 1913, China granted Germany the option to finance, construct, and supply materials for two lines



U. S. Official Photograph

THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE



of railway, one at Kaomi to a point on the Tientsin-Pukow line at Hanchuan, and the other from Tsinan to a point on the Peking-Hankow line between Shunteh and Sinhsiang, and on June 10, 1914, Germany obtained a loan option on any westward extension of the Tsi-nan-Shunteh, the Chiefu-Wehsien and the Tsining-Kaifeng lines. In 1911 Germany relinquished the rights to mines on each side of the railway, retaining only those named heretofore.

These concessions gave Germany a sphere of influence with amazing possibilities of development. The Chinese looked on with grim foreboding and despair in their hearts. For Shan-tung represented both material and sentimental interests for the Chinese. It was the birthplace of Confucius. It possessed 38,347,000 inhabitants, entirely Chinese, limited to the resources of agriculture in a province of 35,976 square miles — a population almost as large as that of France in a territory only one fourth as large. Tsing-tau was the best natural harbor in north China, and its natural outlet. Within the zone of the German railway concessions were two immense coal-fields and an iron-mine containing 40,000,000 tons of high-grade ore. Three big bituminous coal-fields, with a reserve of at least 1,000,000,000 tons, the only fields within economic distance of the Yang-tse iron-mines, were within the zone of the southern extension of the railroad.

This sums up the tremendous value contained in the concessions wrested by Germany from China. It gave Germany a great sphere of interest similar to those acquired by the other European powers, for Russia had

asserted her influence in northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and the basin of the Hwoangho; Great Britain was recognized as the predominant power in the valleys of the Yang-tse-Kiang and in the center of China, and France made her power felt near Hainan and Yuma in the south. To offset the German concessions at Kiaochau, Russia took Port Arthur; England, Wei-hai-wei; and France, Kwang-chow-wan.

China asked the Peace Conference for the direct restitution of all the concessions held by Germany. But it happened that they were now in the hands of another nation — Japan, herself a belligerent and the chief actor in the ousting of the Germans from the far East. Japan early in the war asked Germany to withdraw from China “in the interests of peace in the far East.” As Germany failed to comply, Japan declared war on August 23, 1914, and began a land attack against Tsing-tau. A small number of English troops also took part. Tsing-tau was garrisoned by 5,250 German troops and Austrian reservists, and fell November 7, 1914. The Chinese Government asserted that Chinese territory was crossed during this operation, and protested that this was a violation of Chinese neutrality. At the conference in Paris Chinese delegates informed me that China made an attempt early in August, 1914, to join the Allies in the war against Germany and also to participate in the attack on Tsing-tau, but was advised not to do so, because this action would lead to “complications with a certain power.” By reason of the defeat of Germany the territory was occupied by Japan and placed under military control.

Now comes the transaction that has given rise to much controversy and which the Chinese placed before the Peace Conference as an act of wanton aggression. Japan presented to China the proposals for a treaty known as the twenty-one demands, which were handed direct to Yuan Shih Kai, the President of China, by the Japanese minister in Peking, Hioki, on January 18, 1915. The first group of these demands dealt with the province of Shan-tung and virtually made the Japanese the successors to the German rights and concessions. The proposals brought about a series of notes and conferences, during which several modifications were permitted; but on May 7, 1915, Japan delivered an ultimatum to China, demanding that they be accepted forthwith. The manner in which these demands were presented has been described as grossly overbearing even by Japanese writers. China, however, was not in a position to reject the demands, and agreed to them on May 8, 1915. An attempt to sound out the European governments and the United States and get their support had brought more or less non-committal replies, the United States alone informing both cabinets that it would not recognize any infringement of the policy of the open door in China.

As the Peace Conference did not meet to consider the whole topic of the rights of foreign nations in China and how they were obtained, it is obvious that only that part of the twenty-one demands which deals with Shan-tung actually concerned the conference. The documents presented to the Peace Conference show these to be the following clauses:


In the first group of the treaty we find a provision that "the Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the province of Shan-tung." There follow stipulations that China will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan "if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chiefou-Wehsien railway line," and that China agrees to open "suitable places in the province of Shan-tung as commercial ports."

On the same day Japan agreed to restore to China the leased territory of Kiao-chau Bay in the following agreement:

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiao-chau Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiao-chau Bay to be opened as a commercial port.
2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international concession may be established.
4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

Finally, on September 24, 1918, in an exchange of notes between Baron Goto, Japanese minister for foreign affairs, and Tsung Hsiang Chang, Chinese minis-



U. S. Official Photograph

THE JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Left to right: seated, Baron Makino; Marquis Saionji; Viscount Chinda
Standing, Mr. K. Ijima and Mr. H. Natsui

ter at Tokio, the following engagements affecting Shantung were entered into:

1. Japanese troops along the Kiao-chau-Tsinan railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Toinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsing-tau.

2. The Chinese Government may organize a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiao-chau-Tsinan railway.

3. The Kiao-chau-Tsinan railway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expense for the maintenance of the above-mentioned police force.

4. Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of the above-mentioned police force, at the principal railway stations, and at the police training school.

5. Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiao-chau-Tsinan railway administration as part of its staff.

6. The Kiao-chau-Tsinan railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise.

7. The civil administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished.

Japan having obtained the rights to the German properties from China, thereupon asked her allies in the war — Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy — to sustain her in the possession of these properties when the subject came up at the Peace Conference. This the four allies agreed to do. The British ambassador at Tokio gave Japan the assurance that Great Britain would support Japanese pretensions to Shantung and to the German islands north of the equator, in a note dated February 16, 1917. The French ambassador gave the same assurance for his government on March 1, 1917. Russia replied favorably on March 5, 1917, and Italy gave a verbal assurance on March 23, 1917. This action was only slightly different from that taken at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia, like Germany, had leaseholds in China which Japan coveted, this time

in the Liao-tung peninsula. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, Russia ceded her leases to Japan. China agreed to the transfer by a treaty signed December 22, 1905, which also gave other concessions. The Treaty of Portsmouth was recognized by the powers. In the matter of Shan-tung Japan reversed the process, getting China's consent first, and then Germany's consent by her signature of the treaty of peace.

There was, however, this fundamental difference in the disposal of the leaseholds: Russia negotiated her peace with Japan, but Germany did not negotiate her peace with Japan. The terms regarding Shan-tung were forced on Germany by Japan, Great Britain, France, and the United States, sitting as a Peace Conference. Italy was not represented at this meeting, but was fully in accord.

There was also this difference: At Portsmouth China interposed no objection to the transfer of the Liao-tung lease. At Paris China definitely opposed the transfer of the Shan-tung lease and concessions.

This subject was taken up by the Council of Three, Signor Orlando being absent, on April 22. Japan demanded that the terms of her agreement with China be recognized by the Peace Conference as binding; that is to say, when the question of disposing of Germany's property in Shan-tung came up, Japan presented a prior claim, together with the promises by Great Britain, France, and Italy that they would recognize this claim.

There was nothing unusual or new in this action. Leaseholds change hands daily in business life, and the

owner of the property is frequently coerced, by such gentle threats as obtain even in our business practices, to give his unwilling consent. But —

The council heard Japan in the morning and China in the afternoon. China emphatically objected to the transfer. China said consent had been wrung from her under duress. She asked that the Peace Conference disregard the treaty of May 8, 1915.

Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau declared they meant to stand by their promises to Japan. They had deviated from these promises in the case of the Pacific islands north of the equator, but were not ready to do so in the case of Shan-tung, for a very good reason. Both Great Britain and France were in the same position as Japan. They had wrung great concessions out of China. They could not repudiate Japan's leaseholds without repudiating their own.

Japan knew this. Japan also knew that she could throw the whole Peace Conference into confusion by either withdrawing or refusing to join the League of Nations. Japan was virtually gaining nothing but manacles for her grasping hands by joining the league. But the league without Japan in it was unthinkable.

This was the situation that confronted Woodrow Wilson on April 22, 1919.

China took the position that when she declared war with Germany she abrogated "all treaties of whatever nature between China and Germany. On this ground China contended that the Shan-tung leaseholds reverted to herself. The fact that China had already agreed to their transfer to Japan does not appear to play any

part in the Chinese argument. Yet China did not formally denounce the treaty with Japan. She was not strong enough to denounce it because none of the Allies was ready to back her up by force if Japan used force.

President Wilson faced a treaty that was valid in international practice, as valid as the Belgian treaty of neutrality which Germany violated and Great Britain defended, and which, by the way, was originally forced on Belgium.

President Wilson had two courses open to him. They were: first, he could repudiate the China-Japanese treaty of 1915, and denounce Japan's practice. By doing so he would: (a) make an enemy of Japan; (b) denounce also Great Britain and France; (c) lose the League of Nations, and (d) probably see Japan occupy Shan-tung without regard for treaties or leaseholds, with the consent of Great Britain and France. The United States could then protest, but could save nothing for China unless she went to war alone.

Second, he could acquiesce in the transfer of the leaseholds, hold Japan to her promises, and eventually, through the League of Nations so educate public opinion that it would be considered dishonorable and immoral for a nation to hold leaseholds, privileges, and concessions gained under duress and against the will of the people concerned. This would (a) bind Japan before the world, (b) save the face of Great Britain and France, (c) save the League of Nations, and (d) prevent an open rupture with Japan.

President Wilson, being a man of the highest type of courage, chose the second course.

After the Peace Conference had agreed to the transfer of the Shan-tung leaseholds, Japan consented to join what is known as the four-power consortium to furnish future loans to China. This is an agreement between Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan that future loans to China shall not be made by any one power, but that all four shall share in the privilege of making the loan. This is believed to be the beginning of an important change in the administration of Chinese affairs, as it is understood that Japan has agreed to consider it binding on all loan privileges which were to come to her in Shan-tung as a result of the treaty. This method of making loans to China was advocated by the Government of the United States many months before the consortium was agreed to. It is a constructive, forward-looking step, which will help take China out of financial bondage to Japan. The consortium has been strongly opposed in Japan, and recently certain Japanese groups have declared themselves for keeping Manchuria and Mongolia out of the zone of operation of the consortium.

I have tried to present the question of Shan-tung impartially as it came before the Peace Conference. The whole subject, even in Paris, awakened the most extraordinary recriminations. The campaign of publicity for the Chinese case was so well handled that it won numerous friends even among the working classes of France, who heretofore had received little informa-

tion on the subject. The government-controlled press of Paris had given only meager space to the Chinese arguments and had taken it for granted that Japan's demands would be sustained. In the more liberal newspapers of England and America, however, the cause of China won vigorous adherents. Japan was pictured as a grasping power, gradually arrogating to herself great strips of Chinese territory, growing to dangerous proportions as the result of a war which enriched her in land and gold, while it left old Europe impoverished. Even among the delegations at the conference there were men who became cool and reserved in the presence of a Japanese diplomat. The fact that Japan had become an adept at the land-grabbing methods which European countries had practised for centuries was resented most by those who unconsciously had been her tutors.

Despite the storm of abuse in the liberal press and the wave of criticism that swept the United States, the commissioners of Japan at the Hôtel Bristol went about their business unmoved. Their deportment was a model of Old-World diplomacy. They knew the value of silence. On the rare occasions when they spoke it was in keeping with the best traditions of diplomacy. The day after the informal Chinese tea at the Hôtel Lutetia,—the one that I described at the opening of this chapter,—the Marquis Saionyi, chief of the Japanese delegation at the conference, felt impelled to give his point of view. I recall the sensation I experienced when he gave it — a feeling that this man knew exactly what he was going to get out of the Peace Conference. From that moment I no longer doubted that Japan's

claims would be fully sustained, and yet all he said was this:

Japan adheres with full sympathy to the great project of establishing peace upon just, impartial, and solid foundations. We envisage this question not so much from the point of view of the entire world, as from that of the far East, where we have been obliged to assure the maintenance of peace by arms on three occasions in the last half-century. We are happy that humanity is able to perceive the first rays, rather feeble as yet, of the new era in which right will definitely prevail against force.

I have the firm conviction that China will understand our just and legitimate aspirations and that she will join completely with Japan for the maintenance of peace and general security and for the progress of civilization in the far East. The foundation of the League of Nations will help essentially to dissipate the current prejudices of men relative to their true interest.

When the decision in the case of Shan-tung was made public, the Council of Four — or, rather, three, for it was attended at this time only by M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and President Wilson, in the absence of Signor Orlando of Italy — was roundly excoriated in the liberal press, and President Wilson was charged even in his own country with betraying the interests of democracy. The Chinese delegation published an able and well-written protest in which it declared that the council “has been bestowing upon Japan the rights not of Germany, but of China; not of the common enemy, but of a weaker ally.” And the delegates pointed to the fact that Japan’s new rights jeopardized the safety of Peking, “which becomes an enclave in the midst of Japanese influence.” The delegation again said that when China declared war all German rights were considered abrogated and that all territory therefore reverted to China, a claim, however, which was made after

the rights in Shan-tung already had been signed away.

In China itself the news resulted in demonstrations against the Japanese and a boycott against Japanese merchants, which the Chinese Government would have been powerless to stop had it wished. Colleges closed, and street disturbances took place in cities like Canton and Tsientsin. An attempt was made to instruct the Chinese delegation at Paris to sign the treaty of peace with a reservation objecting to the decision affecting China. It was said that this view was advocated by a number of the delegates from other nations, and that even two of the three who made the decision at one time thought this might be a proper parliamentary manœuvre. At the height of the storm the President of China, Hsu Shih Chang, attempted to resign, and it was reported from the Orient that he had refused longer to take orders from the military party, which leaned toward the Japanese and was endeavoring to stop demonstrations against the treaty of peace. The resignation, however, was not accepted, but the Chinese delegates in Paris refused to sign the treaty of peace without reservation and the Council would not permit signature with a reservation.

That is the story of a picturesque controversy at the Peace Conference, which opened with a tea and, as in the case of the tea thrown into Boston Harbor, may yet end with another treaty of peace.

CHAPTER VII

A dip into President Wilson's mail-bag and what I found there — Also throwing light on what happened when the smaller nations heard of self-determination.

“EXCUSE me,” said a voice at my elbow one morning just when I had become engrossed in the “Matin's” argument that France could accept not a cent less than 320,000,000,000 francs from Germany — “Excuse me, but have you seen O'Kelly?”

I looked up, and beheld the glowing, smiling face of Van Steen, friend of oppressed nationalities, special advocate for small nations. You have heard of the tracer of lost persons. Van Steen was a tracer of lost causes. At least he seemed to find it a pleasure to plead for a good many unpromising ones. Unknown to fame was his name, obscure even, although the heads of states and members of delegations at the conference read it at the bottom of numerous letters that cluttered up their mail — read it, and straightway forgot it. For Van Steen was one of that great body of men who hovered about the tag ends of the conference. There were, in fact, three distinct groups: first, the inner circle of delegates from recognized states; second, the great body of assistants and experts who helped the conference machinery to revolve; and third, the fringe of hangers-on. In America the fringe would be called the lobby. Van Steen belonged to the lobby.

“Good morning,” he said, and then repeated his inquiry, “Have you seen O'Kelly?”

Of course he meant the redoubtable emissary of Eamon de Valera, "president of the republic of Ireland," who, true to Gaelic tradition, spelled his name, "O'Ceallaigh." I confessed that I had not seen him.

"O'Ceallaigh is in town," said Van Steen. "I am trying to find him. I have a grievance to register. Have you read in the 'Times' how certain Irishmen are desecrating the memorials of Englishmen who fought in the Boer War?"

I had not read the articles. Van Steen turned to a large, bulging portfolio that he always carried — a portfolio that had once been black, but now looked rather gray and worn about the edges. He delved for a moment within its dark recesses and brought out a booklet of his own making, which contained clippings from the "Times," neatly arranged in the order of their publication.

"The Irish who are petitioning this conference for recognition of their republic," said Van Steen, "have been perpetrating outrages on memorials to Englishmen who fought in the Boer War. Now I want to ask O'Ceallaigh to tell them to stop it. It's wrong."

"No doubt about that," I said. "But to what shall I ascribe this sympathy of yours for British memorials?"

"I am interested in the cause of Boer independence," said Van Steen, with a chuckle that apparently had nothing to do with his statement. "When the Irish attack Boer War memorials, the British get the impression that the Boers and the Irish are fighting together, and they begin to see visions of the disinte-

gration of the empire. But it is not true. The Irish Sinn Fein party has declared for a republic. The Nationalist party of South Africa has declared its readiness to appoint delegates to visit England and confer with the king on the subject of independence."

"Then there is actually a movement for independence in South Africa?"

"Most assuredly, yes," replied Van Steen. "In fact, it is my hope that the people of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, who lost their independence in a war that the world condemned, but did nothing to stop, in time may come back into their own by grace of President Wilson's statement to Congress on January 18, 1918, on 'the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.'"

His remark sent my memory back a score of years. South Africa! The Boer War! Lord Roberts, Kitchener, Kruger, Botha, Smuts, Dewet, Milner! The Jamieson Raid! The Siege of Ladysmith! Boer parades in the United States, Boer funds and public meetings, Boer petitions to Congress! The stirring animosities of those times had passed quickly from among us, and we now counted the Boers as a happy and contented lot. To-day our minds were occupied with the Balkans, with Germany, with the Letts, the Finns, the Czechs, the Poles, and we had no time to give to people whom we thought had been assimilated years ago. Were not the Boers happy and prosperous under a British administration? Did they not have

a large measure of self-government in their Parliament of the Union? Did not Botha and Smuts come voluntarily to give their genius to Great Britain, the latter even standing sponsor for a plan for a league of nations which surely radiated confidence in the aims and abilities of the British world empire? Why should South Africa come up again now as a subject of discussion, perhaps controversy?

Was it possible that there was no such thing as a true conquest by the sword?

These thoughts flitted quickly through my mind while Van Steen continued to describe the Boer movement. I remembered that he had told me he was of Dutch descent, and that over a score of years ago he had been associated with a legation in Paris that no longer existed.

“The South African nationalists,” he said, “declared that they would send deputations to England to confer with the king on the subject of independence. They received a reply from Lord Buxton, the governor-general, who said that the secretary of state for the colonies informed him that his Majesty’s government regarded the South African constitution, the government, and the parliament of the Union as alone qualified to speak for the people of South Africa. Thereupon delegates were named to go to Paris and lay the situation before the Peace Conference. The British authorities made an objection to one or two of the delegates, but on the whole did not oppose the idea. General Christian Dewet and Pieter Grobler were, I believe, stopped from sailing; but General Hertzog, Sen-

ator Wolmarans and Dr. Malan were given credentials."

"Then the British were really willing to let men who actually aimed at secession spread their views at large?" I interrupted.

"Yes, they were," replied Van Steen, with a chuckle that was characteristic of him. "The British have always believed that it's a good idea to let men with a grievance blow off steam. However, before these men sailed, a number of things happened. When they boarded a British vessel at Cape Town the crew struck, declaring they would not sail with traitors. So they were compelled to take a Dutch ship for New York. From New York they will sail eventually for France. Some time this summer they should arrive here."

"And then?" I said.

"Then they will place before the Peace Conference the aspirations and hopes of the people of South Africa and ask for aid," said Van Steen. "They count first of all upon the sympathy and unofficial help of President Wilson."

President Wilson! What a beacon light of hope that name had become to all the aspiring, discontented, aggrieved, oppressed, and inarticulate peoples of this earth!

"Listen," continued Van Steen. "I have prepared a letter to the President on the subject. I want you to read it and tell me whether it is the proper thing to send. My experience, as you know, has been entirely with European cabinets." He chuckled again; in fact, he laughed to himself, as if at a humorous reminiscence. "If the head of a European cabinet gets a letter that

does n't quite agree with his ideas of what should be on this earth, he throws it into the waste-basket. I am informed that letters addressed to your American representatives, however, are always read and generally acknowledged."

Van Steen handed me his letter to the President. It was simple and to the point. President Wilson may remember it; at least he will find it in his files. It asked the Peace Conference to take up for consideration the subject of recognition of the annexation of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic to the South African states of the British Empire. While I read, Van Steen watched me with that curious expression of suppressed mirth that was characteristic of him.

"That is going back a long way in history," I commented.

"It concerns a very fine point in diplomacy," said Van Steen. "In the case of both the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, at one time called the Transvaal, the act of annexation of 1900 was never formally reported to the foreign cabinets, so that there is no official recognition by the other nations on record. Technically, therefore, these two states may be said to exist, and therefore entitled to be considered for membership in the League of Nations. Do you think that will interest your President?"

"I think that our President came here to make peace with Germany," I replied, "and it does not seem fair to ask him to sit in judgment over all the lost causes of the earth."

“Your President has spoken with conviction of justice to the small and oppressed,” said Van Steen, “and on that ground I mean to appeal to him for other nationalities as well.” He tapped his bulging portfolio as he spoke.

I had on my desk a great collection of letters, circulars, and printed matter that had come in the week's mail. Every morning saw the pile increase; every evening there were more books, maps, pamphlets, and personal pleas than there had been the night before. There could be no unemployment among the printers of Paris. The presses must be running day and night in every attic and basement in Paris, grinding out tons of appeals and propaganda for consideration by the delegates at the conference. As for the letters to the President, copies were freely made and sent to the journalists. I picked up half a dozen letters at random and showed them to Van Steen.

“Here are more letters from the President's mail-bag,” I said. “Let us see what they are about.”

Together we perused the first letter. It was signed by E. A. Omar, president of the Egyptian association in Great Britain, and had been sent from the Imperial hotel, London, April 26, 1919. It read:

The Egyptian Association in Great Britain beg to record its strong protestation against the recognition by the republic of the United States of the illegal protectorate imposed by Great Britain on the undefended and unarmed nation of Egypt during the course of this war. They beg to remind the president that his act is a complete violation of his well known principles of justice and fair play to the weak as well as to the strong nations. They beg further to record that the president should, before giving a decision destructive to the legitimate claims of a small nation, have at

least allowed the Egyptian side to be heard. They further most sincerely and humbly desire to impress the fact that the Egyptians, having been denied the elementary principles of justice which requires a hearing of an aggrieved party before a decision is given against it, cannot be held responsible for whatever developments might further occur. The Egyptians cannot still believe that the president has given a final decision to the effect that the case of Egypt would not be heard in an open and just tribunal, and that the mandataries which the whole country have unanimously elected should return home unheard and full of agony and disappointment.

Van Steen read it without comment. I picked up another letter. It was in French and signed Sean T. O'Ceallaigh, *deputé de la conscription du college green, Dublin, représentant à Paris du gouvernement provisoire de la republique Irlandaise*. It was accompanied by a memorandum in English which began: "On behalf of the Irish nation, whose accredited representative I am —"

"Not entitled, however, to sit at the peace table," commented Van Steen. I read from the memorandum:

At the general election last December the issue, and the only issue, placed before the Irish peoples was the independence of their country, and by a majority of more than three to one the representatives elected by the constitutional machinery of the ballot box are pledged to the abolition of English rule in Ireland. In none of the small nationalities with which the Peace Conference has hitherto occupied itself is the unanimity of the people so great; in none has the national desire for freedom been asserted so unmistakably and with so much emphasis. Following upon the general election an Irish national assembly has met; an Irish republic has been constituted and proclaimed to the world; a president has been appointed and with him ministers to direct different departments of state; a program of domestic policy has been issued, and an appeal has been addressed to the nations of the world to recognize the free Irish state that has thus been called to life. But while the national will has been declared and the mechanism of free government is ready, the former is being stifled

and the latter paralyzed by England's ruthless exercise of military power. The president is a fugitive; the Irish parliament is forced to conduct its business in secret; the most elementary civil rights are abrogated; courts-martial are sitting at every center and the gaols are filled with prisoners, victims of every brutality and indignity, whose only offense is that they have sought the freedom of their native land. It is in these circumstances that the Irish nation, through me, addresses the peace conference.

Mr. O'Ceallaigh asked the conference to take up the case of Ireland because that nation "manifestly comes within the scope of the principles that have been indorsed by the civilized nations," and protested explicitly against the adoption of Article X of the covenant of the League of Nations, by the terms of which members undertake "to preserve and respect as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all states members of the league." Mr. O'Ceallaigh did not wish the nations to guarantee Great Britain in the possession of Ireland.

The case of Ireland has become so important a factor in American politics and in Anglo-American relations that the story of what actually took place at the time of the Peace Conference may be recounted here. When the Sinn Fein leaders first announced that they would ask the Peace Conference for a hearing of their claims for independence, a titter of amusement might have been heard in more than one of the delegations in Paris. Ireland was purely a British matter, they argued, and no one would be so foolhardy as to antagonize the British Government by even suggesting that this was fit for international attention. The British themselves discounted the strength of the Sinn Fein party, and gave little heed to the results of the elec-

tion, which showed that this party had made a tremendous gain in adherents over the nationalists. Then twenty-five members of the Sinn Fein who had been elected to seats in the British House of Commons met on January 21, 1919, in Dublin and formed the "Dail Eireann," or Irish Parliament. A goodly number of them wandered into jail as a result of their political activities, including Eamon de Valera, "president of the republic." Three men were appointed to go to Paris to present the Irish case, Count Plunkett, Arthur Griffith, and de Valera. On February 3, de Valera made his spectacular escape from the Lincoln jail under circumstances that caused a good deal of amusement at the apparent stupidity of his jailers. The imminence of his appearance in Paris was foreshadowed, and O'Ceallaigh attempted to pave the way for his reception at the conference. But the British would have none of it.

At this juncture American intervention made an international matter of the Irish question. A convention of Irish societies of the United States appointed three delegates to visit Paris and try to get aid for the cause of Irish independence — Edward F. Dunne of Chicago, former governor of Illinois; Michael J. Ryan of Philadelphia, former public service commissioner of Pennsylvania; and Frank P. Walsh, at one time joint chairman of the War Labor Board. Besides, an attempt was made to get a promise from President Wilson. A group of representatives of the Irish societies called on him at the Metropolitan Opera House in New

York city on March 4. They reported that they asked the President the following question:

“Are you prepared to advocate before the Peace Conference the right of Ireland to dispose of herself according to the principles laid down in your fourteen points?”

President Wilson is said to have replied:

“Surely you do not think that I can answer this now?”

The delegates then told him that they would get his answer in Paris. Then the American House of Representatives by a vote of 216 to 41 passed a resolution asking the American mission in Paris to consider favorably the Irish claims to the right of self-determination — a resolution typical of the influence foreign elements in American politics frequently exert on a body that depends upon the popular vote for its existence. When Messrs. Dunne, Ryan, and Walsh reached Paris they called immediately on President Wilson and Colonel House. The British authorities gave them the right to visit Ireland, and their visit became the occasion for Sinn Fein demonstrations that caused alarm in British circles. When they returned to France, Secretary Lansing informed them that their utterances in Ireland “gave deepest offense to those persons with whom we are seeking to deal. Consequently it has seemed useless to make any further effort in connection with the requests which you desire to make.”

This letter brought a hot rejoinder from Walsh, who declared that the party had conducted itself properly

in Ireland and had violated no promises. An attempt was made to win the consent of men from the British dominions to a hearing of the Irish case before the Peace Conference, and Prime Minister Massey of New Zealand and Prime Minister Hughes of Australia were said to have viewed the matter favorably, but Borden of Canada was reported opposed to the project. On June 11 President Wilson had a conference with Walsh and Dunne, and was said to have agreed to do what he could unofficially. It appeared unlikely, however, that the conference would act officially, for the reason that the so-called Irish republic was not actually performing the functions of a *de facto* government in Ireland.

X The three Americans inflamed public feeling still further when they published a report of cruelties and hardships said to have been inflicted on Irish political prisoners in British jails, and the whole subject assumed international proportions because the sympathetic attitude of Americans of Irish birth or descent in the United States affected the good relations existing between England and America. The success of the League of Nations seemed threatened because the opponents of the league joined hands with the Irish in denouncing Great Britain, asserting that the league was merely an attempt on the part of the British to dominate the world order through the United States. Groups that had been covertly pro-German during the war also joined in the agitation because it embarrassed Great Britain. It became increasingly clear that no matter whether the Sinn Feiners were justified or not in their demands for independence, the time had come



Photo by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

David Lloyd-George, Prime Minister



Photo by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

TWO LEADERS OF THE BRITISH DELEGATION

Arthur James Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

for the British to set resolutely to work to give Ireland political tranquillity, freedom from exploitation, and a measure of self-government, thereby eliminating a dangerous element not only from British politics, but from American affairs as well.

"It looks as if there is a lot of work ahead for the British Empire," I told Van Steen when we were considering the case of Ireland. "I should n't wonder if several years will elapse before they get around to your nationalists in South Africa."

"I hope for the best consideration for my cause," said Van Steen, "but there must be a good many other nations appealing to President Wilson besides the three we have considered."

I looked over the letters again. Here was the duplicate of another addressed to the President. It was from "La Mission Corréene, 38 Rue de Châteaudun, Paris," and began:

"Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to submit for your perusal a copy of the claim of the Korean people and nation for liberation from Japan, which my delegation has filed with the Peace Conference." The letter was signed by J. Kiusic Soho Kimm as representative of the provisional government of Korea.

"On what ground does he base his claim for recognition?" asked Van Steen.

"On the ground that one man, the Emperor of Korea, under the coercion of Japan, signed away the independence of his nation by the treaty of August 22, 1910, after Japan had recognized the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea in the treaty of

Shimonoseki with China on April 17, 1895. He asks that this act be annulled."

"I suppose he cites reasons why the delegation seeks this annulment," said Van Steen.

"Yes." I read the headings quickly. "Japanization and Prussianization." "Expropriation of Korean Landowners." "Banning the Korean Language and History." "Controlling Korean Education." The argument had been well presented. I picked the following sentences at random:

Imprisonment, banishment or worse might be the penalty if some Korean should be tempted to recite to the children of the soil a traditional story or song or some folk lore telling how men fought and died for Korea in other days.

Korean history cannot be taught and after the student has advanced a little way he must stop school altogether.

Nearly every wealthy Korean is obliged to have a Japanese overseer at his house controlling his properties and finances.

And it is not a little interesting to note that an American investigator in the course of his inquiries on the state of Korea under the Japanese found that no family in some places was permitted to own the Korean kitchen knife, which has been in common use from time immemorial. One such knife had to be shared by five or six families, and when not in use had to be hung at a spot in full view of the beat of a Japanese gendarme.

Finally this line struck my attention: "The policy of the prize pig." The paragraph below it read:

The "improvements" loudly advertised in the annual reports of the Korean government general are made either for the encouragement of the Japanese settlers or in the interests of what may be truly described as the policy of the prize pig—for much the same reason that a breeder fattens his pig for a show.

"The man who prepared the Korean memorandum to President Wilson," I said, "knew a great deal about the methods of American publicity. Shall I go on?"

"I don't think it necessary," said Van Steen. "When I consider that all these people are appealing to President Wilson, I wonder when he will get around to my poor Boers."

"And these are not all," I said. "His mail-bag is jammed full to the very top every day. I'll wager that there are a dozen more appeals in this pile of letters alone."

For curiosity's sake, we ran through them. Van Steen took a pencil and set down the name of the nationality, and opposite it something about its wishes. The list looked like this:

Albania — Nationalist group seeks autonomy and eventual independence, the country to be placed temporarily under the guardianship of one of the powers. "The Stars and Stripes have appeared in Albania. A new era of approaching peace and happiness is dawning on the clouded and blood-stained horizon of the Balkans. The torch of the American goddess of Liberty has been lifted, and we hope it will not be lowered until each and all Balkan races are redeemed and restored within their racial lines in accordance with the dictates of the impartial justice advocated by President Wilson."

Armenia — The delegation from the Armenian republic, headed by A. Aharonian, its president, asks recognition of an independent Armenian state formed by the union of the seven vilayets and of Cilicia with the territories of the Armenian republic of the Caucasus, under the special guarantee of the Allies and the United States or under the League of Nations, with a special mandate for twenty years to one of the great powers.

Croatia — Dr. Raditch signs a protest against the usurpation of sovereign powers by the Serbian Government over the autonomous nation of Croatia, and asks the conference to guarantee self-government to the Croats and organize the greater Serbian state along the lines of a federative republic like the United States.

Esthonia — A delegation seeks recognition of the independence of Esthonia, the plea having been put personally to President Wilson during his visit to London, and being repeated now before the conference.

Finland — Dr. Adolf Torngren and Dr. Y. Hirn, delegates to the Peace Conference named by General Mannerheim, ask recognition of the independence of Finland and a guarantee of its integrity.

Georgia — The delegates Cheidze and Tsertelli present their claims for the recognition of the independence of the republic of Georgia, in southern Russia, and assert that it was never conquered, but voluntarily entered into a union with the czars and now takes back its ancient rights.

Kouban — M. Bytch, president of the legislative assembly of Kouban and head of the delegation in Paris, asks recognition of the independence of Kouban, in Russia, and help in a defensive fight against the Bolsheviki.

Kutso Vlachs — Rumanian elements in Albania seek autonomy under the protection of one of the great powers, preferably Italy.

Lebanon — Nahoum A. Mokarzel, delegate of the Lebanese League at the Hôtel Continental, seeks the reconstitution of Lebanon in its historic and natural frontiers, with a constitutional and independent government with French collaboration.

Lusatia — Serbs living in this ancient margravinate, which was divided between Saxony and Austria by the Congress of Vienna, ask independence and close relations with the Czecho-Slovaks.

Persia — M. Mochaverol Mamalek, minister of foreign affairs for Persia, and the Persian mission in Paris, ask the Peace Conference to give back its old frontiers, and its political and economic independence, as well as restoration of the integrity of the country by the evacuation of all foreign troops and reparation for the enormous damage committed by the armies that used Persian territory during the war. Persia submits that it has been a theater of war and that, through distinct declaration, it "joined the protests made by the entente against the violation of international law committed by Germany, especially against the submarine warfare."

Ukraine — M. Sydorenko, president of the delegation from the republic of Ukraine and Dr. Paneyko, vice-president, seek recognition of the independence of this republic, which they assert is fighting the Bolshevism of Lenin, the reaction of Denikine, and the alleged aggression of the Poles in their territory.

"And there are people in this world," said Van Steen, when we had completed the list, "who think this Peace Conference should have finished its work in six weeks at the most!"

CHAPTER VIII

How the Prince of the Hedjaz pitched his Arabian tent in the apartments of a Parisian hotel, and how he disconcerted the plans for a Jewish Palestine and a French Syria by his modest request for the empire of the califate.

FROM Mecca, the city of the Kaaba, from the holy sites of western Arabia, which the world of Islam approaches only on its knees, came the Emir Feisal to plead the cause of Hussein, King of the Hedjaz, before the four most powerful Christian judges of the earth.

The flavor of the eternal romance of the East is in this story of the rise of Hussein, custodian of the holy temple of the prophet in Mecca. And bound up with this mission of the Emir Feisal is the intrigue and calculated cunning of the diplomacy of the Western World. The war has obscured the romantic battle waged in the midst of the Arabian desert by the horsemen of the King of the Hedjaz, but in the story of the Peace Conference the mission of the Emir Feisal stands out like a patch of dazzling color against a drab background.

Only a few years before the war Hedjaz was a vilayet in western Arabia, known principally for its numerous holy places of Islam, inhabited by Arab traders and groups of wandering Bedouin tribes, with a population at the most of little more than half a million. To-day Hedjaz is spoken of as an independent kingdom, aspir-

ing to the hegemony of all the Arabian-speaking world, seeking trade routes that for decades had been the object of German intrigues in Constantinople, asking title to seaports with famous names and inland cities of the ancient califate of Bagdad, and offering to be the spokesman internationally for hundreds of thousands of men of alien race and tongue. Neither the conservative, liberal, nor extremist elements of the ancient Empire of Russia, a world of nearly two hundred million people, had been able to force a way to the peace table. Montenegro, a recognized nation and one of the first victims of the Austro-German avalanche, knocked in vain at the doors on the Quai d'Orsay. But the mission from Hedjaz, coming to Paris in flowing robes and turbans, obtained two delegates to the Peace Conference for little more than a song.

To hear why, and to learn the story of the new Arabia, I, too, one day joined the pilgrimage to Hedjaz.

One might well expect to visit the son of the sherif of Mecca in a tent glowing with brilliant colors, on the fringe of the Arabian desert, there to find him munching figs and dates and surrounded by Arabs in flowing robes of wool. It seemed incongruous that my path should lead to the velvet-carpeted corridors of the Hôtel Continental, on the Rue de Rivoli, and that I should be ushered into a suite of rooms immaculate in white enamel, resplendent with red damask hangings and generously endowed with heavy crystal chandeliers. But there was an Oriental touch that compensated for the lack of Eastern surroundings. In the corridor before the door of the emir stood a coal-black negro, tur-

baned and robed, his features immobile, but his eyes flashing. Inside the rooms were other turbaned negroes, picked men of the prince's body-guard, who spoke in low, guttural tones as they bowed and performed the slight offices of hospitality for a stranger.

The Arabs of the prince's entourage wore European attire, but the moment they donned their long robes of black wool and added the picturesque turban, which was held by a number of gold cords about the brow, they seemed to transfer themselves across the seas into the atmosphere of the land from which they had come. And finally when the emir entered the room, also wearing a long, trailing black robe and a gold-colored head-dress, the Parisian surroundings were forgotten, and I was in a land that has been a secret orchard from the days of the Israelites to our own.

It was true; the emissaries of Hedjaz had come out of the desert to Paris to ask for an empire.

The emir is a quiet, soft-spoken man of about thirty-five. He has the look of a scholar, the modest demeanor of a man of refinement and cultivated tastes. For sixteen years he lived in Constantinople, a hostage at the Ottoman court for the good behaviour and loyalty of the ruling house of Hedjaz. It is said that he best loves classical and philosophical studies. It was almost with an air of apology that he sketched the claims of Hedjaz on a map of Asia Minor. The greater part of the map, including Arabia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and most of Syria, had been shaded with a lead-pencil.

"This is the Arabia for which we are asking the Peace Conference," said the prince. He pointed on

the map to a point as far north as Alexandretta, on the coast, and then indicated all the territory south of a line drawn eastward to Diabekr, the Tigris River, Tekrif and Madekik, and stretching some distance beyond Basra.

"In America we think of Arabia as a land of deserts south of Palestine," I said.

"All who speak Arabian are Arabs," said the emir, modestly, but decisively, "and where they live is Arabia."

Ahmed Kadry of Damascus, the prince's personal physician, supplemented the statement.

"In the territory indicated," he explained, "most of the inhabitants speak Arabian, although there are populations there that do not speak it. Many foreigners believe the Arabs in the south to be simply Bedouins. But that is not true. The Bedouins are nomadic Arabs. The word 'bedouin' means 'dweller in a tent.' The Arabs are scattered all over Arabia proper, Mesopotamia, and Syria, which of course includes Palestine."

The emir nodded vigorously in assent.

"Then you are asking for sovereignty over this territory?" I asked.

"Eventually, yes," he replied. "At present, however, we seek only the federation of all the Arabian lands. It may be that the conference will see fit to grant autonomy to certain districts in Asia Minor or to extend the protectorates of great powers over wide areas. With that policy we are, of course, in sympathy. We fought with the Allies in the war, and when we threw off the yoke of the Turk and declared Hedjaz inde-

pendent, the British were the first to recognize us and to extend their help."

At this moment an English officer in khaki, who wore an Arabian turban like the others, came unobtrusively into the room. He was a man of medium height, with smooth shaven, regular features. He had a fine face, a strong, well-modeled face, with a splendid chin and well-set eyes that took a friendly interest in everything. He was introduced as Colonel Lawrence. I had heard before that he had played an important part in the campaign of General Allenby in Palestine, and realized at once that this was the modern English Warwick who had become a topic of conversation, and who was credited with being the principal power behind the mission of the King of the Hedjaz. Wilson, Clemenceau, Foch, Lloyd George — these were figures that all the world knew and acclaimed; but the world did not know Colonel Edward Lawrence, who proved to be one of the picturesque, versatile men of the conference, and whose name will be met again in the future.

I shall never forget the words in which Colonel Lawrence described himself, after the first few pleasantries had been exchanged.

"Indeed, I'm not a diplomat," he said. "I'm not even a soldier by profession. I'm a student. I was in Asia Minor on a scientific mission when I became interested in Hedjaz. I suppose I was asked to help because I knew something about the country. I should like nothing more than to get out of uniform and back to my studies."

Then he told the story of Hedjaz.

“The King of the Hedjaz was a vassal of the Turks,” said Colonel Lawrence. “By controlling the king, the Turks also controlled Mecca and maintained their hold over Islam. When the British began to invade Turkey, the King of the Hedjaz came to us and asked that we recognize him as an independent sovereign, feed his army, and equip and pay his troops in a campaign against the Turks. He made no request of a political nature, saying merely that he would come for his reward after the war. We accepted. The moment that Hedjaz rose, the Turks could no longer depend on their Arab troops. They were compelled to turn their Arabian fighting units into labor battalions. From that moment the Turk was doomed.

“We landed arms and rations from Egypt and India on the Red Sea and paid the troops of the king. The nucleus of his army was made up of tribesmen who had deserted from the Turks. The king grew stronger as the war progressed. At the time of the armistice he had fifty thousand men in the field. His fighters performed brilliantly in battle, and his horsemen led in several charges. And now he asks that all the Arabs be recognized as one people under his sovereignty. When at the end of the war the king went on foot from Medina to Aleppo, he walked every step of the way on Arabian soil.”

The emir had become a listener. Colonel Lawrence had become the real spokesman of the delegation from Hedjaz.

“We do not urge that the King of the Hedjaz should have direct sovereignty over all this territory as yet,”

he continued. "It would be better to divide it into autonomous zones, forming the beginning of a great Arabian confederation. The zones should be placed under a protectorate, named by the League of Nations. This would prevent exploitation by selfish interests."

"Does not this plan conflict with the proposed Kingdom of Jerusalem?" I asked.

"There is as yet no Kingdom of Jerusalem," replied Colonel Lawrence. "The country is integrally a part of Arabia, but the King of the Hedjaz has no objection to giving autonomy to the Zionists in the land they ask, from Dan to Beersheba. I think this can be done with success."

The remark was translated for the Emir Feisal, who had been listening intently, but who does not speak English. He nodded his head.

"We have a certain kinship with the Jews," he explained in French. "Both Jews and Arabs are Semitic. We are cousins."

The face of the prince to some extent bore out this assertion. It was a face of fine lines, a well modeled forehead, a large, sensitive mouth, and a swarthy complexion, with a bit of a beard such as might have been worn by the patriarchs of old. But the lines of his nose were straight.

"What interest, if any, has Great Britain in your plan?" I asked of Colonel Lawrence.

"The interest of Great Britain is non-political," he replied. "Great Britain is the protector of so many Moslems that it is to our interest to see that Mecca is not exploited. If the Moslem world thought that Great

Britain had undue influence over Hedjaz, it would make trouble for us with the Moslems in India."

"What hope do you have that your plan will succeed?"

"We have obtained the support of Great Britain," said Colonel Lawrence. "What we need now is the support of the United States. Once we gain that, I am sure the whole scheme can be put into the hands of the League of Nations."

The turbaned black men of the Arabian desert served tea and cakes. Tea is the beverage over which the fate of the world is being determined at this conference. We talked of many things, and it seemed to me that I had opened a new window on a little-known corner of the world.

The next day I sought out a friend who possesses an intimate knowledge of French foreign affairs.

"I have just made an interesting discovery," I said. "It is the story of the rise of the house of Hedjaz, the successor to the ancient califate of Bagdad, destined to rule again in the high places of the medieval calif."

"It is an iridescent dream," he remarked briefly and, I thought, not without a touch of bitterness.

"How do you explain the phenomenon of the King of the Hedjaz?" I asked.

"Great Britain," he answered sharply.

"What interest has Great Britain in Hedjaz?"

"Well, the 'Temps' says it cost the British five and one half million francs a month for the expenses of Hedjaz by the end of last summer, and that over two and one half million francs were paid monthly to the

Emir Feisal as chief of the Arab Army of the North."

"And why did Hedjaz, a country without influence, whose help in the war was hardly as important as that of the minor countries of the Continent, get two delegates at the Peace Conference?"

"Because Great Britain urged it, and France acceded. Confronted with the wishes of the two most interested powers, the United States gave its consent," said my informant. "That is all. By the way, as you are interested," he added, "I would advise you to consult the secret agreement between France, England, and Russia, the geography of the Suez Canal and the route to India, and the story of French and German commercial enterprise in Asia Minor. If that does not suffice, come to me again."

We go back then to the secret treaties. Truly Trotsky, commissioner of foreign affairs for soviet Russia, was a friend of the uninformed when he rummaged in the czar's lumber-room and found these little helps to an understanding of secret diplomacy. One of them is a memorandum reporting the result of negotiations at London and Petrograd in the spring of 1916. It outlines the following zones of influence in Asia Minor:

France and Great Britain are disposed to recognize and to protect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states under the suzerainty of an Arab chief, in two zones in Asia Minor. France will have the right of priority of enterprises and loans in its zone, and Great Britain the same privileges in its zone. France and Great Britain in their respective zones alone will furnish foreign counselors and functionaries at the request of the proposed Arab state.

In the zones France and Great Britain will be authorized to establish a direct or indirect administration or any control they

desire or judge suitable to establish after an understanding with the Arab Government.

France is to receive as her zone the coast strip of Syria, the Addansk district, and the territory bounded on the south by a line running through Ajutab-Mardin to the future Russian boundary, and on the north by a line running through Ala Daga, Kosanya, Ak Daga, Yildiz Daga, Zara, Egin and Kharput.

Great Britain acquires as her zone the southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and reserves for herself in Syria the ports of Haifa and St. Jean d'Acre, Haifa to be a free port for French commerce.

Alexandretta in the French zone is declared a free port for British commerce.

With the aim of conserving the religious interests of the Allied powers, Palestine, with the sacred places, is to be separated from Turkish territory and is to be subject to a special régime by agreement between Russia, France, and England.

I soon found that the French regarded the claims of Hedjaz as decidedly antagonistic to the wishes of France in Asia Minor. Moreover, it was felt that the manner in which Hedjaz had been quietly supported by Great Britain at the conference indicated that Great Britain was trying to gain a wider sphere of influence in Asia Minor than the original secret agreement permitted. Most confusing, however, was the fact that although the Hedjaz delegation expressed the warmest friendliness for the Zionists who wanted a Jerusalem of their own, the English Zionists repulsed their overtures and declared emphatically that the new Jewish state must be free from all Arab interference, and that no arrangement giving them autonomy under the nominal sovereignty of Hedjaz within an Arabian confederation would be countenanced.

As early as February 6 the storm broke. From a discussion of the relations of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles, the council of the five, including the President

of the United States, the prime ministers of France, Great Britain, and Italy and a representative of Japan, turned to hear the cause of Hedjaz, presented by the Emir Feisal.

In his memorandum the Emir Feisal named six divisions of Arabia in which he was interested: Syria, which he regarded as sufficiently advanced for autonomous government; Irak and Djezireh, both parts of Mesopotamia, which he said should come under the protectorate of "one of the great powers" for the early exploitation of their resources; Hedjaz, which was completely independent; Nedjed, in the interior, and Yemen, on the Red sea, which were considered able to regulate their affairs with the help of Hedjaz and without interference from the Peace Conference. As for Palestine, the memorandum set forth that the enormous majority of the population was Arabian, but that, not wishing to assume responsibility for regulating the affairs of the many races and religions represented here, Hedjaz was willing that this also should come under the protection of a great power, the dominant position of the Arabs being meanwhile recognized.

The hearing aroused considerable French antagonism. The attitude of the French Government may be guessed partly from the comment in the semi-official newspaper, "Le Temps," which directed attention to the fact that the "great power" which Hedjaz desired should be given a mandate in Mesopotamia and Palestine was none other than Great Britain, and that this was hardly in keeping with the declaration of the Arab king that he was under no political obligations to

the British. The "Temps" moreover said of Hedjaz that "its history is brief, but its appetite is very great," and spoke of "the substitution of a Bedouin imperialism for a Turkish imperialism."

Frenchmen said bluntly that if the dream of Hedjaz were realized, Hedjaz would become the center of a great "fictional" empire running from Akabah and perhaps Ma'an on the north as far south as the British protectorate at Aden, including all Arabia, and also all Turkish territory where the Arab tongue is spoken, including Syria, Alexandretta, Kurdistan, and Mesopotamia. The French also said that Syria was under the rule of the Bedouin Arabs only from A. D. 635 to 656; so that Hedjaz could not contend that it was recovering historic rights for itself.

A few days after the Emir Feisal appeared before the council another attempt was made by Hedjaz to build up its claim. This occurred at the plenary session of the Peace Conference on February 14, when Rustem Haida, in commenting on the covenant of the League of Nations, which had just been read by President Wilson, contributed this gratuitous kick at the Anglo-French agreement affecting Asia Minor:

In clause 19 of the covenant we read propositions particularly applying to the nationalities that have been liberated from the Turkish yoke, and there the word "mandate" is used, but the definition of that word is not given. It remains vague and undefined. On the interpretation that will be given to that word depends the freedom of liberated populations. This will be seen when the discussion which it is not intended to begin to-day will be instituted. For the present I wish to say that this article leaves to the nations liberated from the Turkish domination the right to choose the power from which they will ask help and ad-



Photographed by Signal Corps, U. S. A

THE EMIR FEISAL, SON OF THE KING OF THE HEDJAZ

Standing behind the Prince are Mohammed Rustum Bey Haider, secretary to the Prince, General Noury Said Pacha, chief of staff of the Prince; Captain Pisoni of the French Colonial troops, Colonel Edward Lawrence of the British Army and Captain Hassan Bey Kadri, aide de

vice. Now, we know that there is in existence a secret covenant to divide this nation of ours without consulting us. We ask whether such a convention, from the very fact of this covenant, has become null and void. We thank all the powers for the part they have taken for the drafting of an act the result of which will be to give welcome guarantees to all the small nationalities.

Now comes the second chapter in this story of near Eastern intrigue. When the Zionists of England rejected the pretensions of Hedjaz to sovereignty over Palestine, the affair became more confusing than ever to the lay mind. Ostensibly Hedjaz was in Paris with the full consent of the British Government, which had even helped it get a hearing. On the other hand there was no doubt that the Zionist movement, which aimed at autonomous government for the Jews of Jerusalem under a British protectorate, was opposed to the aspirations of Hedjaz. Moreover, to some extent the Zionists had already obtained the favor of the British Government for their enterprise, for there was on record a declaration made by the British secretary of state for foreign affairs to Lord Rothschild, which read: "His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country." This declaration had won the approval of President Wilson and of most of the governments represented in Paris. To observers at the conference it began to look as if the British

were divided between Hedjaz and Zion, and that one group was evidently striving to extend the sphere of British influence much farther than had ever been contemplated either by the Zionists or the French.

On March 1 the case for Zion was placed before the Council of Ten by the representatives of the Jews in Palestine, Dr. Nahum Sokolow, Rabbi Weizmann, and M. Ussischkin. They spoke on behalf of a home in Palestine for Jews who recognize no nationality but their own, who favor a revival of the Hebrew national consciousness and of the Hebrew language. They set forth that the present Jewish population was only 100,000, but that there was room for 1,000,000 Jews. They asked that a Jewish state be delimited out of Syria from Dan to Beersheba, and that it be placed under the protection of Great Britain.

On the same day the representatives of the American Jews, Julian W. Mack, Louis Marshall, Stephen S. Wise, and Bernard G. Richards, who were instructed to speak for 3,000,000 Jews of the United States at a convention held in Philadelphia in 1918, submitted to President Wilson their views on how this trusteeship of Palestine might be administered to aid the Jews. They suggested that the Jews there be represented in executive and legislative bodies and in public office, that communities be encouraged to become autonomous, that assistance be given from the public funds for the education of the inhabitants without distinction of race or creed, that Hebrew be made one of the official languages, that the Jewish Sabbath and holy days be proclaimed days of rest, and that a citizenship of Pales-

tine be constituted and recognized under the protectorate of the mandatory power.

Not all of the arguments advanced on behalf of a Jewish Palestine were based on religious or racial grounds. A part of British opinion declared that such a state would be a bulwark for British rule in the East. The Suez Canal and the British Empire in Asia were considered vulnerable through Mesopotamia and Egypt. There was constant danger of religious agitation that might become anti-British in character. A Jewish Palestine would safeguard the canal and the East. The British Palestine committee advanced the argument that the organization of a Jewish state would win the favor of the 3,000,000 Jews in the United States for Great Britain, many of whom occupied places of influence and trust, and so help offset the suspicion of Great Britain's motives that is frequently expressed by Americans of Irish and German descent, and which is fed by the historic picture of England in American school-books. A few significant sentences from the declaration of this committee may throw light on this argument:

Great Britain must either get into very close association with the United States or run imminent risk of a clash with the United States. . . . A war between England and America would probably be the death of both countries. . . . Close association between England and America would be the surest guarantee of world peace. . . . With all these powerful elements arrayed against good relations between England and America it is plain that this country will need to rally in America all the friends she can if the catastrophe of a breach is to be avoided. . . . American Jews have not merely been pro-ally, but specifically pro-English. . . . Any action by the British Government which could be justly interpreted as wanting in fidelity or cordiality to the great Jewish ideal of a Jewish Palestine would be counted in America by American Jews as a breach of faith.

When the Jews in Paris made their plea to the Peace Conference, a letter breathing the spirit of most friendly sympathy and interest was written by the Emir Feisal to Dr. Felix Frankfurter, one of the Americans supporting Jewish aims in Paris. The letter declared:

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home. . . . The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist; our movement is national and not imperialist; there is room in Syria for us both.

The letter further declared that the aims of both the Jews and the Arabs had been misrepresented to the Arab and Jewish peasantry, and closed with the statement that there were differences not on principle, but only on matters of detail, and added the hope that these might be adjusted by "mutual good will." Throughout the pages of this remarkable letter I seemed to hear the voice of a young and talented diplomat, a man who wore a turban, but had the uniform of an English colonel beneath his flowing robe.

The attitude of the Emir Feisal may have been strongly conciliatory, but the Arabs in Palestine did not seem to agree with him. Reports reached the conference that wide-spread anti-Zionist movements were on foot. Threats of violence against the Jews were reported to Paris. The news made a painful impression. The delegates who were not directly interested in the fate of Asia Minor began to feel that Palestine

was far from being a unit on the subject of its future government. The American delegates expressed themselves at a loss to judge the situation properly. They had not taken a decisive stand on the claims of the King of the Hedjaz, because the United States was not intimately interested in the disposition of Mesopotamia and Syria except in the general application of the principles of President Wilson. They preferred that these questions should be settled first by the powers directly concerned. On the other hand, they were disposed to look favorably upon the scheme of Jewish self-government in Palestine, because of pressure brought to bear by the Jews at home, and because of the American desire to aid oppressed minorities to develop unhampered.

Paris was the center of several movements against a Jewish Palestine. The French Government was lukewarm to the idea at first, and French Jews as a whole showed little interest. An organization called "Les Amis de la Terre Sainte" began issuing pamphlets attacking the movement. The antagonism of the French Government, however, was not thought to be based on religious grounds, but rather on a suspicion that Great Britain was getting a little too much influence in Asia Minor. By the time the Jewish delegates came before the Council of Ten the views of the French Government appeared to have undergone a change, and M. André Tardieu, the wide-awake member of the French delegation, declared that France would not oppose placing Palestine under an English mandate. This helped clear the atmosphere.

But the Peace Conference was not yet ready to act.

The problem of Arabian sovereignty involved the Jewish Palestine, and the creation of the Jewish Palestine affected the disposition of Syria and the secret agreement regarding Asia Minor as a whole. Other questions came up,—those of the Turks in Anatolia, the Greeks on the sea coast, the future of Constantinople, the califate, the proposal of an American mandate for Armenia,—all more or less connected with the settlement of the problems of Hedjaz and Palestine. The Peace Conference finally determined that it was insufficiently informed. It voted to appoint an international commission to visit Asia Minor and gather data on all these questions. The Americans named Henry Churchill King, president of Oberlin College; Charles R. Crane, who represented President Wilson in a diplomatic mission to Russia in 1917 and was treasurer of the American committee for Armenian and Syrian relief; Professor Albert Howe Lybyer of the University of Illinois; Professor George Redington Montgomery of New York University, who was special assistant to the American ambassador in Constantinople in 1916; and Captain William Yale. The British named Sir Henry McMahon, a student of Indian and Egyptian affairs, and Commander D. G. Hogarth, a scholar well versed in the problems of the near East.

The appointment of the commission was not regarded with a great deal of enthusiasm in American or British circles, for it was not at all certain that these men would present a unanimous report; and if they did, it might not be approved by the conference even then. Experts had made investigations before, had reported,

and had seen their reports thrown out. A thorough inquiry might take many months. But the delegates to the Peace Conference felt that it would be months before they got around to the treaty with Turkey, and the commission might well employ the time available till then. The departure of the international commission was delayed, however, and finally there was left only the American body, which inaugurated a series of hearings throughout Asia Minor and during the summer amassed a vast amount of information. It returned to Paris the latter part of August convinced that the United States should accept a mandate in Asia Minor.

So much for the Emir Feisal and the picturesque rise to power of the King of the Hedjaz. His case having been presented, the emir sailed for home. But he did not forget to send a worthy gift for the hospitality he had enjoyed. On June 4 it was reported that a new Arabian mission, composed of Arab officers and notables, had embarked on a French cruiser for Marseilles. At the head of the mission was General Noury Said Pacha, chief of staff for the Emir Feisal and well known in Paris. Among his effects the general carried sixteen blooded Arabian steeds, the gift of the King of the Hedjaz, through the Emir Feisal, to his excellency, the President of the French republic. Colonel Lawrence had gained the consent of the British and hoped to win the Americans to his point of view. Was it likely that the sixteen blooded Arabian steeds of General Noury Said Pacha might help win a favorable opinion from the one great power that remained to be appeased?

CHAPTER IX

The story of a little town called Fiume, and how the amazing unanimity with which all parties concerned applied the Fourteen Points almost disrupted the Peace Conference.

IF you walked rapidly along the Boulevard des Capucines from the Place de l'Opéra to the Madeleine, you might never notice the Rue Edouard Sept. A most unostentatious street it is, gliding quietly out of the boulevard at the first turning beyond the Rue Scribe; and yet, had you walked here on the day of which I am going to speak, you might have been struck by the unusual activity manifested here. Large closed limousines passed in and out; a messenger on a bicycle hurried down the *rue*; a uniformed *functionnaire* from some bureau or other arrived with formal-looking envelopes; a man dragged a mail-bag along the walk, and disappeared around the bend. You were prompted to follow. The windows of an art shop halted you for a moment; you glanced at the tempting display of magnificent colored engravings, at the work of Poulbot, Jonas, and Hansi. Then you passed on, and scarce three hundred yards beyond the *rue* lost itself in a sort of arcaded circle of buildings that constitute the Hôtel Edouard Sept, and there, in the center of the circle, you found the large equestrian statue of King Edward VII, from which both the *rue* and the hotel take the name.

Two soldiers in uniforms of olive-green were on guard before the hotel. Above the entrance flew the flag of the House of Savoy. The soldiers nod informally, and you pass into the hotel, and here, for the period of the Peace Conference at least, you stand upon the domain of Italy.

Paris has faded away; in this cul-de-sac you do not even hear the steady, drumming noise of the big motor-busses that run from the Bastille to the Madeleine; no maniacal tooting of motor-horns annoys you, no ringing laughter of a group of American doughboys on leave comes to your ears. This might be Rome. The very atmosphere of this reception-hall is like that in one of the quiet hostelries round about the Pincio or on the Via Nazionale. The man in the Prince Albert who comes forward to take your name is assuredly direct from Italy; the placards on the walls are Italian; on the tables in the lounge just beyond lie the "Tribuna," the "Stampa," and the "Corriere della Sera"; and there is wine of Italy, too, in the straw-covered bottles in the refectory just behind the lounge.

Here sooner or later one touches elbows with that numerous host which is representing the Italian cause at the Peace Conference, for this is Italy's stamping-ground. Here one may meet, first, the men of the Italian delegation, including Vittoria Orlando, prime minister, at its head; then Baron Sidney Sonnino, minister of foreign affairs, and regarded by many as the guiding hand in Italian statecraft; the shrewd, practised, and powerful son of a Jewish father and a Scotch mother; then the Marquis Salvage Baggi; Salvatore

Barzilai, and Antonio Salandra, former prime minister of Italy. Here also come General Diaz, commander-in-chief of the armies of Italy; General di Robilant; Count Bonin Langare, Italian ambassador to France; the Marquis Imperiali, Italian ambassador to the Court of St. James's; Count di Cellere, Italian ambassador to the United States; and Signor Crespi, minister of food supplies and distribution, a notable group of men, who have written their names in indelible ink on many a page of the history of the conference.

At this particular time our favorite captain has arranged a meeting with Signor Orlando for a limited group of American writers. You should know our captain — a tall, powerful figure, with large, broad shoulders and a big, well-modeled head; a man who, you say, would make a fine hero for grand opera. Indeed he was, not many years ago, singing in grand opera in New York and Chicago. Later he answered the call of his native land, and fought in the mountain fastnesses beyond the Isonzo, and now he is officer of liaison between the Italian delegation and the American press, for Italy knows well the need and the value of illuminating propaganda. Too well, in fact, for I could paper the walls of a large-sized room with the gaily colored maps of the New Italy that have come to me since the conference began.

Our small group is nearly complete. The captain comes in, wheels about, and looks at his watch.

"Six o'clock, and two men missing! And I said a quarter to six, five forty-five precisely! And *he* is waiting for us up-stairs! I can't think of it! *He*

must not be kept waiting! I will call it off; I will tell *him* —”

The stragglers arrive, and the captain is appeased. We mount the stairs, two steps at a time. We hurry down the velvet-carpeted corridors. The door opens. Ah, *he* is there!

I suppose that in the United States we would regard Signor Orlando as looking much like a prosperous, sedate business man, a successful man who has not worried too much, who has had time to put on a bit of avoirdupois, who can sit back and finger his watch-chain, and smile, and nod that wonderfully fine head of his, and assume a complacent, satisfied air — and make you feel complacent and at home, also.

That is the way Signor Orlando looked, and that is exactly opposite from the way Signor Orlando felt, for at the moment when we came to talk with him he was sitting on a cushion of needles. His cause had met formidable opposition in the conference; there were men in Paris crying “Imperialism!” and there were men in Rome crying “Do something!” and yet here was Signor Orlando, torn between two policies, sitting here before us, smiling blandly, and speaking of the excellent ties that bind the Italian and the American people. That is why Signor Orlando is a diplomat.

For fully thirty minutes the minister spoke on Italo-American amity, and then some one asked him the question that was uppermost in the minds of all of us, and in the minds of the people of Paris and Rome and all the world that was watching the subtle manœuvres of the diplomats at the Peace Conference:

“Will Italy give up her claims to Fiume?”

“No. Absolutely no.” And the smile faded, and the lips of the minister became firmly compressed.


“Will Italy compromise on some of her claims under the treaty of London?”

“No. The treaty of London is a compromise. The claims of Italy were recognized as just by her allies, who signed the treaty and who will stand by their word. Trieste and Gorizia are guaranteed by the treaty, and Fiume must be ours, for Fiume is Italian.”

Triest, Gorizia, Fiume — words that unlocked hidden chambers in one's memory, that called up images hidden away through the years. Immediately there came to me the picture of the mellow Italian sky, and the purple waters of the bay of Genoa beating themselves into long lines of white foam on the rocky Ligurian coast. A great heap of bronze rising against the sky-line — the memorial to the Thousand of Garibaldi who sailed from Quarto. And before the monument a wreath, and a wide placard, with but one name — Trieste! And then the picture of a little town on the Riviera, a street of drooping shade trees on a smiling morning in the spring of 1915, and two troubadours walking aimlessly about, strumming their guitars, and singing melodiously of the lost lands and the unredeemed brothers of Trieste, Gorizia, and Fiume.

“We stand,” continued the minister, “wholly upon our claims, which were found just in the treaty of London, and which, moreover, we base upon the principles of President Wilson.”

The secret treaty and the Fourteen Points, both guar-



(c) Underwood & Underwood

FOUR LEADERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FIUME

From left to right: M. Clémenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino. Photograph taken December 7, 1918, at No. 10, Downing street, London.



anteeing the claims of Italy! Let us read again what President Wilson said:

Point 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

Point 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

Point 11. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

These three points are involved. It is because Italy's claims touch upon the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and upon land properly comprised within the domain of the nations on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, that I give the points which ostensibly deal only with the Balkan peoples. For this is the crux of the matter. Italy's claims were being opposed by those very peoples — by Jugo Slavia, or rather, as it formally styles itself now, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and between Italy and the Jugo Slavs the matter had passed from the stage of friendly negotiation and become a controversy.

There are available to-day yards of maps, whole kilometers of maps. There are tons and tons of leaflets, pamphlets, books, copies of documents. There are statistics to prove any contention you wish to support. There are hand-books that will provide you with arguments on any subject, as if this were an American political campaign. There is everything except the as-

surance that the problem of the Adriatic will be settled so as to avoid a future recurrence of war.

What are Italy's claims? That must be the first question.

It is illuminating to consider what Italy's claims have been in comparison with what they are to-day, for Italy's attempt to occupy her unredeemed provinces and other lands along the Adriatic has passed through three stages. The first stage was that of negotiation between Austria and Italy, before Italy joined the Allies in the war. The second was that of negotiation between Italy and the Allies, which resulted in a secret agreement being signed, as a result of which Italy went to war. The third is that of Italy's fight before the Peace Conference for the land promised in the treaty — and a little bit more. In each instance, we find, Italy's claims grew in size.

Lord Bryce explained recently that in 1915 Austria offered Italy the Italian-speaking districts of the Trentino and those parts of the Tyrol which had an Italian-speaking population, up to a point about twenty miles south of Botzen, which was the boundary between the Italian and German languages, and had been so since the eighth century. Lord Bryce said:

Italy refused this offer, demanding a frontier somewhat farther north, which would have given her not only all the Italian-speaking population, but also a few German-speaking districts, including the town of Botzen, whose population is about two-thirds German-speaking, and the valley of the River Adige as far north as the strategic position of Klausen, between Botzen and Brixen, where the Brenner highroad and the railway descend through a narrow gorge that forms the most defensible

point of that great line of communication from north to south. Austria refused this, and the negotiations were broken off.

Italy then began her negotiations with the Allies. She would enter the war on their side if she could win back her unredeemed provinces in that way. Her demands resulted in the signing of an agreement — what we now call the secret treaty or the pact of London on April 26, 1915, approximately one month before she declared war on Austria-Hungary. It was signed by the Marquis Imperiali for Italy, Count Benckendorf for Russia, M. Jules Cambon for France, and Sir Edward Grey for England. It conveys to Italy considerable more territory than the unredeemed provinces, or districts that are purely Italian. Without attempting to cover all the ground mentioned in this treaty, it might be said here that it gave Italy the district of Trentino; the entire southern Tyrol to its natural geographical boundary, the Brenner; the city and suburbs of Trieste, Gorizia, and Gradisca; all of Istria to Quarnero, including Volosko and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin; the province of Dalmatia, including within its limits Lissariki and Trebino and all the valleys of all the rivers flowing into the sea at Sebenico, with all their branches; a large number of islands in the Adriatic off the coast of Dalmatia; then “in full right” Avlona, or Valona, and a great many other concessions which will be named as they become subject matter for negotiation.

Between the time that this treaty was signed and the armistice of November 11, 1918, Italy's demands grew still larger. When the Austro-Hungarian monarchy crumbled, Italy's troops advanced into Austrian terri-

tory and occupied the lands outlined in the secret treaty. Read again the armistice terms with Austria-Hungary. Almost word for word they follow the language of the secret treaty on the subject of boundary-lines. Moreover, Italian troops occupied districts clearly not mentioned in the treaty. And Italy laid claim to these and other parts of the former monarchy on the grounds of their Italianity. And first and foremost Italy laid claim to Fiume, on the ground of self-determination of nationalities, for Fiume had almost unanimously voted to join the Italian kingdom.

It is a fascinating tale, this story of Fiume. A small town of fewer than fifty thousand inhabitants, it has become for Italy the symbol of Italian unity. Italy wants it because it is Italian; the Jugo Slavs want it because it is the best seaport of the great Croatian hinterland, and because, they assert, it is not purely Italian. The American President, through six months of fruitless negotiation, contended that Fiume shall be the nucleus of a free state.

Fiume was located at the convergence of many roads, and became a city even in Roman days. In 1471 it passed under Hapsburg rule, and in 1779 was united to Hungary, but given autonomous rights as a *corpus separatum*, or separate body, by the Empress Maria Theresa. There is excellent historic authority for the statement that through a long series of years Fiume fought the Croatian influences. Fiume passed through a period of Napoleonic rule, and from 1813 to 1822 was administered by Austria direct. It then passed back to Hungary. During the Revolution of 1848 the

Croats under Ban Jelacic occupied Fiume and held it until 1869; then it received its constitutional liberty in the *Ausgleich* and went back to Hungary.

Now begins the new story of Fiume. On October 18, 1918, Andrea Ossoinack, deputy for Fiume in the Hungarian Parliament, rose and declared that in view of reports that Fiume was to be handed over to the Croats, he wished to make the following declaration:

Austria-Hungary having admitted the principle of self-determination in her peace proposals, Fiume, as a *corpus separatum* claims that right for itself. In accordance with this right it wishes to exercise, without any kind of hindrance, the right of self-determination of the people.

In his introduction the deputy said, "Fiume has not only never been Croat, but has, on the contrary, always been Italian in the past and must remain Italian in the future."

On October 30, 1918, the Italian National Council of Fiume issued the following proclamation:

The Italian National Council of Fiume, meeting this day in plenary session, declares that, by force of the right by which all peoples have acquired national independence and liberty, the city of Fiume, which has been up to now a *corpus separatum* constituting a national Italian commune, claims for itself the right of self-determination by the people.

Relying upon this ground, the National Council of Fiume proclaims the union of Fiume to its fatherland, Italy.

The Italian National Council considers the state of affairs brought about on October 29, 1918, as temporary, places its rights under the protection of America, mother of liberty and universal democracy, and awaits their sanction by the Peace Congress.

Childlike is the simple faith of the Fiumians! They place it in America, which has labored most deter-

minedly to keep the boundary-lines of Italy from inclosing Fiume.

The next document on the Italian side of the question is a memorandum presented to the Peace Conference by the president of the Italian National Council of Fiume, Dr. Antonio Grossich; the mayor, Dr. Antonio Vio; and the deputy, Andrea Ossoinach. It sets forth that Fiume solemnly proclaimed its annexation to Italy by a plebiscite; that Fiume regained her right freely to decide her own destiny upon the collapse of Hungary; that Italian is the language of commercial intercourse in Fiume, and that all the syndics, deputies, municipalities, and municipal councils have always been Italian; that the commerce of Croatia was only seven per cent. of the total, the rest being that of Hungary and other countries of the hinterland; that the traffic from Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina was only thirteen per cent. of the total from those countries, which sent eighty-seven per cent. through the Dalmatian ports; that Fiume should be proclaimed a free port, for the use of all countries of the hinterland rather than the Jugo Slavs alone, if freedom of commercial intercourse is to be granted all countries of the hinterland; and that if Fiume is made an Italian port, Italy can, at minimum expenditure, insure to it the necessary maritime connections with extensive shipping services, whereas in the hands of the Jugo Slavs it would fall into decay. As both Hungary and Jugo Slavia are agricultural states, a competition for foreign markets would certainly arise between these two states. "The possession of Fiume by the Jugo

Slavs might induce them to adopt toward Hungary the same economic policy Hungary used toward Serbia, with grave prejudice and danger to the peace of Europe." Italy, said the memorandum, would not discriminate.

The representatives of Fiume also objected to the idea that the city should be annexed to Jugo Slavia with certain definite guaranties and privileges to the Italians, which they declared to be illogical and impracticable, as the nationality of a country could not be guaranteed by international treaties or by any special prerogatives of autonomy when it was known that the state which granted them would not respect them.

And then it rained figures. Statistics of all kinds, Italian, Fiumian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Hungarian, German, flooded the mails of the delegates to the Peace Conference. It soon developed that many of the statistics were accurate, but that the territory they represented was another matter. And it also developed that the location of the boundaries of Fiume was to have a great deal to do with the decision of the conference itself.

"Fiume has 46,264 inhabitants," said the Italians. "We took an honest census immediately after occupation. According to nationality, the Italians are 62.5 per cent. of the whole, the rest being Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Hungarians, and Germans. In the town district 90 per cent. of the Italians are native-born."

"But Fiume cannot be considered without its urban area," said the Jugo Slavs. "Sussak is inseparable from Fiume, and is inhabited entirely by Croats. The

population of Fiume and Sussak is 62,989, of which number 27,393 are Jugo Slavs and 24,870 are Italians."

"The Jugo Slavs in their statistics are not including purely the village of Sussak, but the entire district of Sussak to Buccari, seven miles from Fiume's eastern boundary," say the Italians. "The district has five administrative sub-communes, and the village of Sussak is only a section of one sub-commune, with 5,539 inhabitants, of which only 3,871 are Slavs."

"The National Council of Fiume," say the Jugo Slavs, "is a self-constituted Italian committee in opposition to the provisional Jugo Slav government of Fiume."

"The National Council has been recognized by the Peace Conference," reply the Italians, "and the former deputy, Ossoinach, has been received in the capacity of its representative by President Wilson. The provisional Jugo Slav government for the city has never existed."

As controversial statements of this character have been repeated manifold in the course of the Peace Conference, the presence of gray hairs among the delegates is not to be wondered at.

President Wilson came to Paris hoping for an honest application of the principles contained within the Fourteen Points to the problems of the Adriatic. He was in sympathy with the return of the unredeemed provinces to Italy. He found the Italian claims in the Trentino just and logical. He felt that the safety of Italy should not be jeopardized by allowing a rival naval

power to grow up in the Adriatic. He wanted to apply his principle of self-determination of nationalities. But he was opposed to shutting off a growing, industrious people from the sea simply because the coast-line was dotted with settlements having largely another national character from that of the great hinterland which had to use that coast-line. It was, truly, a question of national self-determination, but it was also a question of economic justice.

President Wilson faced for the first time the fact that a hard-and-fast rule cannot always be applied with justice to all men. He had to decide between the hinterland and the coast-line. He saw the finest ports of the Adriatic fall into the possession of Italy. He was willing that Triest and Pola should become Italian, and he made no objection to the Italian naval base at Avlona, a position of strategic importance to Italy. He felt also that the islands of the Adriatic should not be allowed to harbor fleets or armaments which might become hostile to Italy; but when it came to the great Slav territories, such as Dalmatia, eastern Istria, and the islands inhabited for the most part by Slavs, he thought that here Italy, by the very fact that she made her plea on the basis of nationality, should not exercise the rights of sovereignty.

The President had his first conversation with Signor Orlando in Paris on January 9, 1919. President Wilson outlined his idea of how far the Italian boundaries should go. He drew a line through the Istrian peninsula, giving the Fiume-San Pietro-Laibach railway to the Jugo Slavs. He felt that giving Fiume as well as

Triest to Italy would give Italy a monopoly of the upper Adriatic. Hence, though he recognized the claim of nationality in Fiume, he felt that this should be subordinated to economic needs and given to the Jugo Slavs. Signor Orlando refused to consider these boundaries. He said that if the Jugo Slavs gained eastern Istria, they would seek to extend their boundaries beyond Triest and Pola as well. The line drawn by President Wilson brought Pola within gun-range.

A second conversation, without result, took place on February 26 between the President and Signor Orlando. On the same day it became known that Dr. Ante Trumbitch, foreign minister for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had asked President Wilson to arbitrate the dispute between Italy and the Jugo Slavs. The request was read before the conference at the instance of Dr. Trumbitch by M. Clemenceau on February 11, and was as follows:

Mr. President:

The delegation of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at the Peace Conference has the honor to communicate to your excellency that, having full faith in the spirit of justice of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, and being fully authorized to this end by the royal government, it is ready to submit to the arbitration of President Wilson the territorial controversy between the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and the Kingdom of Italy. It prays your Excellency to take cognizance of this fact and communicate same to the Conference. A similar communication has been made to His Excellency the President of the United States.

PACHITCH
TRUMBITCH
VESNITCH
ZOLGOB

Baron Sonnino made the following statement on behalf of the Italian delegation :

Following the communication made to us by our president I consider it my duty to declare that the Italian Government is sorry to be absolutely unable to accept any proposal for arbitration on questions for the settlement of which Italy, in full agreement with her allies, has for three and a half years sustained a hard war and which have been actually submitted to the Conference for examination.

President Wilson politely refused to accept the office of arbiter. The action of the Jugo Slavs produced an excellent impression, although President Wilson should not have been suggested by them, as his views were already known. Italy's refusal to arbitrate cannot properly be censured, for it was the Peace Conference, and not any one person, that should settle the dispute, as it was settling others.

A statement by Secretary Lansing to Dr. Trumbitch on the interest of the United States in the Kingdom of the Jugo Slavs was made public on February 8. It caused considerable comment, because it was evidently a manifestation of American friendship and sympathy for the Jugo Slavs, and coming at this time it seemed to emphasize this fact as against the Italian point of view. The statement was regarded in many quarters as official recognition by the United States of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It read :

On May 29, 1918, the Government of the United States expressed its sympathy for the national aspirations of the Jugo Slav races and on June 28 declared that all branches of the Slavs should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule. After having achieved their freedom from foreign oppression, the Jugo Slavs formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule have, on

various occasions, expressed the desire to unite with the kingdom of Serbia. The Serbian Government, on its part, has publicly and officially accepted the union with the Serb-Croat-Slovene peoples.

The Government of the United States therefore welcomes this union, while recognizing that the final settlement of territorial frontiers must be left to the Peace Conference for determination according to the desires of the peoples concerned.

Ostensibly this "recognition" did not settle the vexed question of whether Serbia had swallowed Montenegro willy-nilly, or whether Montenegro was still to have another opportunity to express its desire for independence or annexation to Serbia. Nor did this throw any light on the dispute with Italy over frontiers.

President Wilson made his first trip to the United States and returned without a settlement having been reached. On April 3 the subject was taken up again by the conference, and the President supported his plan of having Fiume made a free city under the League of Nations. He was willing to give Lissa to Italy for strategic reasons, but did not favor letting Italy have sovereignty over the great numbers of Slavs of Dalmatia, although he wished certain guaranties of autonomous rights to be given communities that were preponderatingly Italian. As the discussions now continued, they became more and more provocative of heated debates in unofficial circles. President Wilson consulted his experts on the subject of the situation in the Jugo Slav territories, and these are supposed to have given him information that confirmed his point of view. The Italians began to see more and more that the President would remain firm in his determination not to give Fiume to Italy. It was also reported that

Mr. Lloyd George was ready to stand by the secret treaty, but that he did not feel called upon to support the whole set of Italian claims, with Fiume in addition to the treaty. The advice of the Northcliffe press, under the leadership of Mr. Wickham Steed, that Italy should renounce Fiume and some of her claims in Dalmatia caused much disapproval and a great deal of caustic criticism in Italy, where newspapers declared that English shipping concerns were vitally interested in the port of Fiume and expected to enter into strong competition for the trade of the hinterland with the Italian lines running from Triest. In fact, economic arguments were constantly being advanced as bearing on the settlement, and one of the favorite cries of the Jugo Slavs was that if Italy acquired Fiume, this port would be allowed to dwindle in importance for the benefit of Triest.

The issue was apparently wholly between President Wilson and Signor Orlando, and both men were firmly set in their points of view. The situation became more and more awkward. Outside the Peace Conference circle the Jugo Slavs and the Italians indulged in a most disturbing game of hurling charges and counter-charges against each other. From the propaganda bureau of the Jugo Slavs at 17 Rue Cadet, far from the center of Conference activities, issued an amazing series of reports, declaring that the Italian occupying troops had committed serious breaches of the peace in purely Jugo Slav cities, forbidding national demonstrations, and getting into clashes with the municipalities. The Italians issued similar reports, alleging outrages against

the Italian troops. It is not intended here to sift the truth in these charges, but merely to indicate the state of things in Paris. In the midst of this situation it was decided that the Germans should be invited to come to Versailles. The Italian delegation opposed this notification on the ground that Italy's claims should be settled first. Nevertheless, President Wilson made the announcement that the Germans should come April 25. The Council of Four and the members of the conference fully expected a solution of the Italian question before that time.

But matters did not mend. Conversations continued, but the two men who had to decide the issue remained unmoved. On April 23 an unofficial statement was issued at the American headquarters in the Hôtel de Crillon which reviewed the American point of view in the controversy. It explained President Wilson's attitude in the light of the Fourteen Points. The point which said that "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognized lines of nationality," covered the long-expressed aspirations of the Italian people, and should be considered at the same time as wholly consistent with the two other generally accepted principles that "every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states," and "that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them, without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that

would be likely, in time, to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world," and finally that Serbia should be "accorded free and secure access to the sea." By the application of these principles Italy gained 400,000 Italians in southern Tyrol and a strategic frontier along the Alps; Triest, Monfalcone, Gradisca, Gorizia, Pola, and the Isonzo valley, a territory with 300,000 Jugo Slavs,—“only slightly less numerous than the Italians,”—but whose rights had to be subordinated to those of the Italians. Fiume, it was explained, was a small city surrounded by a preponderant Jugo Slav population. For Italy Fiume had almost no commercial significance in the past, as in 1913 Italy brought through Fiume only 1,000 out of 1,300,000 tons of imports, and exported from Fiume less than 2,000 tons out of the city's total export of over 600,000 tons. For the Jugo Slavs, however, it was a different matter. Blocked by mountains is the great plain of the newer part of Jugo Slavia, the home of 8,000,000 people, whose only outlet is by going around the narrow northern part of the mountain-range through Fiume to the Adriatic. Passage through the mountains themselves is most difficult, for they broaden as they go south, and communication is confined to narrow-gage roads, one having 130 tunnels in fewer than sixty miles. As a Jugo-Slav outlet, Fiume would become a port for south central Europe as a companion to Triest. As for the Dalmatian coast-line, America was willing to give Italy naval protection, but could not see the justice of forcing an alien population, which is nearly ninety-six per cent. Jugo Slav, under another flag.

Amplifying this statement is a memorandum which President Wilson gave to Signor Orlando on April 14, with permission to make it public in Italy. It is too long to repeat here, but the essentials are these; President Wilson is willing to give Italy all that the treaty of London gives with regard to her Alpine frontiers, but not all of Istria or Fiume. He believes Fiume should be an international port, "with a very considerable degree of genuine autonomy," but included in the customs system of Jugo Slavia. He also agrees to the cession of Lissa, the retention of Avlona, the dismantling of the forts on the eastern side of the Adriatic, and the stipulation that the powers along that coast shall possess only minor naval forces sufficient for police duty.

Signor Orlando said of this memorandum, in an address before the Italian Chamber and the Senate in Rome on April 28:

Inasmuch as that memorandum denied Italy any right over Dalmatia and the isles, accorded but an incomplete liberty to Fiume, and even went so far as to break up the unity of Istria, I could not hesitate, and I told Mr. Wilson that it was absolutely impossible for me to agree to peace on the conditions indicated, which gave us satisfaction on none of those three essential points. I added that in such conditions the delegation could not continue conversations which were devoid of any acceptable basis, and that I reserved to myself the right, before taking any more radical decision, to place myself in communication with the representatives of the allied powers to which Italy was bound by special relations.

President Wilson very warmly expressed his regrets at this hypothesis, adding that he would do whatever was possible to avert it, and to that end he thought it would be opportune and advantageous for the two allied powers, France and Great Britain, to set to work to seek some means of conciliation, while, for his part, he would have the questions at issue examined afresh by his

experts to see if, and what, further concessions could be made to Italian aspirations.

On the afternoon of April 23 President Wilson published a statement on the Italian claims which was regarded as an appeal to the Italian people over the heads of their delegation and their Government. The President had spoken of making such a declaration several days before, but when it came, it descended upon the conference like a thunderbolt. For the moment all other issues were forgotten. So sharp was the reaction of the Italian delegation that it looked as if the break-up of the conference were at hand.

In the history of the Peace Conference this appeal will always stand out as marking a turning-point in diplomatic procedure. It will become one of the great papers of the conference; it will be consulted again and again not alone for its content, but for the moment that gave it birth and for the influence that it subsequently had upon the whole subject of Italian expansion on the east coast of the Adriatic. I therefore give the document in full:

In view of the capital importance of the questions affected, and in order to throw all possible light upon what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the following statement will contribute to the final formation of opinion and to a satisfactory solution.

When Italy entered the war, she entered upon the basis of a definite, but private, understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other powers, great and small, have entered the struggle with no knowledge of that private understanding. The Austro-Hungarian empire, then the enemy of Europe, and at whose expense the pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to

pieces and no longer exists. Not only that. The several parts of the empire, it is now agreed by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent states and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty. We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller states whose interests are henceforth to be as scrupulously safe-guarded as the interests of the most powerful states.

The war was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which would set up a new order of right and justice.

Upon those principles the peace with Germany has been not only conceived but formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed. We cannot ask the great body of powers to propose and effect peace with Austria and establish a new basis of independence and right in the states which originally constituted the Austro-Hungarian empire, and in the states of the Balkan group, on principles of another kind. We must apply the same principles to the settlement of Europe in these quarters that we have applied in the peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of these principles that the initiative for peace was taken. It is upon them that the whole structure of peace must rest.

If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet and inlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the lands to the north and northeast of that port—Hungary, Bohemia, Rumania and the states of the new Jugo Slavic group. To assign Fiume to Italy would be to create the feeling that we had deliberately put the port upon which all these countries chiefly depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a power of which it did not form an integral part, and whose sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic, nor identified with the commercial and industrial life of the region which the port must serve.

It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the pact of London, but was there definitely assigned to the Croatians.

And the reason why the lines of the pact of London swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that here and there on those islands, and here and there on that coast, there are bodies of people of Italian blood and connexion, but also, and no doubt chiefly, because it was felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foot-

hold amidst the channels of the eastern Adriatic, in order that she might make her own coasts safe against the naval aggression of Austria-Hungary.

But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications which the Austrian government constructed there shall be razed and permanently destroyed. It is part, also, of the new plan of European order which centers in the League of Nations, that the new states erected there shall accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair treatment of groups of Italian people there, because adequate guarantees will be given, under international sanction, of the equal and equitable treatment of all racial and national minorities.

In brief, every question associated with this settlement wears a new aspect—a new aspect given it by the very victory for right, for which Italy has made the supreme sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy, along with the four other great powers, has become one of the chief trustees of the new order which she has played so honorable a part in establishing.

And on the north and northeast her natural frontiers are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the Alps from northwest to southeast, to the very end of the Istrian peninsula, including all the great watershed within which Trieste and Pola lie, and all the fair regions whose face nature has turned toward the great peninsula on which the historic life of the Latin people has been worked out through centuries of famous story, ever since Rome was first set upon her seven hills. The ancient unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great walls which are her natural defense. It is within her choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noblest quality of greatness, magnanimity, friendly generosity, the preference of justice over interest.

The nations associated with her, the nations that know nothing of the pact of London or of any other special understanding that lies at the beginning of this great struggle, and who have made their supreme sacrifice also in the interest, not of national advantage or defense, but of the settled peace of the world, now unite with her older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe. America is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn, millions strong, from Italy's own fair country sides. She is linked in blood as well as in affection with the Italian people.


Such ties can never be broken, and America was privileged, by the generous commission of her associates in the war, to initiate the peace we are about to consummate, to initiate it upon terms

she had herself formulated and in which I was her spokesman. The compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes a part in with those principles. She can do nothing else. She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably consistent with those sacred obligations. Interest is not now in question, but the rights of peoples; of states new and old, of liberated peoples, and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of rights; above all, the right of the world to peace and such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure.

These, and these only, are the principles for which America has fought. These and these only are the principles upon which she can consent to make peace. Only on these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace.

At the moment when President Wilson released his statement on the situation the negotiations with Italy in the Council of Four had reached a critical stage. According to the story told at the Italian headquarters the secretary to Mr. Lloyd George arrived there at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of April 23 with the reply of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau to Italy's demands. This was handed to the Prince of Scordia, who conveyed it to Count Aldobrandini, secretary to Signor Sonnino. The count found that the reply dealt with all questions ostensibly to the satisfaction of Italy, but did not explain the status of Fiume. He thereupon asked the secretary what the three proposed for Fiume. He replied that he had no information on that point.

The count thereupon telephoned the houses of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George to demand whether these men would receive the ambassadors of Italy in order to clear this matter up. President Wilson being occupied for the moment, the Marquis Imperiali, Italy's ambassador to London, went immediately to the home of



Press Illustrating Service, Inc.

THE FIRST AMERICAN TROOPS TO ENTER FIUME—A PLATOON FROM CO. G, 2ND BATTALION, 332ND U. S. INFANTRY

With the Italian troops they marched into Fiume when the city was occupied by the powers

Mr. Lloyd George. To his question of what would be the status of Fiume, Mr. Lloyd George answered:

"A free city, outside of all control." He added that he would be pleased to receive the Italian reply that evening.

The Marquis Imperiali returned to the Italian headquarters and found the members of the delegation reading the statement of President Wilson, which had just been published in an extra edition of "*Le Temps*." A meeting was hastily held, at which a letter to Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau was drafted by Signor Orlando, in which he said:

The Italian delegation finds it impossible to continue to participate usefully in the work of the Peace Conference. The delegation regrets that President Wilson intervened at a moment when the Italian representatives were making a supreme effort on behalf of conciliation, which by this very act he rendered impossible.

Signor Orlando further praised the loyalty with which Great Britain and France adhered to their promises embodied in the treaty of London, and declared that the sole responsibility for the decision which had been forced upon the Italian delegation — that of leaving Paris — rested upon President Wilson alone, and that the American people could not be made to share in it.

Crowds gathered in front of the entrance to the Hôtel Edouard Sept and called for Prime Minister Orlando. There were cheers for Italy and France. The crowd was dignified and well behaved. A little later the delegation published the following note;

As a result of the declaration by President Wilson on the Adriatic question, the Italian delegates have decided to leave Paris to-morrow.

The note produced a sensation and added fuel to the excitement. It was felt that the conference had reached a turning-point. No one knew whither the day's developments would lead. President Wilson's methods stunned and shocked. The conservative elements rallied to cover against this disastrous "new diplomacy." Among the practised European diplomats sympathy seemed to be pretty general for Italy. President Wilson again stood out alone, a solitary figure.

In French and British circles it was pointed out that each had labored diligently to bring about an accord. The lack of harmony, it was pointed out, was entirely between Signor Orlando and the American President. For four days the representatives of the French Republic had toiled far into the night at the work of finding a solution. They had sought to delay the publication of President Wilson's statement, asserted "*Le Temps*." This they had done in a spirit of faithfulness to their convictions. M. Clemenceau had agitated for an alliance with Italy in 1880, and M. Pichon had been one of the founders of the *Comité Franco-Italie*, at a time when war between these two countries and Great Britain appeared imminent. These were old ties. The British, on the other hand, were also not slow to assert that Mr. Lloyd George had done everything in his power to avert a rupture. In fact, he had almost brought about a solution. On April 24 Mr. Lloyd George asked Signor Orlando to breakfast with him at the *Rue Nitot*,

but the Italian premier was unable to accept. Mr. Lloyd George then went to the Hôtel Edouard Sept and had a long talk with Signor Orlando. The latter had arranged to depart at two o'clock in the afternoon, but Mr. Lloyd George counseled delay, in the hope of finding a solution for the crisis. Signor Orlando waited until eight o'clock, but refused to put off his trip to Rome. Thus the honor of the European cabinets was preserved from contamination by the upstart from the West.

On April 24 the following note was issued by Reuter and credited to the British delegation:

Great Britain has advised Italy to renounce for its own interests certain of its claims. However, if the Italians insist on obtaining the rights given them by the treaty of London of April 26, 1915, France and Great Britain will honor their signatures.

"They point out that the treaty of London gives Fiume to the Croats and that if the treaty is put in force, the article relative to Fiume will be likewise.

"MM. Clemenceau and Lloyd George endeavor to arrive at an agreement.

"Mr. Wilson published his declaration upon his own responsibility."

When the newspapers arrived it was found that reams upon reams of white paper had been used to heap abuse and criticism upon the head of the man who had dared use this "innovation" in a political controversy. Italy responded almost with one voice in utter condemnation of the man who had been feted and acclaimed there but four short months ago. The conservative press of France politely stated its amazement — and regret. Many of the newspapers of England declared that the President had gone too far. The administration organs

invented alibis for Mr. Lloyd George, and only a few newspapers spoke without heat. The issue was lost sight of in an attack on the statesman who had come from America to "dictate" to the old world.

The news was spread broadcast that the departure of the Italian delegation meant that Italy would withdraw from the Conference and make a separate peace. The report was not true, nor based on anything more than a conjecture. Signor Orlando merely contemplated making a trip to Rome to get a vote of confidence from the Italian people, and although the delegates of Italy might be absent for an indefinite length of time, there was no question of Italy's leaving the Conference.

But by far the most important development of the twenty-fourth was Signor Orlando's statement in reply to the President. He deprecated the fact that the President's appeal had been addressed to the people rather than to the Government, a procedure which, he said, had been followed heretofore only in the case of the hostile governments. But, he continued, he would not complain of that; in his turn he would follow the example of the President, and address the people. To draw a distinction between the Italian Government and the Italian people, which might imply that a free people was capable of submitting to the yoke of a will that was not its own, was, he said, a supposition that would be unjustifiably offensive to his country. He did not agree that the contentions of Italy violated the principles of President Wilson, but he had not been able to convince the President of this. He must regard the way in which President Wilson applied his principles to the

Italian claims as altogether unjustifiable. The assertion that the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire involved a reduction of Italy's aspirations "will not be received without reserve." He continued:

The presidential message affirms that with the concessions which it mentions Italy would be extended to the walls of the Alps, which are her natural defense. This recognition is of great importance, provided the left flank of that wall is not left open and that Monte Nevoso, which divides the waters flowing towards the Black Sea from those falling into the Mediterranean, is included in Italy's right to such a line. This is the mountain that the Latins themselves always called *Limes Italicus* from the time when the true configuration of Italy was realized in the sentiment and the conscience of the people. Without that protection a dangerous breach would remain yawning in that admirable natural barrier, the Alps, and it would mean the breaking off of that unquestionable political, historical and economic unity which the peninsula of Istria forms.

And I further think that he who can proudly claim to have proclaimed to the world the free right of peoples to self-determination is the very one who is bound to recognize that right in the case of Fiume, an ancient Italian city, which proclaimed its Italian affinity before the Italian ships were anywhere near it — an excellent example of national consciousness retained for centuries. To deny that right simply for the reason that it is a cause of a small community would be to admit that the criterion of justice to different peoples varies according to their territorial extent; and if the denial of this right is to be based on the international character of the port, have we not the cases of Antwerp, Genoa, Rotterdam, international ports serving as outlets for the most diverse peoples and regions, without their having to pay dearly for this privilege by the stifling of their national conscience?

And can one describe as excessive Italy's aspiration toward the coast of Dalmatia, that bulwark of Italy which throughout the centuries which Roman genius and Venetian activity made noble and great, and whose Italianism, defying for a whole century all sorts of implacable persecutions, to-day shares the same tremors of patriotism as the Italian people? With regard to Poland the principle is proclaimed that rights cannot be created by denationalization secured by violence and arbitrariness. Why not apply the same principles to Dalmatia?

I have quoted the essential arguments in Signor Orlando's statement, omitting his story of the coöperation of the Italian people in the war and in the conference, and the declaration of warm sympathy and admiration for the American people with which he closed. He departed that evening, after he had attended a meeting of the Council of Four, at which President Wilson talked with him at some length on the subject of his declaration. Signor Orlando is quoted as saying that he informed the President that the matter had reached a point at which even the acceptance by the council of the demands of Italy could not be allowed to delay his immediate reference of the controversy to the Italian people. Baron Sonnino left the following morning with Signor Salandra, and M. Pichon was present at the *gare* to do the honors for France. A large crowd had gathered, and the principal Italian representatives in Paris joined in the demonstration.

Let us follow Signor Orlando to Rome and witness the remarkable enthusiasm with which the Italian people responded to the coming of their representative. Heretofore the premier had slipped quietly, unostentatiously into the city, preferring to avoid crowds. Now he went openly, because he meant to learn the opinion of all Italy. And all Italy, apparently, was with him. Enthusiastic thousands acclaimed him at Modane, Turin, Asti, Alessandria, and Genoa. On the morning of April 26 he arrived in Rome. Press despatches describe the event as rivaling all other welcomes in its intensity. Unnumbered thousands awaited the premier on the wide piazza bounded by the railway station, the

baths of Diocletian, and the Hotel Continental. Many persons were perched precariously on the ruins of the ancient baths and on roofs of houses, just as they had been when President Wilson arrived four months before. For ten minutes the crowd cheered, and then Signor Orlando addressed them.

"Have the Italian Government and the Italian delegation in Paris, in acting as they have acted, represented faithfully and with dignity the aspirations and will of the Italian people?" shouted the prime minister.

"Yes! Yes!" came a hoarse roar from all sides.

"I do not doubt your sentiments," said the premier, "but I wanted a confirmation. Here is the confirmation!"

With a gesture he indicated all the thousands gathered on the piazza. It was well that he could not see two months into the future and behold himself the object of a biting interpellation.

Then came a manifestation which showed that this was a personal attack on the President, and not upon the American people. "Long live America!" cried the crowds. "Down with President Wilson!"

Signor Orlando then made a statement that was not worthy of him, not worthy of a man who had conducted his high office with dignity and uniform courtliness throughout these trying times.

"We must show that we have taken the worst into consideration," he said. "After four years of unspeakable privations and sacrifices we may find ourselves faced with fresh sacrifices and privations. At this moment Italy is ready and greater than ever —

greater than in May, 1915. The decision must be a well-considered one. Food supplies are failing us, but Italy, which has known hunger, has never known dishonor. I do not conceal from you the danger of this very critical hour and I am with you, a brother among brothers, and also a chief who asks to obey and follow the will of the people. It may be that we shall find ourselves alone, but Italy must be united and have a single will. Italy will not perish."

This statement shows the lengths to which the heat of the controversy had driven even so self-possessed a man as the Italian prime minister. For his suggestion that Italy might know yet great sacrifices and privations seemed to recall reports circulated in Paris that the American Government might curtail its food supplies to Italy — reports reprinted in newspapers like the "Morning Post" of London, which said:

Moreover, rightly or wrongly, many Frenchmen believe that Mr. Wilson, like so many other idealists, is not afraid of using the big stick. Behind the somewhat florid compliments to Italy there lies a threat, and it is felt here that the gentleman who may have the honor of translating that threat into action may be the ubiquitous Mr. Hoover.

The demonstrations in Rome continued for several days. General Diaz, Signor Barzilai, and Prince Colonna, the mayor of Rome, all addressed the throngs. On the day that Signor Orlando arrived the King and Queen of Italy, the Duke of Genoa, and the crown prince appeared on the balcony of the Quirinal Palace amid the thunderous acclamations of the crowds, and here later the prime minister joined them. The next day Prince Colonna addressed a meeting in front of the

Capitol, and declared that Fiume as well as the land named in the treaty of London should be annexed, and that the Government should remember its duty in regard to "other unredeemed Italian cities, and especially Spalato and Trau." On April 28 Signor Orlando addressed the Chamber and the Senate, giving his story of the negotiations. He said that the point of view of Great Britain and France was that they meant to observe their "pledge of honor" given in the secret treaty. He added:

It has been stated that inasmuch as the treaty does not include Fiume in the Italian claims, they do not think they can agree on this question with the Italian point of view, and could assent to the principle of making Fiume a free and independent sovereign city only on condition that this should be by way of a compromise, and not as a supplement to the integral execution of the clauses of the treaty.

Ostensibly all Italy stood back of the prime minister. President Wilson's statement seemed to the Italians so much like an attack on their pride that they dropped their party bickerings and united to the support of the delegation in Paris. Even those Italians who had fought the Italian program as too ambitious, men like Leonida Bissolati, the socialist leader who withdrew from the Orlando cabinet late in 1918 because he would not support the Dalmatian claims of Italy, declared that he supported Italy's claims to Fiume on the ground of President Wilson's own principles. Gabriele D'Annunzio, the poet, an overzealous nationalist, became vituperative in his personal criticism of the American President. Signor Turati and the official socialists refrained from joining the acclama-

tions for Orlando, explaining that although they favored self-determination for Fiume, they did not wish to enter into the burning question of the moment, for they differed from the whole system by which affairs were being arranged in Paris.

Severe criticism of President Wilson's act might have been looked for in the Italian newspapers, but there were a large number of organs of various political groups in England that were no less abusive. The "Daily Express" of London called the statement: "A sample of diplomacy gone mad. It is the rabies of diplomacy." The London "Globe" spoke of "blundering, blustering diplomacy of the big stick." The London "Dispatch" said that "most significant of all is the resignation of the American ambassador at Rome, who also disagrees with the president." "John Bull" spoke of "an overbearing autocrat." "The Morning Post" called the act "wild West diplomacy" and added: "President Wilson has come among the allies like a rich uncle. They have accepted his manners out of respect for his means." "The Times," however, refused to become excited over an "innovation" feeling that the unprecedented condition of the world made many innovations inevitable, if things were to move at all.

The administrative council of the Confédération Générale du Travail, the labor federation of Paris, sent the following statement to President Wilson:

Your strong and public protest against the Italian claims has met, we can assure you, with unqualified approval in the minds of the French working classes, in the name of whom we thank

you for this new mark of courage and fidelity to the peace principles of which you have made yourself the champion, and which ought to be imposed on all the belligerents in the sacred interests of the peoples and peace.

Gustave Hervé, however, writing in "La Victoire," undertook to dim the brightness of this compliment from the workers. He reminded the President that the rulers of the confederation, after all, "represent only the Bolsheviks of France, and that the rest of the country — that is to say practically the whole of France — has been plunged into despair these last three days owing to the attitude adopted toward Italy, their friend and ally."

It was now the Council of the Three that sat in Paris: President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau. They turned from the Italian situation and took up other questions, such as that of the German leaseholds in Shan-tung. In the meantime the work of trying to find a solution for the Adriatic dispute went forward unofficially. It was pointed out that Italy did not ask the whole Dalmatian coast, but that more than half of this coast, many of the islands and historically Italian towns like Spalato and Ragusa were left to the Jugo Slavs. Spalato is 160 miles south of Fiume and capable of great development. When Italy first began her negotiations with the Allies before entering the war, she asked for the neutralization of the whole coast-line, including Montenegro, as well as the towns of Spalato, Trau, and the Peninsula of Sabbioncello. Russia protested, and Italy modified her claims to those contained within the pact of London. Among other suggestions were these: that the Allies should give

Fiume to Italy and build a new harbor for the Jugo Slavs elsewhere, as for instance at Senj, thirty miles southeast of Fiume, or at Buccari, opening on the Gulf of Fiume, and reached more quickly than Fiume by trains from Agram.

In the next few weeks the American mission was regaled with the comment on the President's note coming from the United States — comment of various kinds. The widely quoted remarks of Senator Lodge, asking the same treatment for Dantzic as for Fiume, and deprecating American intervention in European affairs, appeared to please Italian opinion. The Italians also in their propaganda material made use of reports that the legislatures of Massachusetts and Illinois had requested the American mission to grant the claims of Italy in full.

Eventually the negotiations were resumed. Finding the American President firm in his views, the Italian delegation now began to admit the possibility of compromising on details of the pact of London, although holding fast to Fiume. More attention also came to be given to Italy's claims in Asia Minor and in Africa. While this was in progress, Italian public opinion, which had so enthusiastically indorsed Orlando, veered and began to be extremely critical and fault-finding with the Italian delegation because it had been unable to accomplish anything. "The war was won, but we have lost the peace," was a phrase that began to be repeated in Italy, and the blame was placed upon the shoulders of Baron Sonnino, who from the first had directed Italy's foreign affairs.

Then the idea of building up a buffer state of Fiume came to the foreground.

This city, the bone of contention, was now to be made a sovereign city under the League of Nations, and provided with sufficient territory so that it would not be amenable to foreign influences. One of the most discussed of the plans was drawn up by M. Tardieu, who is also said to be the author of the plan governing the Saar basin. M. Tardieu proposed that the town of Fiume, excluding the suburb of Sussak, should form a free state under the League of Nations, together with the territory of Volosca and the islands of Cherso, Arbe, and Veglia. The state was to have the southeastern stretch of the railway running from Fiume to Laibach and to follow the frontier of Italy, which was to get the rest of Istria. It was to be administered by a council composed of two Italians from the Kingdom of Italy, one inhabitant of Fiume, one Jugo Slav, and one Hungarian. Italy was to receive Zara, Sebenico, and the islands of Lussin, Lissa, and Curzola. Italy was also to have a mandate over Albania under the League. A plebiscite was to be taken within fifteen years in Fiume, so that the inhabitants might determine what state they wished to join.

At about the same time Colonel House made a proposal to Signor Orlando on his own initiative, saying, however, that it was not necessarily approved by President Wilson. This plan is understood to have had the support of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. Colonel House wanted to give the whole of Istria to Italy, as in the treaty of London, and make Fiume a sovereign

city, with Italy representing it diplomatically. He also gave Zara and Sebenico to Italy, as well as the Quarnero and other islands.

President Wilson did not approve of the plan of Colonel House, because he wanted a line drawn through Istria so that the Jugo Slavs would command the Lai-bach railway. There are 130,000 Slovenes and only 4,000 Italians in eastern Istria, and the President did not feel justified in giving all this to Italy. He did not wish Italian territory to border direct on the city of Fiume.

The Jugo Slavs objected to any settlement that would not give them Fiume, and naturally did not wish a preponderant Italian majority in the government of Fiume, nor to have the city represented by Italy diplomatically. Objection was also raised to the idea of a plebiscite within fifteen years. It was reported at one time that the Jugo Slavs demanded a plebiscite in three years, saying that in fifteen the complexion of the place might have been changed by infiltration. They also wanted a plebiscite for the territory as a whole, whereas the Italians demanded a plebiscite by districts, so that a Jugo Slav majority outside the town could not outweigh the Italian majority within it. Gradually opinion at the conference inclined toward the creation of a state of Fiume, with sovereign rights under the League of Nations, free from all outside control and governing itself. The renunciation by Italy of virtually 150,000 Slavs in the interior of Dalmatia also helped clear the atmosphere.

Although glad to see the Italian claims cut down

by the suggestion of a free state of Fiume, the Jugo Slavs were not ready to give up land for it which they considered a part of Jugo Slavia. Thus they opposed the inclusion of Sussak and the island of Veglia, although they wanted the inclusion of Istria up to the Pola-Triest railway.

With the controversy between President Wilson and the Italian delegation thus clearly in mind, it may be profitable to indicate what Italy sought in other fields, with a view to understanding Italy's aims at the Peace Conference as a whole.

Italy demanded in Asia Minor the vilayets of Adalia and Konia, and southern Anatolia, together with certain coal-mining concessions in northern Anatolia.

Italy opposed the formation of a Danube confederation out of the former Austria-Hungary, a policy pursued by France, feeling that it would be anti-Italian. Italy also opposed the formation of a customs union of these states.

Italy opposed the transfer to Greece of western Thrace, held by Bulgaria under the terms of the treaty of Bukharest. Italy also felt that she had a certain claim on Smyrna, which was given her in the convention of St. Jean de Maurienne, but which was occupied by Greek troops during the spring of 1919 with the consent of the powers.

Italy demanded a rectification of the frontier of Libya-Tunis, in an endeavor to get the caravan route that connects the two roads of Ghat and Ghadames, as well as rectification of the Libyan frontier on the Egyptian side, with the possible cession of Jubaland and

the port of Kismayu by England. Italy also sought territorial concessions in French Somaliland and Jibuti, in order to complete the northeast African possessions of Italy and to give her a route for economic penetration into Abyssinia by way of the Jibuti-Addis-Abeba railway. It was understood that France brought considerable opposition to this scheme, and endeavored to pave the way for Italy to help administer a part of the Portuguese colony of Angola, which would not hurt France.

While these negotiations were going on, the heat of the controversy with President Wilson cooled. The Italian press began to be more and more critical of the work accomplished by the Italian representatives in Paris, blaming them rather than the American President for the lack of progress. It was charged that Baron Sonnino had failed to make friends everywhere; that he might have followed one of two policies:

Either an open policy of sympathy and of solidarity with all the little powers, or a hidden policy of agreement and entente with certain of the great powers in such a way as to insure solid support in the interplay of the various interests. But Orlando and Sonnino have followed neither the one nor the other, and to this is to be imputed the main blame for Italy's isolation. . . . With the unconsidered step by which they abandoned the conference Sonnino and Orlando seemed to tell the Italian people they could and ought to act independently. But then suddenly and secretly they slipped back to Paris, and to those who asked why, they said that separation from the allied and associated powers would have been dangerous and that our interest counseled us to participate in the labors of the conference up till the last.

The agitation for their resignation began. Two members of the delegation dropped out, Salandra and

Salvago-Raggi. The issue, however, could not long be avoided.

On June 19 Prime Minister Orlando appeared before the Chamber of Deputies in Rome and endeavored to justify the policy of the Italian delegation in Paris. He said that it had been the endeavor of the delegation

to maintain with all firmness the essential points of the Italian claims, without which Italy is convinced peace will neither be just nor adequate to the immense sacrifices suffered; to remain faithful in its duties to its allies; to avoid any blind form of obstinate intransigence. Indeed, we have tried to facilitate conciliatory suggestions capable of producing accord in the conference over the problems concerning Italian frontiers. Economic and political problems of Italy have been solved in a manner with which, on the whole, I feel satisfied. Besides we have obtained the determination of our northern frontier along the magnificent barrier which nature placed as Italy's bulwark. Regarding the eastern Adriatic Italy has not refused to discuss such solutions as are capable of insuring an agreement of all the great powers, but failing which Italy remains firm in demanding those territories granted her by a solemn pledge of validity which was acknowledged by our allies, who declared that these same territories were to be assigned to Italy as a reward for her entering the great struggle.

All of which was very well, but it did not satisfy the deputies. The great question, the vital question, after all, was, "What have you done in the matter of Fiume?"

The reply of Signor Orlando was not at all convincing. He asked the chamber to go into secret session in order that he might discuss his policy in Paris. He added that he would consider the vote on his proposal as a vote of confidence in his administration.

The deputies defeated the proposal by 259 to 78

votes, a severe blow for the Paris delegation, and the Orlando ministry thereby passed out of power. Prime Minister Orlando resigned, Baron Sonnino followed his example, and the delegation which had fought for Fiume and incurred the opposition of President Wilson passed into history.

Baron Sonnino, M. S. Crespi, and the Marquis Imperiali placed their signatures under the treaty of peace with Germany on behalf of Italy on June 28.

The King of Italy called upon Francesco Saverio Nitti to form a cabinet; a singular choice, as Nitti had left the cabinet of Orlando in January because he disagreed with Italy's pretensions to a great part of the Adriatic coast-line. He had previously visited the United States in 1917 with the mission of the Prince of Udine, and had entered the cabinet the same year as minister of the treasury. When he left he had the same views as Bissolati — that Italy should cultivate the friendship of the Jugo Slavs, whom he considered a coming power in the Balkans. Some of the opposition newspapers called Nitti a lieutenant of Giolitti.

It might be expected from this choice that the policy of Italy in Paris would be considerably modified, but a surprise came when Signor Tomasso Tittoni was named minister of foreign affairs. Tittoni had previously served in this office from 1903 to 1905 and from 1906 to 1910. In the latter year he was made ambassador to France, in which capacity he served until 1916. Tittoni was in Paris when the secret treaties were negotiated, and though the name of the Marquis Imperiali is signed to the one affecting Italy, Tittoni

played an important rôle in the negotiations leading up to Italy's entrance into the war. Signor Orlando had headed the delegation in Paris, but Prime Minister Nitti determined to remain in Rome and to send his foreign minister to direct the Paris negotiations.

No matter how diplomatically Signor Tittoni bows to the will of the conference in Paris and accepts a compromise settlement of the Fiume dispute, the controversy over this little town will not be ended. It may go on for years, for the issue has now become clean-cut, and the Italians of Fiume will not easily forget their Italianity. And Fiume, having declared its annexation to Italy, has taken another step that demonstrates the temper of the Fiumians. On June 13 the Italian National Council of Fiume held an extraordinary session at which it voted the institution of an army for the defense of Fiume. To meet the expenses of this army it voted to issue bonds up to 100,000,000 lire, or \$20,000,000. To further the administration of justice, it voted that hereafter all decrees shall bear the formula "Victor Emmanuel III, by the grace of God and the wishes of the nation King of Italy, etc." And as director of all the affairs of war of the town of Fiume, the council named Sem Benelli, poet and patriot, incomparable author of "The Love of the Three Kings." Verily, it is a story of romance, of politics, and intrigue, this story of Fiume.

CHAPTER X

Conference days in Paris — Jottings from a note-book in the year of the great peace.

PARIS of Peace Conference days, what an odd, exotic place it is, not at all like Paris of the Parisians! Filled with men of strange tongues and stranger dress; with statesmen who speak in the legislative chambers of half the world; with the back wash of the war; with tattered surviving elements of whole cities, refugees who possess nothing but the clothes upon their backs; with gaily adorned commanding officers of armies and navies loaded down with insignia, decorations, and gold lace. Vienna in the year of the congress presented no scene like this.

There is that famous line of the old Prince de Ligne at the congress, one hundred and four years ago: "*Le congrès danse*," he said, "*mais il ne marche pas*." What would the old field-marshal and favorite of Catherine II of Russia say to-day could he see Paris of the Peace Conference — the Paris in which statesmen are cudgeling their brains over the problems of the coming peace? To-day it is Paris that dances, Paris of the *Poilu*, of the doughboy, of the Tommy and the Anzac; Paris of the bright, colorful night life, which has crept so cautiously into its own. Perhaps it was always there even during the war. It is as if some one had drawn

back a thick hanging of old Gobelin tapestry and revealed the figures of an ancient frieze pirouetting on a waxen floor.

I sat to-night in the auditorium of the Casino de Paris while the fighters of the New and the Old World mingled in one mad, intoxicating throng, a medley of o. d., horizon blue, gold braid, stiff red collars, tasseled caps, broad-brimmed Anzac hats; colonials of another race; brave, bearded men wearing the Croix de Guerre, the Medaille Militaire, and the ribbon of the Legion.

The soldier world of Paris finds its way easily to the casino. It is a house of dance and song, where Broadway melodies of a season or two ago come back to life resplendent with topical verses that Broadway would never recognize. It is a theater where men may loll back in their chairs and smoke, and where between the acts resounds the tumultuous cacophony of the French version of the American "jazz" band. It is the theater where Mistinguet plays her thirty odd rôles in one evening and goes through the most maddening attack of cyclonic dancing that Paris has ever seen.

A lieutenant of engineers leaned forward and tapped me on the arm. "See," he said, "even our diplomats come to the casino."

It was true. Several of the world's great statesmen were occupying a box, but scarcely one of the numerous throng in uniform was aware of it or cared. In that, too, time had wrought great changes since Vienna. There the crowd came because the sovereigns came; it stood for hours in the rain or the hot sun waiting for a glimpse of its masters. And those who wrote of Vienna

spoke at great length of the emperors and kings and princes and nobles that graced the public festivals, and gave but scant space to the rabble that bore arms. I recalled a few lines in the memoirs of Count de la Garde devoted to the crowds that gathered in the Augarten to view the monarchs as they passed with their troops, or stood on tiptoe to gaze as the sovereigns attended military mass. There was one titled woman who complained that the rabble had torn her clothes — the rabble that was there only to die for the nobility of that day.

The casino was one agitated mass of color. Through the thick tobacco smoke shone blue, khaki, red, and gold. Even the mimic world across the footlights was trying to mingle with the mass. From the stage Albert Chevalier was leading the audience in a new version of that wonderful marching-song "*Madelon*." It was a new *Madelon* this time, a *Madelon* of victory. A canvas sheet was dropped, showing the words of the chorus. The *Poilus* rallied for the refrain. The doughboys so far had met nothing inside the dictionary or out to deter them. They shouted in wild disharmony. And thus it ran:

Madelon, emplis mon verre
Et chante avec les poilus!
Nous avons gagne la guerre
Hein! Crois-tu qu'on les a eus!
Madelon, ah! verse à boire,
Et surtout n'y mets pas d'eau,
C'est pour fêter la victoire,
Joffre, Foch, et Clemenceau!

Throughout the hall men were joining in — Chasseurs Alpins wearing their tam-o'-shanters, Scotchmen

in plaids, Canadians and Tommies liberally sprinkled with brass insignia, and Americans with all sorts of odd devices on their sleeves: the magic figures 1 for the First Division; the fir-tree of California, the sun, the wild-cat, the Indian head, and all the picturesque markings that have been evolved since the war began.

It was a friendly, a sociable crowd. Its variegated make-up was typical of all Paris of the conference.

To-day in Paris ministers plenipotentiary and commissioners extraordinary mingle on the boulevards and in the cafés, sit beside bronzed doughboys in the "Metro," haggle with tradesmen in the *rue*, run after elusive cabs and await their turn among the unnumbered hundreds for a room with bath at the few available hotels. At night in the music halls, theaters, and opera-houses of Paris one sees the men who have won the war with their fists and the men who are to secure the peace of the world by their wits and mental power sitting side by side.

January 7, 1919.

There was an exhilarating tang in the air that made me want to walk when I left my hotel on the Quai d'Orsay early to-day. I swung across the Pont Royal, and reveled in the sight of the turbulent and swollen Seine, and walked with a brisk step across the Garden of the Tuileries. Far down on the Rue de Rivoli I could see the large façade of the Ministry of Marine and of the Hôtel de Crillon, and through the morning haze I could see the flagstaffs, with the flag of France flying from the staff on the one building, and the flag of the United States flying from the other.

Even at that distance it appeared as if the flag on the Crillon was at half-mast. Perhaps it was only a momentary illusion, I reflected, as I turned into the arcades of the Rivoli. Then I passed a news-vender's stand, and there in "Le Matin" I read the news: Roosevelt was dead.

Only a matter of a few brief lines at that, but they sufficed to tell the tale. It seemed incredible. Even here, in this environment, where anything could happen and anything be believed, I found it hard to comprehend that T. R. was dead.

I did not think of him as a part of this conference or even as a factor in the peace negotiations. He seemed more an inseparable part of America, three thousand miles away. It was as if the report had come that there was no longer a New York or a San Francisco, as if some gigantic physical upheaval had changed the map of the world.

As I turned into the Rue de Castiglione my mind was busy with his career as a great public figure. It was amazingly short, this career, so short that even I, who thought of myself hardly at the median line of life, could touch both ends of it.

Fifteen, twenty years sufficed to write his story. Yes, it was only fifteen years ago this summer that he had been nominated, on his own, for the highest office in the land at the convention in Chicago which it had been my good fortune to attend.

I thought of the times that I had seen him, of the conditions under which I had talked with him, of the enthusiasm he had always aroused within me. I

thought of one of the last times I saw him — in the compartment of a speeding train, when he had elucidated his doctrine that a man could be neither Swedish nor French nor English nor German if he claimed citizenship in the United States, but just pure American, striving with heart and soul for the welfare of his native land, no matter what the origin of the name he bore or the blood that flowed in his veins. How truly we Americans needed that preachment to-day — here in Paris!

The announcement of his death took just a few lines in "Le Matin," but Stéphane Lauzanne had risen gloriously to do honor to this friend of France. At the top of his first two columns appeared in black type the words of Roosevelt to Lauzanne: "I have no message to send to France. I have given my best. If you speak of me, say simply that I have but one regret, that I was not able to give myself!" And Lauzanne told of his last meeting with T. R. in Oyster Bay. "His was a great figure; and, what is even better, a fine mind."

"Roosevelt is gone," I said to a friend. "Can you believe it?"

He shook his head.

"America won't be the same place when we get back, will it?" he said.

January 25, 1919.

Louis XIV was his own congress of nations. He remade Europe with the sword. President Wilson is easily the leading figure at this congress of nations.

He works with the pen. Yet, like Louis, after a hard day's work in remaking the world he turns to the opera. In the days when Louis first danced in the opera America was a colonial wilderness. When Jean-Philippe Rameau wrote his simple harmonies in the latter half of the eighteenth century the United States was still unborn; the Bourbon kings were still powerful, and imperial trappings were to be seen in those days before and behind the curtain.

To-day they have been retired to where they belong, behind the scenes; yet it was odd that the first opera ever attended by a President of the United States in Paris should be one written by Rameau for a Bourbon king. No one in the time of Louis could ever have dreamed that one day a President would sit in state to hear the beloved music, or that he would pass behind the stage, where royalty and famous artists had gone before him, to meet men and women in the service of art. It was the first time in the centuries-old history of the opera in Paris that the "Star-Spangled Banner" was sung from the stage. Germaine Lubin, prima donna of the opera, sang it, and Marthe Chenal sang the "Marseillaise," the two standing before a shield of the arms of Paris surmounted by the flags of the Allies. The thrill that came to the Americans in that audience must have been felt by the French, responsive as they are to dramatic incidents of that kind.

The opera, which has been slowly coming back to its own, blossomed out in gala attire for the President's visit. There again were to be seen the charming toilets and display of gems which it was not good form to

wear during the war. But the number of uniforms of generals, colonels, captains, and men of lesser rank of all the Allied armies stood out in sharp contrast to the picture of the opera as it was before the war.

In the famous foyer the crystal chandeliers were only half lighted, and the marble and onyx of the great staircase seemed gray and dimmed by dust; but the reception that Paris society gave the American President lacked nothing in intensity. The halls that had resounded with cheers for musicians and artists now echoed with cheers for the President of a democratic nation. It was only fitting that grand opera in Paris should come back to life like that.

February 20, 1919.

There is talk in the corridors of the Crillon about 1920. Not only in the corridors, but in the offices, too, and in what a European journalist would call "high places." The men in the corridors do the speculating; the men in the offices do the worrying. For the Democratic party must have a candidate in 1920 who can bring with his victory an indorsement of the President's conduct of the war and the peace negotiations.

One of the leaders of the Democratic party who has been unusually conspicuous as a friend of the President told a newspaper man to-day that it was most likely, in fact highly probable, that Herbert Clark Hoover — ahem, he was almost willing to say that without a doubt Herbert Clark Hoover — well, anyhow, would n't Hoover make a bully nominee, and could the Democrats put him across?

To-morrow, dear reader, there will be a paragraph in a New York newspaper, saying that there is a growing sentiment in high Democratic circles in favor of Herbert Clark Hoover, who has done such wonderful work in Belgium.

That is one instance of how political leaders try out the names of possible candidates. The paragraph will be copied by other newspapers and commented upon. Shrewd politicians will watch for its effect on the public mind. By that they will measure the availability of the man.

Considering the source of the suggestion, we can come to three conclusions: that President Wilson will not become a candidate except for exceptional circumstances; that the administration has not yet determined on its candidate; that Herbert Clark Hoover is considered a possibility.

Before the war the name of Herbert Clark Hoover was known only in the field of his profession, and during the war he minded strictly his task — that and nothing more. And to-morrow — who knows? The world likes men who know how to mind their own business.

March 3, 1919.

Norman Angell was propped up in bed in his room at the Hôtel Vouillemont, just around the corner from the Crillon, when I looked him up to-day. He was trying to intimidate a slight attack of the "flu" with a deluge of hot tea.

"Beats all," commented Mr. Angell, between sips, "how my friends are dying right and left of the 'flu.'"

Every time I pick up a paper I see a new name."

"Do you approve the covenant of the League of Nations as it stands?" I asked.

"No, I don't. It is a league of governments, not of the people. Its outstanding weakness is that it does not provide adequate representation of the people as distinct from the governments. Besides, the whole tendency heretofore has been to separate the executive from the legislative powers. Within the nation the cabinet cannot make laws, but under the covenant the delegates of a cabinet will be able to pass most far-reaching laws."

I sat down on the edge of the bed, and Mr. Angell outlined the ideas that had come to him.

"Sometimes a government is itself merely a minority, owing to the political defects of our group or party systems," he continued. "Prime Minister Lloyd George has a majority of approximately 250 votes in Parliament, yet under an equitable system he would not have more than a majority of twenty or thirty.

"They tell us that all the political groups should be represented in the proposed machinery of the league. Until this is done the whole people will not have a voice in the affairs of the league.

"There is such a thing as equality of states, and the principle is a valuable one, but it must be offset by equality of peoples. If Nicaragua as a state has one vote, and the United States has one, and we leave it at that, we get a situation which is preposterous. But if in addition to the chamber of states, which presumably the body of delegates will be, we have another

chamber representing the peoples proportionally, America will have in that chamber 1,000 times the voting power of Nicaragua. The league must create such an assembly of representatives.

"The same situation came up when Alexander Hamilton was working on the Constitution of the United States. Each of the thirteen States considered itself a sovereign state and demanded equal representation, which meant giving Rhode Island the same number of representatives as New York. Hamilton thereupon arranged for a popular chamber which should be made up of representatives of the people, and so added to the equality of States the equality of men.

"My suggestion is in effect the creation of an additional body,—an assembly of representatives,—and a reduction in size of the body of delegates. You would then have a machine corresponding to the American Federal Government, the council corresponding to the cabinet, the assembly of delegates to the Senate, and the assembly of representatives to the House of Representatives. My idea is that this latter assembly should suggest legislation. I feel that the membership in the assembly of delegates should be decreased in number, and a house of representatives added."

March 17, 1919.

The peace commissioners are up pretty late these nights, but they are not dancing the polonaise. They are fighting against time, laboring by the sweat of the brow to get the affairs of the world in shipshape order before harassed Europe slips into bankruptcy.

When a peace commissioner appears at a social gathering in Paris to-day it is after the fish has been served and the hosts are anxiously wondering whether the guest's chair will remain unoccupied. He dashes in, nibbles at a bit of celery, and then starts reading a speech which his secretary has carefully typed — perhaps written — for him. He does not raise a glass of brimming champagne and shout, "Here's to the ladies!" He does not even remain to find out whether his speech has been a hit or a flat failure. By the time the international row over his remarks starts he is half-way down the staircase, ready to deliver another speech at another dinner, which he reaches shortly after the meat course.

Take the typical day of an American commissioner. He rises at 7; gets a rub-down; breakfast at 8; reads his mail and papers; dictates to his secretary at 9; at 9:30 hears a plea by a delegation for the political autonomy of Tierra del Fuego; at 9:35 he hears a missionary on religious differences at the Antarctic circle; at 9:40 he gets a memorial for the suppression of the "Berliner Tageblatt"; at 9:45 he listens to pleas for a loan of \$20,000,000 for making sausages out of the Thuringian Forest; at 10 o'clock he meets American newspaper men, and categorically denies all the reports printed in the French newspapers. He is then whisked off to a meeting of the committee on the territorial claims of Iceland, followed by a meeting of the committee on the territorial claims of Greenland. As the two overlap, he goes to lunch feeling that he has started another civil war. In the afternoon —

When Mr. Wilson's ship left America the delegates to the conference began to speed up, and they have been speeding up ever since. These are hard days for the members of the subordinate committees. One day they hear the ayes and the next day the noes. The arguments on the ethnographical, ethnological, and geographical character of the Banat of Temesvar or some other equally exciting place pile up. Great heaps of books are brought in, and gay colored maps dazzle the commissions' eyes. Experts in all languages parade their vocabularies.

In view of the fact that the Council of Ten has most of its sittings in the afternoon after the commissioners have partaken of the hearty six or eight course luncheon with which the French fight off famine in the middle of the day, it is no wonder that its members like to doze now and then. Of course they do not really get a good nap,—just a sort of forty winks,—and if they did, nobody would speak about it for fear of starting another Balkan war.

"I have often wondered how Secretary Lansing kept awake," said the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour the other day. "Now I have sat next to him and found out. He draws the most fascinating pictures imaginable."

"No doubt about it," commented Henry White. "Secretary Lansing is actually an artist. He draws heads mostly, and they are fine. He has a humorous sense, too. After the meetings the attendants gather up all his works of art and file them away along with

other documents of the conference in French archives. His drawings keep him awake."

"I am sorry that I have not an accomplishment of some kind," said another commissioner. "I must confess that I have had a hard time keeping awake. Yesterday I had a fine chance for a nap. The Zionists were presenting their case, with which I am fully in sympathy. One of their number, a very scholarly man, gave a long speech in Hebrew. I speak English, French, and the New York dialect, but my Hebrew has been neglected. So I dozed off, and woke up when the interpreter started."

"Who interpreted for him?" asked a friend.

"Well, come to think of it, the speaker himself did," replied the commissioner.

CHAPTER XI

How Belgium set about to get a brand-new parchment for a tattered scrap of paper, and what came of it.

"GENTLEMEN," said M. Paul Hymans, minister of foreign affairs for Belgium, as he arose to address the Council of Ten, "there is a little matter — ahem — which appears to have escaped the attention of the Peace Conference. I refer to the so-called scrap of paper."

Thereupon the delegates, who had grown gray since the armistice, turned aside from their labored study of the ethnological and anthropological conditions in the Banat of Temesvar, and scratched their heads. The "scrap of paper" had a familiar ring; there was something about the phrase that sounded like ancient history, and so it was, for it antedated the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points, and the coming of the Prince of the Hedjaz, and the merry war between friends in Paris. It was in the first days of the Great War that the neutrality of Belgium had been riddled like a sieve, and it was in that first year — 1914 — that Bethmann Hollweg, chancellor of the German Empire, characterized the treaty which guaranteed it as a "scrap of paper."

Never before was a treaty defended like this, with blood and treasure and unmeasured sacrifice.

"Well, now," said the men who sat in judgment on a world, "what would you have us do about it?"

"Belgium wants a new treaty," said M. Hymans. "The arrangement of 1839 failed to keep us out of the war. Now we want a real treaty that will."

As a matter of fact, there were three treaties of 1839, and originally there were four. To go back to ancient history, these four treaties were signed in London on April 19, 1839. The first treaty was between the five great powers of that day — England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria on the one hand, and Belgium on the other; the second between these five powers and the Netherlands, and containing virtually identical clauses; the third between Belgium and the Netherlands. The fourth treaty was between the five powers and the Germanic Confederation, and did not bear particularly on Belgium, but on Luxemburg; however, it established certain precedents, which came in opportunely in 1919. This treaty became inoperative when the confederation dissolved after the defeat of Austria by Prussia at Sadowa in 1866.

Looking backward, it cannot be said that the treaties did not serve their purpose fairly well, as treaties go; for in the seventy-five years that lie between 1839 and 1914 they had more than once proved the barrier to aggression by way of the great Belgian plain. And scares there had been a-plenty, even one or two wars, notably the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which might easily have led to a violation of Belgian territory had the bond not been held sacred by the leaders of that day. Yet while the German general staff planned its invasion

of France by way of Belgium, the German diplomats protested that Germany would never repudiate the treaties. Thus as late as 1911, when it was reported that Germany meant to violate Belgian territory when the Dutch scheme to fortify Flushing brought about a crisis, Bethmann Hollweg informed the Belgian ambassador at Berlin solemnly that Germany had no intention of disregarding the covenant. And again in 1913, Jagow, German secretary of state for foreign affairs, declared: "The neutrality of Belgium is settled by international conventions, which Germany is resolved to respect," and Heeringen, minister for war, said: "Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaties." There could be no question that Germany properly and publicly acknowledged that the German Empire was the rightful successor to the obligations of Prussia and was bound by Prussia's signatures to the treaties of 1839.

Now came a delicate point: the conference had met to make peace with Germany, not to meddle with the affairs of neutral nations. And the Netherlands was a neutral nation, yet involved in the Belgian treaties. Was the conference empowered to take up with the Netherlands the discussion of the treaties? M. Hymans contended that it was. Moreover, here was a wonderful opportunity for the Netherlands to set herself right before the world, for the treaties of 1839 had been forced down the throat of the new Belgian kingdom, then just liberated from Dutch rule, and the conditions they imposed were such as to help stifle the eco-

conomic life of Belgium and give extraordinary advantages to the Netherlands. M. Hymans had visualized this opportunity as well as any one. The scrap of paper had been torn up, and Belgium needed a new piece of parchment to guarantee her position in Europe. Alone she could not hope to wring concessions from the Netherlands; but backed by the Allies, it would be a different matter. The Central powers no longer counted in diplomatic intercourse. With pressure brought to bear on her, the Netherlands could not properly resist.

M. Hymans made his plea before the Council of Ten on February 11. The council turned the matter over to a commission of two delegates from each of the five great powers, under M. André Tardieu, to determine the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference. M. Tardieu reported on March 8. His report dwelt on three points: first, that the treaties must be revised; secondly, that they could not be separated, and must be revised as a whole; thirdly, that nations not originally signatories might take part in the revision. His report set forth that "the three treaties negotiated against Belgium and imposed upon her and the Netherlands by the great powers have furnished to Belgium none of the guarantees which they had promised her, have seriously diminished by their territorial and fluvial articles her possibilities of defense, and are largely responsible for the prejudice she has suffered."

Here comes the part played by the precedents established by the obsolete treaty with the Germanic Confederation. After the defeat of Austria at Sadowa by Prussia in 1866, the Germanic Confederation was dis-

solved, and a contention over Luxemburg arose between Prussia and France which might easily have led to war. The King of the Netherlands, who was also Grand Duke of Luxemburg, a title conferred by the Congress of Vienna when it gave Luxemburg to the house of Orange, called a conference of all the powers signatory to the treaties of 1839 to revise them, and this met in London on May 7, 1867. Baron Bentinck, speaking for the king at that meeting, considered the four treaties as a whole, although only one was in question. At the same time Italy was invited to take part in the conference, and was welcomed by the Netherlands, although Italy was not a party to the treaties. This established the precedents for the action of 1919.'

The members of the American mission did not all agree to this at first, and I recall a conversation with one of them in which he said that revision of the treaties might properly be undertaken by a commission not related to the Peace Conference, or made later when the League of Nations became operative; but that the conference was concerned primarily with the terms of peace. But America had a special interest in Belgium, for the seventh of the Fourteen Points read in a clear, explicit language: "Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve, to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure

and validity of international law is forever impaired." On the strength of this declaration America might well support the Tardieu report, which it did.

M. Hymans is an astute diplomat, a most clever statesman. When he first came before the Council of Ten he did not formulate any claims, but he merely explained the situation that confronted Belgium. He spoke of the need for better guaranties of the independence of Belgium; of the inconveniences to Belgian commerce by the present regulation of the Scheldt (Escaut) and the Terneuzen Canal; of the need of combining Antwerp with the Meuse and the Rhine; of the Belgian desire for certain cantons which had been joined to Prussian provinces by the Congress of Vienna; and of Belgian aspirations to some sort of political or economic understanding with Luxemburg. What he said was sufficient to cause general consternation and unrest in the Netherlands. The Dutch press immediately accused the Belgians of imperialistic ideas, of aspiring to the rights and territories of a neutral nation, and although some of these charges were justified by what appeared in the newspapers of Belgium, the Dutch attitude was not entirely called for, in view of the fact that the Netherlands had been largely benefited by the dubious treaties of 1839. The Dutch Government, however, on February 18 sent a memorandum to Brussels, asking that the Belgian Government communicate to the Netherlands the claims affecting Holland which M. Hymans had placed before the conference.

The Council of Ten adopted the Tardieu report and sent an invitation to the Netherlands to attend a con-

ference on the treaties. The Netherlands agreed to appoint delegates "to make known its point of view with regard to revision." The council then appointed a commission composed of the ministers of foreign affairs of the five great powers — in the case of the United States, the secretary of state — and representatives of Belgium and the Netherlands. This body held three meetings, on May 19 and 20 and June 3.

At the first session M. Hymans presented Belgium's case. This statement gives so clearly an understanding of the needs of modern Belgium that I may be pardoned here for going into the subject at length, and for supplementing M. Hyman's argument with information that I gathered in the course of a visit to Belgium a few weeks before this meeting took place in Paris. Belgium will always occupy a position of importance in European politics; for hundreds of years its development has been dominated by strategic and economic considerations, and one power after another has attempted to make them serve its ends. Belgium has suffered greatly in the war, but the world is concerned chiefly with her reëstablishment and restoration, and has little idea of the problems that Belgium must solve if she would again become a prosperous industrial and agricultural state.

M. Hymans first set forth that the Scheldt was really a Belgian river because it served only Belgian interests. On the Scheldt depends the prosperity of Antwerp and the whole country. The arrangement of 1839 placed the administration of the river under the joint surveillance of the Netherlands and Belgium,

which caused the upkeep of the river to depend on the consent of the Netherlands, which is the sovereign over the lower Scheldt, and whose ports are rivals of Antwerp. Belgium wishes the power to administer the river, to make all the necessary improvements without any one's consent, in order to serve the needs of commerce. Belgium claims the free disposal of the river in war and peace, and sovereignty over the Scheldt, its dependencies, and the canal of Terneuzen, which unites Ghent with the sea.

The story of the port of Antwerp is the story of a fight against tremendous odds. Time and again interested nations have damaged its prosperity, although it is the natural port for the Continent. It has been restricted for the benefit of France, the Netherlands, and Germany. At one time it was closed altogether. But time and again its merchants have argued its cause, and at last they have been granted a hearing. The demands of the chamber of commerce of Antwerp, made early in 1919, may be interesting in this connection: first, the suppression by France of all surtaxes imposed on all merchandise destined for France which enters by way of Antwerp; second, the annexation of the Maestricht district of the Netherlands in order to liberate the navigation between Antwerp and the Liège basin from foreign control; third, the construction of a canal from the Rhine to Antwerp, costs for which were to be partly assessed against Germany; fourth, the construction of this canal across the Limburg district of the Netherlands to connect the Rhine and Antwerp; fifth, full control over the Scheldt.

M. Hymans presented the following summary of the Belgian demands on the subject of the Scheldt and other waters:

1. The relation to the western Scheldt and the problems connected therewith:

(a) The free disposal of the access to the sea along the Scheldt; that is, the rights of sovereignty over the whole course of the western Scheldt between the sea-dikes or subordinate dikes, and as far as the open sea; besides over all waters belonging to the western Scheldt; also over the canal and railway from Ghent to Terneuzen, and also over the mouth of the canal, where it discharges into the western Scheldt.

(b) The recognition by the Netherlands of the necessity for Belgium, for the defense of her territory, of supporting herself on the lower Scheldt over its whole course, and of the right to make use of this river with full freedom and at all times for her defense, which carries with it the consequence that the Netherlands should renounce all military measures which might interfere in the exercise of this right by Belgium.

(c) The control by Belgium of the locks serving for the draining of Flanders.

(d) The redressing of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen of Bouchaute.

2. With reference to the waters of communication between the western Scheldt and the lower Rhine, especially the making at common cost of a canal with a large vertical section from Antwerp to Moerdijk in substitution of the waterways contemplated by the treaties of 1839.

3. With reference to Dutch Limburg:

(a) The establishment in southern Limburg of a régime which shall guarantee Belgium against the dangers to her safety resulting from the configuration of this region, and which shall give to Belgium a guaranty for her economic interests, which are prejudiced by regulations affecting the land and water territory of the treaties of 1839.

(b) A waterway with a large vertical section, Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt.

4. With reference to Bar-le-Duc (also known as Baarle-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau); an arrangement putting an end to the inconveniences resulting from the present intermingling of Belgian and Dutch territory.

M. Hymans said that the prosperity of Antwerp depends on its communications with the Rhine hinterland and the basin of the Meuse. These communications meet an obstacle in Limburg, which was separated from Belgium in 1839. The enclave of Maestricht on the left bank of the Meuse is at present highly detrimental to Belgian commerce. Belgium wanted the territory from Maestricht to Ruremonde, so that Belgian vessels on the Meuse may pass solely through Belgian territory.

The prosperity of Ghent is connected with control of its outlet to the sea — the canal of Terneuzen, which was built in 1827, before the separation. This canal is controlled at its mouth by the Netherlands, and here also restrictive measures are enforced, making the terminal harbor wholly dependent on Holland. While these conferences were going on, a group of Belgian engineers who had been associated with the waterways

of Belgium came to Paris and made its headquarters at the Hôtel Lotti, the seat of the Belgian delegation. They gave the following facts about the canal: it is thirty-two kilometers in length, with seventeen kilometers in Belgium and fifteen in Dutch territory. In Belgium all navigable ports have channels twenty-six meters wide, whereas in the Netherlands they vary from fifteen to twenty-six meters. At Terneuzen there is only a depth of 5.12 meters at low water, while at high water only vessels with a maximum draught of 8.25 meters can get through. The canal was enlarged in 1895 and 1902, both times after years of obstruction by the Netherlands, at the expense of Belgium and giving the most unusual concessions to the Netherlands, such as the right to close the locks "whenever the Dutch Government will deem it useful to safeguard Dutch interests." By order of the Dutch Government vessels over 140 meters long and 7 meters wide and drawing more than 8 meters are forbidden to go through the new lock at Terneuzen. With regard to fog-signals, guiding-lights, speed regulations, etc., there also are difficulties between Holland and Belgium. The whole situation discloses the most amazing misuse of its natural advantages by the Netherlands against a neutral nation that was not in a position to enforce its demands.

Two questions were posed by M. Hymans, for consideration by the commission. They were:

1. Can the Meuse line, which is the Belgian first line of defense, be sufficiently defended and held under the territorial conditions established by the treaties of 1839,

which have notably placed the city of Maestricht in the hands of the Netherlands?

2. Can the Scheldt line, the principal line of defense for Belgium and a line naturally strong, be held effectively without Belgium having to support her defense upon the whole course of the river?

The Netherlands was represented by M. van Karnebeek, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs. At the session of June 3 he presented the position of the Government of the Netherlands to the Belgian demands. He said first that the integrity of Dutch land and water could not be brought into question; second, that the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands could not be taken up anew on other principles than those contained in the treaties of 1839; third, that his Government was ready to examine in principle the points affecting the navigation and economic interests of Belgium; finally, that the Government feels that the military question must be left in *cadre* of the League of Nations.

On June 3 the French minister of foreign affairs, acting for his colleagues on the commission, sent the following statement to the Belgian and Dutch representatives:

The powers, who have recognized the necessity of a revision of the treaties of 1839, entrust to a commission comprising the representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands, the task of studying the measures which must result from the revision, and of making proposals which may not involve transfer of territorial sovereignty or the establishment of international servitudes. The commission will invite Belgium and the Netherlands

to submit common formulas with reference to the navigable waterways, allowing themselves to be guided in so doing by the general principles accepted by the Peace Conference.

This was a victory for the Netherlands, a defeat for Belgium. The powers said that there would be no transfer of territorial sovereignty. Belgium's aspirations, therefore, to possess Maestricht and the lobe of Limburg, and perhaps even that part of Dutch Zealand, which lies south of the Scheldt, received no support from the powers. M. van Karnebeek was cognizant of the diplomatic victory he had won, for on June 6 he said to the second chamber of the Netherlands at The Hague:

The importance of this arrangement lies herein — that a change of territorial sovereignty has been set aside, while in the second part the way is indicated which leads to common deliberation and common settlement by the two powers most affected. It is my impression that on this footing the Netherlands can participate in the further course of the international controversy. As far as our relations with Belgium are concerned, the government will continue to be guided by the thought that the spirit which is aroused between the two nations is more important than the formulas which bind states. The Netherlands, which, as is known, stands on its rights, has given sufficient proofs that it does not wish to live otherwise than in peace and friendship with Belgium. It desires this for the future also, notwithstanding the threat which arose from the neighboring country and has now been abandoned.

M. Hymans on the other hand, in speaking before the chamber in Brussels, said that the Belgian Government gave its adherence to the resolution of the powers, adding that it was well understood that the procedure indicated did not prevent the examination of all measures indispensable for abolishing the risks and inconveniences to which Belgium and peace generally was

exposed under the terms of the treaties of 1839, and for guaranteeing to Belgium full liberty for its economic development as well as its complete security. He concluded by saying:

The work of revising the treaties of 1839 is about to commence. It will take long. It will not lack the best efforts of the government and will receive the full support of the nation. Opinion should not exaggerate, but remain firm and confident of the outcome. Our cause is just and must triumph.

Thus the annexation movement in Belgium that was directed against the Netherlands died in the Peace Conference. An interesting side-light to this situation is furnished by "Het Volk," the Dutch socialist newspaper. It says that if the Belgian annexation movement is dead, the credit should go to the steadfast opposition of the socialist members of the Belgian cabinet, men like Vandervelde, Anseele, and Wauters.

Assured of the friendship of the great powers, Belgium may well expect many of the burdens imposed by the treaties of 1839 to be removed and an entirely new, bombproof parchment substituted for the tattered "scrap of paper." And as it turned out later, Germany's consent to any agreement which the Allies and the associated powers might enter into with Belgium and the Netherlands was provided for in the treaty of peace, according to which Germany agrees to observe it and to give her formal adhesion immediately, should it be required.

But if the powers stopped any Belgian plans of expansion at the expense of the Netherlands, they looked favorably on the desire of Belgium to annex Prussian

Wallonia, or Malmedy, and Moresnet, a neutral territory located at the point where the boundaries of the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium meet. The annexation of Prussian Wallonia was advocated by the Walloons of Belgium and opposed to a mild extent by the Flemish part of the Belgian population, and thereby hangs a long story which touches on the delicate internal situation in Belgium itself — the fight between the Flemings and the Walloons for supremacy in this little nation.

When the Peace Conference was considering the proposals of Belgium, Colonel House received a telegram from a so-called Flemish committee of The Hague, purporting to act in the name of "the oppressed people of Flanders," and asking him to bring before the conference the position of the Flemings in Belgium. The arguments advanced by this committee are those regularly heard in Flemish circles of Belgium, and in brief are as follows: Belgium is divided between the French-speaking Walloons, who are descendants of the Romans and Belgæ, and who speak French, and the Flemings, who are Teutonic and speak Flemish, a tongue very similar to Dutch. The Flemings assert that the French element, being in control of the Government, has used its power to advance French as the native tongue, instead of Flemish, and has virtually shut the Flemings out from the universities, public offices, and political life when they do not speak French. It is understood that the Walloons so far have had a majority, but the Flemings charge that these figures have been juggled and that in reality Belgium is preponderatingly Flem-

ish, and that eighty per cent. of the soldiers in the army were Flemish, but were commanded in the French tongue. The Flemings ask autonomy as part of their movement to reëstablish Flemish civilization and culture; they seek a federation of two self-governing parts of Belgium, with Flemish schools, courts, and government offices in all Flemish districts, and the regional system in the army. All this in the telegram to Colonel House.

The French-speaking Government of Belgium is naturally opposed to this program. It sets forth that the Flemish element is not chronically discontented, but is being used by crafty politicians to further their own ends. Two languages in the army are opposed by every military authority who has observed the havoc wrought by this system in old Austria-Hungary. It also charges that to stir up the Flemish people is the favorite pastime of the German Government, which plays on the Teutonic strain and thereby hopes at length to disrupt Belgium and take the Flemish districts, including the port of Antwerp. There is no doubt that Germany laid the foundation for exactly that sort of policy during the war by her support of the activist movement, and by proclaiming the council of Flanders under the protection of German bayonets in the Alhambra Theater in Brussels in 1918. The Germans re-instituted a Flemish faculty in the University of Ghent, and opened Flemish normal schools at Laeken and Uccle. The better element of Flemings, however, repulsed the overtures of the enemy. The fine record for loyalty achieved by the Flemish soldiers in the Belgian Army

is sufficient to prove that this back-fire availed the Germans nothing. A recent attempt on the part of a small Flemish element to embarrass the Government in a debate in the chamber led to an outright government victory, and indicated that the country was well satisfied with the cabinet headed by M. Delacroix, which includes such able men as M. Hymans, M. Jules Renkin, and M. Emile Vandervelde, perhaps the leading representatives in Belgium respectively of the liberal, Catholic, and socialist parties.

The little country that held out so bravely during the war, that fought so doggedly on the little stretch of sandy plain in Flanders, which was all of Belgium that did not fall into the hands of the enemy, carried on its campaign in Paris just as courageously and energetically, determined to win at all costs every advantage which would further the growth and prosperity of this little realm. Technical advisers, lawmakers, scientists, engineers, diplomats crowded the corridors of the Hôtel Lotti on the Rue Castiglione, where the Belgian colors hung draped over the arcades and where soldiers in the khaki of the Belgian Army stood guard day and night. Here labored MM. Hymans, Vandenhoevel, and Vandervelde, and every once in a while they were reënforced by a tall, sandy-haired youngish-looking man of erect bearing and modest address, for whom the sentinels clicked a salute in short order. It was Albert, no less a diplomat than a king.

CHAPTER XII

The eighth point wins a splendid victory, and then comes the Saar basin, and the whole fourteen suffer an eclipse.

“AND the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 and the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted.”

It was the eighth commandment of the fourteen, and it was running through my head, repeating itself over and over, as our train glided through the low-lying meadow-lands of the Alsatian foot-hills. Again and again it kept time to the click of the rails and the thumping of the trucks, and when my eye traveled up to the western sky and followed those proud hills, capped with a coronet of battlemented towers, the thought came back to me that this was the land that France had gathered back into the fold as a mother gathers her daughter into her arms. And I recalled what Marshal Joffre had said to the little girl in the quaint Alsatian costume:

“You are Alsace; I am France. I bring you the kiss of France.”

I turned to a member of the French official party who was sitting close by, gazing out of the car-window with a preoccupied look. He was a fine scholar, a French savant who had traveled much,

"I know what you are thinking about," I volunteered; and as he turned, "about Alsace."

"Yes," he replied, and nodded slowly.

"I wonder if it will look different to you now that it has become French," I said.

"I have never seen Alsace," he replied quietly and, I thought, somewhat sadly; "this is my first visit, too. I could not bear to come here *then*."

His answer was typical of the feeling in the hearts of many fine Frenchmen, for few had the heart to view Alsace and Lorraine under the German heel. Many of the wounds of the war of 1870-71 had healed with the passing of that generation, but remembrance did not die out. There were ready and willing hands, it seemed, to keep green the garlands laid at the base of the statue of Strasburg in the Place de la Concorde, and before the memorial to Turenne at the Invalides. There were writers, too, ready to plead the cause of the lost provinces; not, perhaps, with the fire and spirit of the circle that gathered in the salon of Mme. Juliette Adam as the nineteenth century drew to a close, but with as great a degree of devotion and zeal. Alsace and Lorraine became symbols of martyrdom. When the war came, the old wounds opened anew, and possession of these lands became the cherished war aim of France. When the tricolor flew from the spire of the cathedral of Strasburg, it was not as if it had been unfurled over a conquered land; it was the flag of the mother-country, back again after a long exile.

Alsace and Lorraine were back in the fold now. The wrong that had been done to France had been righted,

or at least was about to be righted. I mentioned the matter to my French friend.

"The return of Alsace and Lorraine was one of the aims for which France fought," he said, "and it was so stated in the Fourteen Points by President Wilson, which were agreed to by the Germans. Although, as a matter of fact," he added, "your President's statement was a bit ambiguous."

"You mean with regard to righting the wrong?" I asked.

"Exactly," he replied. "We should have preferred the plain statement that the provinces shall be returned to France. Germany is even now saying that the eighth point does not rule out a plebiscite, and is making capital out of the President's stand for the right of peoples to choose their own political destiny."

"But there will be no plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine?" I continued.

"Of course not. We have never acknowledged that we ever relinquished ownership and title. We merely gave up the provinces under force and under protest. So we are not obligated either by a written word or morally to put the matter to a plebiscite now. And, as a matter of fact," he added as he looked out over the roofs and towers of the great city which we were now entering, "I am rather glad that we do not have to put it to the test."

The train stopped just then in the central station of Strasburg, and I could not pursue the subject farther. There were bags to be looked after, and raincoats and umbrellas to be produced, for we were landing in a

mild, drizzling rain. I did not think of his remark again until we paraded out of the station into the great square beyond, and I beheld a city which flew the tri-color and yet had something about it that was different from any French city I had ever known; in which even the doors and the window-frames and the roofs had a distinctive architecture, and where the lettering of the shopkeepers' signs was in a new kind of script, and where these signs frequently displayed names that had no apparent relation to the newly painted "*maison française*" below them. I caught up with my friend, who was going forward with wide-open eyes, but a closed mouth, taking in scenes of which he had heard much, but which he had never seen.

"I think I know what you meant back there in the *wagon*," I resumed. "You meant this," and I indicated the sign-boards.

"They were here close to forty-nine years," he replied almost irrelevantly, "and they began their dastardly work almost the day they arrived — began it with the conscious plan of making Alsace and Lorraine a part of the empire. That's nearly half a century. Pretty long — too long when the ruler is one who never sleeps, who never forgets his object, who has eternally in view the aim of uniting these lands to him by ties that will overcome the call of duty, nationality, religion, honor. I suppose that if we came to count heads now, we would find a mighty lot of Germans here. And yet that would not be justice. Others should be counted — others who once lived here, but who went over the Vosges and sought new homes in other departments of

France. And then there are the dead, who were robbed and despoiled, and who are silent now. And yet many of these people about us who speak German fluently, and their own Alsatian patois, at heart are true to France."

There was much wisdom in what he said. Germany might well appeal to the Peace Conference for a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine, for there was always the possibility of organizing a turbulent, obstructive minority. The Germans had exploited these lands, had colonized them, had Germanized them. The dead could not vote, or the exiled; only the living, and it had been nearly fifty years since the provinces were torn from the side of France. In that half-century great changes had taken place. Alsace and Lorraine had been agricultural provinces, producing wheat, rye, oats, barley, potatoes, roots, and vegetables. In 1871 a slight majority of the inhabitants had been farmers, and now only thirty per cent. of the population was working the farms. Not that farming had retrogressed. A great industry had come to life after the Germans took possession; mines had been developed, great waterways had been built, mills and smelters had been reared and an active shipping life had been stimulated. Strasbourg had become one of the great inland ports of the German Empire. In 1907, out of 1,820,249 inhabitants in Alsace and Lorraine, 551,658, or 30.3 per cent., had been engaged in agricultural pursuits; 730,952, or 40.2 per cent., in mining and in industries; and 221,953, or 12.2 per cent., in commerce or trade. Virtually the whole of that industrial life and a great part

of that commerce and trade had been built up by Germans, many of whom had immigrated from other parts of the empire. Most of the railway functionaries were Germans, for the lines of Alsace and Lorraine were an integral part of the German railway system, and in their great mills and mines the owners had purposely favored the German element.

In the course of the next few days I was to have ample opportunity to see what a wonderful land had come back to France, and to learn what changes had been wrought here in the years of German tenancy. Strasbourg was once known to fame as the city of the great cathedral. I found it now the fourth largest port on the Rhine, a great distributing-center which gave occupation to thousands of merchants, shippers, and freight-handlers. In 1913 the gross water traffic had been just a little less than 2,000,000 tons. The Germans had attempted to regulate the shifting sands of the Rhine; they had carved a harbor out of the little island that lies in the stream just beyond what Strasbourg calls the Little Rhine; in fact, two great harbors had been cut here, lined with concrete and stone, and provided with all the appurtenances needed to serve an extensive carrying trade, such as a municipal warehouse with a capacity of 160,000 sacks of grain; another with a capacity of 180,000 sacks, and leased before the war to Mannheim interests; granaries, flour-mills, and factories. The supplies that came into these harbors moved over all the inland waterways of Germany, and there are many. They passed over the Rhine-Marne Canal, famous now in American history

as the waterway where the Germans first found American soldiers; over the Rhine canal to Mulhouse and Basel, which, when extended, will reach Marseilles. Heretofore Strasburg had looked eastward for commercial development, and there had been immense advantages in trading with the German states, and disadvantages in trading with France, so that the channels of communication to the west had been neglected. Now Strasburg was on the eve of another commercial development. The waterways to the west were to be enlarged and extended; France would endeavor to open up trade with Switzerland, and perhaps with the central European lands, and would try to make Bordeaux, Nantes, and St. Nazaire the ports for shipping that for years had entered by way of Antwerp and the Dutch harbors. French engineers also had laid plans for making Brest, Cherbourg, and Pallice ports of the first rank, and Professor Hauser of Dijon University had outlined a scheme for the canalization of the upper Loire and the construction of a Raonne-Givors canal, which would make it possible to convey coal from the Loire district, and American goods from St. Nazaire to Geneva. The upper Loire could connect with the Rhine by means of the Loire Canal, Givors and the Central and Rhone canals. Strasburg might become in the near future a great distributing center for American goods.

Across the bridges of the Rhine we whirled, past the spot where in revolutionary times the sentinel of France stood with his musket beside the sign-board that read, "*Ici commence le Pays de la Liberté.*" The legend

might well be raised again, after a lapse of more than a hundred years, for the Rhine was once again the dividing-line between two theories of government.

On the other side of the Rhine from Strasburg, in the grand duchy of Baden, lies Kehl. Kehl is not only a port, but it possesses possibilities of development, and while it may not divide honors with Strasburg, yet in hostile hands it may become a strong rival. It was this subject that one of the French members of our party touched on as we passed through this town.

"We cannot properly permit a rival to grow up beside Strasburg while we are endeavoring to build up new means of communication with France," he said. "The reason is obvious. With all their waterways and railroads centering here, it would be an easy matter for the Germans to divert all their Strasburg trade to Kehl, and so rob us of this trade before we had an opportunity to develop our waterways and railroads. It would ruin Strasburg as a port. So we are going to propose to the Peace Conference that Kehl and Strasburg shall be treated as a unit in the negotiations. We cannot ask sovereignty over a part of Baden, but we can ask that Kehl be placed under the commission which will regulate the affairs of the Rhine under the treaty of peace. What do you think the Peace Conference will do about it?"

As a matter of fact, what my French friend meant to ask was, what the American mission meant to do about it, for he knew perfectly well that under the European political code the mere inclusion of a few Germans more or less in French territory meant nothing. But

President Wilson stood for the rights of nationalities and had distinctly declared himself against annexation of what was obviously foreign territory, and the attitude the Americans might take in the light of these pronouncements was what disconcerted our associates. Moreover, Mr. Henry White, the American representative on the commission on ports, waterways, and railways had not proved so amenable to the wishes of some of our Allies with regard to regulation of German waterways as they had hoped, and there was a feeling that Belgium and France might not gain all the economic advantages they expected to get now that Germany lay prostrate. The subject of Kehl was, nevertheless, a moot point; my friend had stated the case exactly, and it turned out later that the commission on waterways had been led to accept this view, for an examination of the treaty of peace discloses that Article 65, under Section V, which relates to Alsace and Lorraine, stipulates that for seven years the ports of Kehl and Strasburg shall be treated as a unit, administered by a manager appointed by the Central Rhine commission, who shall be French; all property rights being safeguarded; equality of treatment of the nationals of both countries being provided for, and the reservation made that in the event France does not find seven years sufficient for developing her port, she may ask for an extension of time not to exceed three years.

If the possession of Strasburg meant a new impetus to the development of waterways in France, the return of Alsace and Lorraine meant no less to the railway systems of France. These too needed development to

satisfy the French needs for communications. At the time of the armistice there were 2,694 miles of railways in the two provinces, employing 11,786 officials and employees with rank, 1,984 minor employees and 18,338 laborers, with a rolling stock that included 1,131 locomotives, 2,281 passenger-carriages, and 27,955 freight-cars. The roads were operated successfully,—there was a profit in 1918 of \$12,710,155,—but railway connections with France left much to be desired. Until 1914 there were only two lines across the Vosges, for military reasons; in the south the line running from Paris to Mulhouse by the Valdieu gap, and in the north the line from Paris to Strasburg through the cut at Saverne. Four lines, however, ran into French Lorraine: the line from Nancy to Château-Salins, that from Nancy to Metz, that from Verdun to Metz, and that from Mezières to Thionville. France had now begun to build a line from Saint-Dié to Saales with military labor, crossing the Meurthe near the Saint-Dié station, following the valley of the Fave, and at the Saale pass joining the railway line which connects this district with Strasburg. A second line will connect Epinal with St.-Maurice in the upper valley of the Moselle. This line will establish direct connection between the industrial centers of the Moselle valley, including Thaon, Epinal, and Rupt, and those of the valley of Wesserling and Mulhouse, and will make possible a direct line from Antwerp to Milan. It will cost 50,000,000 francs to build. Leaving St.-Maurice, it will pass through the Tête des Neuf Bois by a tunnel to the valley of Urbes, pass to Pont Rouge la Thür and south

of the Felleringen to Wesserling. A third line will run across the central Vosges, connecting the middle of Alsace with the eastern departments of France. It will mean a connection between St.-Dié and Ste.-Marie aux Mines, joining St.-Dié, Nancy, Epinal, and Ste.-Marie Schlestadt, Benfeld, and Colmar. It will require only one tunnel, and will shorten the distance between Nancy and Colmar by rail from 198 to 126 kilometers. This gives direct access to the woolen- and cotton-spinning and weaving region. Another development is the likelihood of connecting certain railway lines in Alsace and Lorraine in the near future, to give a direct line to Prague, which is needed if Czecho-Slovakia is to be kept within the Entente sphere of influence. French engineers may soon be working at this scheme in Bohemia, where about fifty kilometers of railway will have to be constructed to make the dream a fact.

The imperial German emblems were still on the bridge across the Rhine at this strategic point, and the approach was encumbered by the remains of a barricade that had been hurriedly erected in the last days of the Great War. My French friend spoke of the emblems as we returned to Strasburg.

"They are coming down in a few days," he said. "The municipal council has decided to replace them with reliefs of Professors Kuss and Arnold, two members of the faculty of our old University of Strasburg, who were persecuted for their political views in 1871."

It was typical of the French that they had been in no hurry to remove the imperial emblems. Alsace and Lorraine were French again, and the mere fact that

there was a German emblem here and there did not appear of consequence. Quietly, but thoroughly, the French went forward to make the provinces an integral part of France. The French showed no hesitation about removing Germans from important places of trust and in loosening the German grip on the trade of the region; but an eagle or two, even a harmless painting, might remain. Thus in one of the great rooms of the governor's palace I viewed the life-sized paintings of the Hohenzollerns,—William, the former empress, and the former crown prince,—and it was M. Maringer himself, then high commissioner, who drew back the hangings that covered them and laughingly exhibited them. No one had damaged the paintings; the French were satisfied to give them a generous “booing.” They were subjects for laughter now, and as to what became of the pictures, the French did n't care — “*ça ne fait rien.*” When, later on, we ate from the imperial plate and raised high the imperial goblets, it did not matter that they bore the Prussian eagle so long as we toasted the future of France.

M. Maringer supervised the preliminary steps of the civil administration, and then gave the reins to M. Alexandre Millerand, a man from whom France expected much. Millerand was one of the big men of France, but for the last few years he had been in eclipse. He was minister of war in the cabinet of Viviani, and served until October 29, 1915, when he was followed by General Gallieni under the Briand ministry. M. Millerand is a socialist, but in the United States he would be regarded as a progressive. At one time he collaborated

with M. Clemenceau on the newspaper "La Justice." Differences in politics caused the two men to become alienated, but when M. Clemenceau was felled by an assassin's bullet, M. Millerand hurried to his bedside, and his visit did the president of the council a world of good, and led to his appointment as commissioner-general for Alsace and Lorraine, with the status of a minister in the cabinet of France. According to the statute under which he worked he took charge under the direct authority of the president of the council, to supervise the general administration of affairs in Alsace and Lorraine and to make the seat of his government at Strasburg, with three commissioners under him, one at Strasburg for lower Alsace; one at Colmar for upper Alsace, and one at Metz for Lorraine.

M. Millerand did not find the incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine into France an easy task. Tremendous difficulties stood in the way. The Germans in the industries and in the railways sought to hamper the work of the French administration by underground methods, strikes, and sabotage. The Government of the republic soon organized the administration of Alsace and Lorraine under the superior council, which had M. Millerand at its head and M. Louis Barthou as vice-president, and was composed of thirty-two members, of whom eleven were French, and twenty-one residents of Alsace and Lorraine. Among the members were such well-known leaders as Lucien Poincaré, vice-rector of the University of Paris; Albert Thomas; Daniel Blumenthal, the former mayor of Colmar, and the Abbé Wetterle. This council was to take up all

questions of a general nature submitted to it by the commissioner, and later studied such matters as the disposition of German property in Alsace and Lorraine, making provision for the University of Strasburg, the new railway lines through the Vosges, the eight-hour day, and financial matters of various kinds.

The French authorities made a survey of the population of the two provinces, and divided the people into four categories, giving them cards as follows: A. All inhabitants of French nationality with a French ancestry antedating 1840; B. All inhabitants who were the issue of a mixed marriage; that is, an Alsatian or a Lorrainer married to a German; C. All inhabitants who are the nationals of an allied or neutral country; D. All inhabitants who are German immigrants. The result showed fifty-nine per cent. of the population belonging to the first class; ten per cent. to the second class; three per cent. to the third class, and twenty-eight per cent. to the fourth class. It was then estimated that the number of immigrants in Alsace and Lorraine reached 480,000, which was considerably less than had resided there before the war, as many of them had served in the German Army and had not returned, and others had departed since the armistice.

France early endeavored to "right the wrong" that had been done to the original French inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine when the treaty with Prussia in 1871 deprived them of their motherland. The terms of that document had been simple, but drastic. I recall two clauses which Bismarck forced upon M. Thiers and M. Favre, and which were ratified by the national assembly



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN PARIS

President Wilson is greeted with military honors by the Guard as he leaves the French Academy with Mrs. Wilson on December 19, 1918, after attending the reception to Academician Joffre. In the foreground is M. William Martin, chef du protocol



at Bordeaux. The first completed the annexation: "France renounces in favor of the German Empire the following rights: A fifth part of Lorraine, including Metz and Thionville, and Alsace less Belfort." Then the fifth clause, which read: "A delay will be granted to the inhabitants of the territories annexed to choose between the two nationalities." In that simple phraseology lies a story of suffering, of untold grief, a tragedy of broken hearts.

To restore French nationality to the Alsatians and the Lorrainers was more complicated. Plans were drawn up by which justice should be done those who had been forced to become Germans before the law. These plans were presented to the Peace Conference, and subsequently incorporated in the treaty of peace. The following provisions were made and incorporated in the annex to the section of the treaty of peace that deals with the status of Alsace and Lorraine: reinstated into full French citizenship and nationality as dating from November 11, 1918, were all who lost French nationality by the application of the Franco-German treaty of May 10, 1871, and who since that time have not acquired any other nationality than German; the legitimate or natural descendants of these persons, except for those whose ancestors in the paternal line include a German who migrated to Alsace and Lorraine after July 15, 1870, the date of the German occupation, and all persons born in the provinces of unknown parents or whose nationality is unknown. Within one year after the ratification of the treaty of peace French nationality might be claimed by all persons whose ascend-

ants include a Frenchman or a Frenchwoman who lost his or her nationality by the German occupation; all foreigners not Germans who became citizens of Alsace and Lorraine before August 3, 1914; all Germans who live there now and lived there before July 15, 1870, or one of whose ascendants was living there at that time; all Germans who served in the armies of the allied and associated powers during the late war and their descendants; all persons born in Alsace and Lorraine before May 10, 1871, of foreign parents, and the descendants of these persons, and the husband or wife of any person whose nationality has been restored as from November 11, 1918. Germans are not to be given French nationality even if they are citizens of Alsace and Lorraine, except by naturalization if they lived in these regions before August 3, 1914, and will have resided there continuously for three years after November 11, 1918.

In Alsace and Lorraine France finds itself confronted with the problem of a church and state united. The religious situation here is entirely different from that in the rest of France. The act by which church and state were separated in France and relations with the Vatican broken must eventually be applied to Alsace and Lorraine, but what the effect will be is rather uncertain to-day. France has endeavored to assure the residents of these two lands that their ancient customs would not be affected. Thus the president of the Chamber of Deputies declared, "The victorious republic will be respectful of your traditions, your customs, your liberties and your beliefs." Speaking at Strasburg on

March 26, M. Millerand said, "I have the wish to respect scrupulously the beliefs and customs of the Alsations." And he added:

"For the moment the Concordat continues, but little by little Alsace and Lorraine will enter into all the forms of French legislation. The president of the Republic, the president of the council, and Marshal Joffre have pronounced the words guaranteeing your liberty, customs, and beliefs. This promise will be kept by me."

One of the first comments on the new régime that I heard from an Alsatian, a member of an old French family, was:

"We hope that France will find a way out to permit us to keep our present religious schools and will not deprive the churches of the support they have received for so many years. It is rather an important question for us, and its solution will have much to do with the success of French Government here."

One is inclined to believe that the Germans blundered much, but in Alsace and Lorraine they introduced many excellent measures. Dr. Gustave Le Bon asserted recently that the Germans failed to understand the psychology of the Alsatian people, but that their economic systems had much in them that was beneficial. He added:

It was only in religious matters, so important to Alsace, that the Germanic domination did not become oppressive. The hope of conquering the people by the influence of the clergy softened much their attitude toward the churchmen and they respected the Concordat with Rome. They knew from history that it was not possible to touch the religious beliefs of the Alsations. Re-

spectful of the treaties (those of Münster and Osnabrück, Westphalia, 1648; and the terms of the capitulation of Strasburg in 1680) even Louis XIV, in spite of the ardor of his beliefs, did not apply the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to Alsace.

The French Government proceeded carefully in this situation. A commission was appointed to investigate the religious status of Alsace and Lorraine, but the appointment of Senator Debierre at its head brought objections because he was regarded as a militant free thinker. Another flurry came when Monsignor Ceretti arrived in Paris to treat with the Government on religious matters. For a moment it was thought that the monsignor might enter into relations with the Peace Conference on behalf of the Vatican, a course that was strongly objected to by Italy, which had caused the incorporation of a clause in the secret treaty of 1915, by the terms of which the Allies agreed to exclude the Vatican from the peace negotiations. The monsignor came, however, to coöperate in the appointment of two French bishops to succeed the German bishops of Metz and Strasburg. A heated debate resulted in the Chamber of Deputies on this subject, and it was charged that the Government had violated the law separating the church and state in France. To this M. Pichon replied that the law was scrupulously observed in France, but that the Concordat was still in force in Alsace and Lorraine. The clergy had asked the appointment of French bishops by France and had shown its friendly attitude toward the Government. It is likely that the religious affairs of these returned provinces may for a time be regulated by a special law, but the eventual

separation of church and state in Alsace and Lorraine is plainly forecast by the statements that have already been made in the French Chamber.

No title to national property was ever better than the title of France to Alsace and Lorraine, yet it is a sad commentary on the ways of the old secret diplomacy that in order to assure the return of these lost provinces France had to agree to concessions demanded by another nation. This is betrayed in the secret agreements made between France and her allies and disclosed in the publication of the alleged secret records of the Russian foreign office by the Bolsheviki in 1917. They disclose that the return of Alsace and Lorraine was a definite war aim on the part of France, but that before Russia would agree to England and France being permitted to regulate the western frontiers of Germany, Russia demanded the right to regulate the eastern frontiers.

There is another subject associated with the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and that is the demand of France for the Saar basin. This, too, is contained in the secret documents published by the Russians. A secret telegram, dated January 30, 1917, and purporting to have been sent by the Russian foreign office in Petrograd to the Russian ambassador in Paris contains a paragraph which reads:

At an imperial audience M. Dumerg transmitted to the emperor the desire of France to insure for herself at the termination of the war the return of Alsace and Lorraine, and of a certain position in the valley of the River Saar, and also to attain the political separation from Germany of her beyond the Rhine provinces and their organization on a different basis, so that in

the future the River Rhine should be a secure strategic boundary against German invasion. Dumerg expressed the hope that the Imperial Government will not decline to formulate at once its assent to these propositions.

The czar assented in principle, continues the telegram, but declared that Russia reserved the right to ask that she be allowed to determine the eastern boundaries of Germany in turn. In a second note, dated February, 1917, and addressed by the Russian minister of foreign affairs to the French ambassador to Petrograd, the claims of France to Alsace and Lorraine are again set forth, and the Saar basin also is included. It reads in part:

In your note of this date your Excellency was good enough to communicate to the Imperial Government that the government of the republic intended to include among the terms of peace which will be offered to Germany the following demands and guarantees of territorial character: (1) Alsace and Lorraine to be returned to France; (2) The boundaries will be extended at least to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine, and will be fixed under the direction of the French Government. At the same time strategic demands must be taken into consideration so as to include within the French territory the whole of the industrial iron basin of Lorraine and the whole of the industrial basin of the valley of the Saar.

These arrangements might well stand as proof of the iniquitous methods of the old secret diplomacy, by which diplomats traded peoples and lands off against each other's claims without any attempt to follow the wishes of the populations affected. France's title to Alsace and Lorraine was so clear and clean that it should not have been soiled by mentioning in the same breath French covetousness for the basin of the Saar. That title was questionable, and that claim was open

to the suspicion that, the war having been won, France would endeavor in every manner to profit at the expense of the competing German.

The demand for the Saar basin was made by France almost as soon as the subject of Germany's western frontiers was opened by the Peace Conference. It was here not a question of French lands taken by Germany in 1871, but of lands that had been in German hands since the Congress at Vienna, and that had not been French for 103 years. Such title as France could muster historically had to fall back upon the military campaigns of Louis XIV, who was active in this region and founded some of the towns, and upon the conquests of the Revolution and the Napoleonic armies; at other times the country had been ruled by the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, the bishops of Metz, or the dukes of Lorraine, and the people had remained fairly preponderatingly German, speaking their German dialect and being but little influenced by the French elements among them. Even if the historical claims of the French could be admitted, the changes that had been wrought here were such that the valley of the Saar could not be given to France without violating the right of nationalities that President Wilson had scrupulously guarded.

One day when I was walking down the streets of Strasburg with Lucius F. Curtis of the Associated Press we were accosted by a pleasant young man who asked whether we were Americans.

"I am asking for information," he continued. "I have been delegated by a number of students of the uni-

versity to express to President Wilson our opinion that the Saar basin should remain German. We are not German sympathizers. We are Alsatians who have seen our country used as a foot-ball in international politics, and we do not want to see the basis laid for new wars that will involve ourselves and all that we possess. The Saar is German, and to take that is purely an imperialistic policy. We look upon President Wilson as the guardian of the rights of all peoples to self-determination and we wish to send him our resolutions."

There were other elements besides the students who objected to the claims of France to the Saar, and on the other side of the Rhine a storm of rage and protest arose when it became known that the conference was seriously debating giving the Saar to France. "No German workman can accept the responsibility of agreeing to this," cried out the Berlin workers. "Defend your brothers! Raise a protest through the whole world! It will be unjust for the capital of the Entente to demand the cession of the Saar basin, to give it a protectorate or provide other government for it."

German protests might have been expected. Germans were bound to object to nearly everything. Certain American newspapers, however, also opposed this demand of France. Liberal newspapers of England also agreed that this was imperialism and economic greed.

One man stood between the French aims and their accomplishment, Woodrow Wilson.

Now comes a strange chapter in the history of the

Peace Conference. Unofficially, France based its claims to the Saar basin wholly upon economic grounds. The Saar is the region of the great coal-fields that are important when considered with the iron mines of Lorraine as an economic unit. To draw a boundary-line which shall leave the iron-mines on one side and the coal-mines on the other, and eventually place the barrier of a customs tariff between them is manifestly unfair; but regulation of the tariff and not a change in the boundary-line is the proper solution, if justice would be served. From the point of view of transportation charges it was also an advantage for the nation which owned the minette iron-mines and the smelters to own the coal, but mere economic advantages could hardly be made an argument before the Peace Conference.

In the secret documents France places her claims on strategic grounds. France wishes to "assure herself of a certain position in the valley of the River Saar," and again, "At the same time strategic demands must be taken into consideration so as to include within French territory the whole of the industrial iron basin of Lorraine and the whole of the industrial basin of the valley of the Saar."

President Wilson, it was asserted in Paris, could not see his way clear to agree to out-and-out annexation. A plan was then proposed to place the administration of the Saar basin under the League of Nations. M. André Tardieu was said to be the author of this plan. To this President Wilson evidently agreed. How the agreement was reached, or why, after both the Presi-

dent and Colonel House were known to be opposed to the transfer of sovereignty, has not yet been made sufficiently clear to the public, and can be answered only by the President himself; but the fact remains that when the treaty of peace was made public, one whole section was devoted to the Saar basin, and the most careful reading failed to reveal that much more than a semblance of righteousness had been preserved by the provision that the League of Nations should become trustee, and that at the end of fifteen years the inhabitants of the Saar basin should be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed.

This is in fact a small concession in view of the great gains which France has been enabled to make in this region. For it is set forth that "As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France, and as part payment toward the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar basin." Provision is also made that France shall receive the mining plants and all their equipment; the basin is to be subject to the French customs régime, and French money may be used. When the plebiscite comes, voting will be by communes or districts, and the clause "If, for the whole or part of the territory, the League of Nations decides in favor of union with France," would seem to indicate that action may be taken to divide this terri-

tory in the event one section votes one way and another differently. Furthermore, should the plebiscite favor Germany, Germany is to purchase the mines in their entirety at a price payable in gold and fixed by three experts, one French, one German, and one named by the Council of the League of Nations, and should the mines then go back to Germany, arrangements are to be made whereby French nationals can get all the coal they need, the contract terms to be fixed also by the council of the league.

In this connection it must also be remembered that France has obtained the promise of deliveries of coal to make up for the losses sustained by the destruction of the coal regions of northern France, in the Nord and Pas de Calais departments, and that this is to be charged up against claims for reparation of damages sustained by France. For ten years Germany is to make up the difference between the actual output of these mines and the annual production before the war.

It was not alone the more liberal-minded Americans who regretted that the members of the American mission had found it necessary to assent to the arrangement affecting the Saar. In the Italian camp it caused an outburst of indignation, for the Italians immediately compared this action with that of the American President toward Fiume. If, they argued, President Wilson held out against awarding Fiume to Italy, for which both economic and nationality reasons could be adduced, how could he compromise his principles so far as to yield to the French demand for the Saar basin, which was certainly inhabited by Germans and devel-

oped by them, and a necessary part of their industrial system?

I could not help but think that France had committed a diplomatic and political blunder of tremendous consequences, for not alone had France provided Germany with an *irredenta*, with which the German mind would busy itself in the years when Germany recovered from the effects of the war, but France had linked the Saar basin with Alsace and Lorraine, and so had committed an injustice against the inhabitants of these fair lands, who now hoped and prayed that lasting peace might be theirs under French rule. I had spoken with these people and come to understand how ardently they craved that peace; I had seen in their faces the joy they felt because now the great wrong of forty-eight years ago had been righted. I had become convinced that any movement that jeopardized their right to live in peace and amity with their neighbors was nothing short of a crime.

One day I was privileged to attend a simple memorial exercise in the cemetery of Colmar. We met before an unusual monument. It had been carved out of the red sandstone of the Vosges and consisted of a rock standing about five feet high, and of another lying as on a tomb. The rock on the tomb was partly raised, and from it stretched a shoulder and an arm, with all the muscles tense — an arm that seemed to be groping with outstretched fingers for a sword which lay just a few inches out of reach of the fingers. It was an idea of tremendous strength and power, which drew the eye back to it again and again, and made me won-

der whether that powerful shoulder, on which the muscles stood out as if in the throes of a tremendous effort, would succeed in bursting the confines of the narrow tomb.

This was the memorial to Vouilleminot, soldier of France, who died on September 14, 1870. The monument had been raised in 1872 by the sculptor Bartholdi, who fashioned the Statue of Liberty, and who was a native of Colmar. In January, 1916, the German General Gaede had caused the monument to be removed, and what I had come to see now was a re-dedication.

A group of French officers in their blue uniforms and red caps with gold braid came down the path and took a position near the monument. They came so unaffectedly and so simply that it was difficult to believe that they represented a nation whose military history is one of the most imposing in the world. Most unassuming among them was General Gouraud, commander of the Fourth Army. He wore the traditional black coat, red trousers, and leather puttees, and except for the gold braid on his cap and the three stars on his sleeves, one of which hung empty at his side, there was nothing to indicate his rank.

Here was a picture that nothing will ever efface from my memory: General Gouraud, standing beside the monument, speaking in a simple, direct manner, quietly, quickly, and firmly; near him the men who had fought with him in this most terrible of all wars; round about him, and lining the paths of the cemetery, the plain people of Alsace, peasants and mer-

chants, men and women, the good folk who had suffered and sacrificed. And behind the speaker stood a half circle of aged, gray-bearded men, with sunken cheeks and pale, thin lips — men who clustered about the flag of the republic and who proudly displayed badges that announced them to be veterans of the war of 1870-71. High overhead in a Lombardy poplar a bird was singing joyously, so loud and clear that his notes seemed to be echoed back from the distant foothills of the Vosges. The poplars were already green; the sky was an inspiring deep blue; there was a promise of new life on the shrubs and hedges. I looked at the soldiers, and their eyes, too, were clear and bright; at the old veterans, and something seemed to blaze with a new fire from beneath their wrinkled brows; at the simple, sincere peasant folk round about me, and their eyes shone with the joy of the promise of a new day. These men of Colmar and Alsace, I thought, deserve the best of France, and that is peace, security, tranquillity. My mind has reverted many times since to that picture. Will the compact that has been fashioned in Paris give them the peace that is rightly theirs?

CHAPTER XIII

The President prepares a garden party at Principo, and the invited guests drag out the family skeleton.

AT first I thought that the wealthy American socialist who lives in Switzerland and writes books eulogistic of Woodrow Wilson might know what was going to be done about Russia, so I went to him. But he shook his head. Then I had an idea that the Kansas editor who made the public cry for Emporia might know the secret, and I sought him out, with no better results. From time to time I would worry Secretary Lansing about it, and Colonel House, and even the amiable Henry White, and once I got a formidable glare out of M. Pichon when I casually remarked one day:

“Monsieur, is the conference going to recognize the Bolshevik government?”

M. Pichon was startled. He frowned, glared, and exclaimed emphatically:

“*Jamais! Jamais!*”

So there really was no way of getting a solution of the vexing Russian problem except to take my question to headquarters. And if it had not been for the *gendarmes* stationed at every corner and behind every shrub of the Place des Etats-Unis, and the two French *Poilus* who guarded the entrance to the Hôtel Bischoffsheim, I should most certainly have done so. There was

still the chance that I might meet the President un-awares in the elevator of the Hôtel de Crillon, or at the cigar-stand, which also sold chocolate and chewing-gum, or in front of the hotel, where the motion-picture photographers lay in wait. I had my question prepared. Before he could get away I should ask him, point-blank, whether he favored Koltchak or Denikin or Lenine or Petloura or Tchaikovsky or all or none; and then, to make a good job of it, I should add the daily prayer of the Senate of the United States: "When are you going to get the boys out of Russia?"

Yet I should be doing an injustice to the man and to the executive if I gave the impression that President Wilson did not do everything in his power to bring about a conciliation among the warring factions of the former Russian Empire. More than that, he was the leader in movements intended solely to stop the devastating civil wars waging within the confines of Russia, to restore this country to its place among the nations, and to give it the seat that it deserved to occupy at the peace table. Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Hedjaz — minor nations of no consequence in world affairs — sat with the great powers in council and helped adjudicate the affairs of the world; Russia, as one of her sons aptly said, having lost 9,500,000 men during the war, of which number at least 1,700,000 were dead, was not even given a voice in Paris. And this despite the fact that the integrity of Russia was made one of the conditions of peace by being included in the Fourteen Points, and was agreed to by both the Allied powers and the enemy.

The sixth point is the longest of the fourteen. Its phraseology gives evidence of long and careful study. No wonder, for the President of the United States was enunciating a policy and preaching a sermon all in one. He was outlining what was just and proper for the Allies to do; he was denouncing the German action that found its climax in Brest-Litovsk; he was addressing the great mass of the Russian people who had faith in the Western democracies, and the great numbers who had espoused the Bolshevik cause and laid down their arms in the face of the enemy. The sixth point is best grasped when it is broken up into its component parts, so that the proper emphasis is placed on each line of conduct. The President declares the only possible program to be:

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory

and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world

in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development

and national policy

and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations

under institutions of her own choosing;

and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire.

The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will,

of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests,

and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

The Peace Conference had been formally opened on January 18. On the following Wednesday, January

22, we were all consulting maps to learn the location of the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmora. For the Council of Five, composed of the President of the United States, the prime ministers or foreign ministers of the Allied powers, and the Japanese representative, had approved the proposal of President Wilson that the Russian factions should be asked to put aside their civil strife for the time being and meet on the Princes' Islands with representatives of the great powers on February 15, 1919, there to discuss plans for a settlement of their difficulties. The object of the powers is most commendably set forth in their announcement, which was sent by wireless to all parts of Russia. It declared that they were friends, and not enemies, of the Russian people; that they recognized the right of the Russian people to order their own affairs without external direction or pressure; that they "recognize the revolution without reservation, and will in no way and in no circumstances aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution; that they do not wish to assist or favor any one of the organized groups in Russia as against the others," but merely to help Russia find a way out of her troubles. The plan they proposed was as follows:

They invite every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war just concluded (except in Finland) to send representatives not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes' Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the associated powers, provided in the meantime there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and that all armed forces anywhere sent or directed against any

people or territory outside the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war, or against Finland, or against any people on territory whose autonomous action is in contemplation in the fourteen articles upon which the present negotiations are based, shall be meanwhile withdrawn, and aggressive military action cease.

The statement assured the delegates that they were invited to confer in the frankest way, and that every facility for the journey would be given by the powers.

Thus virtually in the first few sessions of the Peace Conference President Wilson showed his hand. He had been concerned with the affairs of Russia for a long time, but always with a view of permitting the Russians to settle their own quarrel. Undoubtedly he had busied his mind with a plan of conciliation among the many Russian factions long before the *George Washington* touched the coast of France. And long before the Peace Conference was called in formal session he had spoken of his views to the heads of the Allied governments, and had won them over to his idea. To accomplish this required no small measure of determination and political sagacity. For despite the fact that Great Britain could only gain, and not lose, by the continued warfare between Russian groups, Mr. Lloyd George came valiantly to the President's side, and this made it possible for them to swing M. Clemenceau over to their view. That was the hardest part of the task.

Not one of the Allied powers was willing to treat with Lenin and Trotzky, nor was the United States disposed to do so. To the Western democracies the soviet system of the Bolshevik party represented disintegration and anarchy. The bare-faced manner in which the

Russian people had left the side of their Allies and made peace with Germany had cost the remaining powers thousands of men and great sums of money. The harsh treatment of British and French nationals; the confiscation of personal property, irrespective of international rights and amenities; the repudiation of the national debt of the czar's régime; the nationalization of the principal industries and the threat of nationalization of all industries; the seizure of private and public funds in the banks, and the deprivation of the political and civil rights of all persons who did not work by hand — these were acts that the Western powers found it hard to condone, no matter how sympathetic they might wish to feel with a revolution that broke the chains of bondage welded under the czar. That the President could win this victory in the first days of the conference was no small achievement, even though the French acceded with tongue in cheek.

The President followed up his first move by appointing George D. Herron, a socialist and a writer who lived in Switzerland, and William Allen White, an American newspaper man who had been extremely active in Republican and Progressive political movements, to represent the United States at Principo, the largest of the Princes' Islands. Mr. Herron was a man with a wide European acquaintance, who could meet all classes of Russian socialists and understand their points of view. Mr. White was a plain Westerner with a large fund of sound common sense, something that the Russian situation called for more than anything else.

The United States Government already had made

several attempts to create a more friendly feeling in Russia, but its efforts had not been successful, and more recently it had lent itself to military adventures of rather doubtful character. The President had always wished to see Russia work out her own salvation, and to this end had interfered much less than did the European governments. The President's attitude may be adduced from the message he sent to the Russian congress of soviets in Moscow on March 12, 1918, in which he said:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the congress of the soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia, through the congress, that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration of her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.

The President puts the emphasis upon the people of Russia, not the Bolshevik group. How much the Government abhorred the terroristic methods of that dictatorship is proved by the appeal which the United States felt itself compelled to make in September of the same year. It called upon its representatives abroad to bring the state of terror prevailing in soviet Russia to the attention of the nations to which they were accredited, so that the righteous wrath of all civilized countries

might be visited upon the Bolsheviks. The Government said that it was informed that

the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of marked terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without even a form of trial; ill administered prisons are filled beyond capacity and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death, and irresponsible hands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacre of untold innocents.

In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the Russian people and lend them all possible assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon principles of democracy and self-government, and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this state of terrorism. Furthermore it believes that in order to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russians, citizens of all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

The policy of the United States Government toward Russia has not had a positive, determined character; it might well be characterized as a waiting and hoping policy. It has frequently been criticized as inconsistent or lacking in direction, but in this it has been no different than Russian affairs themselves. It is hardly possible to characterize the American policy in a word, because it has differed at various times. Our Government has pursued the following line of conduct: It has avoided decisive action whenever possible, apparently in the hope that the affairs of Russia would adjust themselves without American interference; it has been sympathetic to any plan to get the various Russian factions together; it has avoided having any relations with the soviet government, and in every instance in which

it has had to address the Bolsheviks it has kept in the foreground the view that they were but part of the great Russian people; it has been unwilling to fight the Bolsheviks in the field, and yet has sent to Russia detachments of troops which have been variously occupied, in protecting stores, railway lines, and property; it has signified its intention of helping Admiral Koltchak with supplies of arms, and yet has withheld actual recognition of his faction as the *de facto* Russian government, ostensibly placing the admiral on probation because of reports that he favored a monarchical régime. The original aim in sending troops to Russia — to help protect the Czecho-Slovak army against the German and Austrian prisoners in Russia and Siberia, and to protect Allied stores from falling into German hands, was fulfilled when the armistice came, and the presence of those troops abroad came to be regarded in America as interference in the internal affairs of Russia and contrary to the spirit of Point Six.

The "call to Principo" was variously received by the Russian factions. Most of those outside the soviet government threw up their hands in holy horror at the idea of meeting with the soviet's representatives, as if it were an abomination to confer with brother Russians. The principal opposition came from the Russian leaders in Paris. Three of the Russian governments — those at Archangel, Omsk, and Ekaterinodar — had united in a central Russian committee in Paris and occupied the former Russian embassy as their headquarters. Professor Boris A. Bakhmetieff, ambassador to France, refused to entertain the idea of meeting the

Bolsheviki. Prince Georges Eugen Lvoff, a member of the progressive party and formerly in the cabinet of Kerensky, and now president of the combined committee in Paris, declared that the invitation to Principo was "a fatal blow not only for Russia, but for the world." He asserted that the Russians in Paris had not been consulted. "Russian patriots cannot meet the men who betrayed Russia at Brest-Litovsk," he said. Nicholas Tschaikovsky, president of the Archangel government, was on his way to Paris when the call went out, but his representatives in Archangel sent word that they would not attend the conference. Sergius Sazonoff, who had been minister of foreign affairs under the czar and represented the southern Russian or Eka-terinodar government at Paris, also refused to countenance the idea. Boris Savinkoff, minister of war under Kerensky, went calmly ahead to organize a federation of anti-Bolshevist governments to encircle the Bolsheviki.


The first acceptance of the invitation to Principo came from the Bolsheviki. The "Isvestia" had published a comment on January 28, saying that the invitation bore neither address nor signature. On February 5 the Paris wireless station picked up a radio message in French signed Tchitcherin, dated Moscow, February 4, and addressed to the powers. It was remarkable for the concessions that it made voluntarily. The soviet government declared its readiness to enter into negotiations; to assume the Russian foreign debt; to grant mining, forestry, and other concessions to foreign capital, and to limit, in so far as was in its power, its



Press Illustrating Service, Inc.

IGNACE PADEREWSKI

Famous today not because he is an artist, but prime minister of Poland, the only nation growing out of old Russia whose independence all Russian factions appear willing to concede



propaganda. The whole reply was a carefully worded statement of the Bolshevik case, and Tchitcherin took pains to outline the Bolshevik military situation, to declare reports of disorder lies, and to speak of the reforms introduced by the Bolshevik government. The Estonians and the Letts accepted on February 13, and the Ukraine declared its willingness to attend the conference, but thought the date too soon. On February 19, at the Hôtel de Crillon, Secretary Lansing met M. Tschaikovsky; M. Tethoff, who had been food commissioner under Kerensky; and Charles R. Crane, and on the same day was announced the formal refusal of the three united Russian governments to treat with the Bolsheviks. The decision caused a great deal of joy in French circles, and there was a suspicion at American headquarters that the Russians had covertly received a great deal of support in circles which outwardly pretended to favor the Principo project. The French Government had favored military intervention in Russia, but President Wilson had set his face sternly against this in December, and although the French asked the peace commissioners to hear M. Noulens and M. Scavenius speak in favor of intervention later on, their testimony on Bolshevik misrule had failed to convince the American President that American troops should be sent.

“Ideology, ignorance, and party politics — such are the evil guests of the Quai d’Orsay,” was the phrase in which the “Echo de Paris” attempted to hit off President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau when the proposal was first made.

The Principo plan soon became a sort of standing joke. For a long time nothing was done in Paris to come to a solution of the Russian question, although it was evident that attempts had been made to bring the anti-Bolshevist groups around to the American view. The flowers bloomed on Principo, the skies were blue above it, the olive-groves were green with new foliage. Mr. White spoke eloquently at our conferences on the beauty of the rendezvous, but it appeared unlikely that our Kansas editor and our socialist professor would ever go there to counsel the Russians to live as brothers.

An idea of the number of Russian factions represented at Principo had the proposal succeeded may be gained from this tentative list of provisional governments eligible to attend: the Moscow council of soviets, calling itself the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet republic; the Koltchak government of Omsk; the southern government at Ekaterinodar, led by Denikin; the directory of Ufa, led by Avksentyev's group of social revolutionaries, which had clashed with Koltchak and was fighting both him and the Bolsheviks; the Archangel government; the Tiflis government; the Ukraine; Esthonia; Livonia; Lithuania; Georgia; the League for the Regeneration of Russia; and the central committee of the social democratic party.

Day after day the American commissioners were bombarded with the question, "What about Principo?" and day after day they responded rather sadly: "We have heard nothing more." The anti-Bolshevist Russian elements in Paris stood firm, and the French press could sneer at the American President with impunity.

Whether planned or not, France had won a diplomatic victory.

Yet the idea that the Allied troops were out of place in Russia continued to spread among the European nations. The German menace had died away, and there were only the Czecho-Slovaks to help and the accumulated stores to protect. The protests in the United States against American soldiers being used longer in Russia spread to France and Great Britain. The French were confronted with an agitation against further military adventures. It spread to the soldiers themselves and to the sailors at Odessa. The *Confédération Générale du Travail* declared openly against war on an Allied country.

About 8000 American troops had been sent to Siberia to coöperate with the Czecho-Slovaks, and about 5000 to Archangel. Eleven nationalities were represented in the troops at Archangel. At this time the protests in the United States Senate against the presence of troops in Russia became more acute, and on February 15 a resolution introduced by Senator Johnson of California calling for the withdrawal of the American troops was defeated only when the Vice-President voted "No" to break the tie. On February 17 Secretary of War Baker informed the senate that the President had arrived at an agreement with the British by the terms of which the American troops at Archangel were to be withdrawn as soon as spring came.

In March M. Pichon furnished the Chamber of Deputies with official figures regarding the number of Allied and American troops in Russia. He showed

that there were 34,765 men on the Archangel front and 334,700 men on the Serbian front. At Archangel the British had 13,100 troops; the Russians were next with 11,770, and the United States third with 4920. The French had only 2345. On the Siberian front the Russians had 210,000, the Japanese had 27,000, the Czecho-Slovaks had 55,000, the Poles had 12,000, the French had 7600, and the United States had 7500.

In March the report was circulated in Paris that an American, perhaps two Americans, had penetrated soviet Russia and had actually walked about on the streets of Petrograd for a day or two or even for three days. I still recall the apparently polite curiosity with which Secretary Lansing greeted this news.

"Bullitt?" he asked. "No, I have heard nothing from Mr. Bullitt."

The story was told that comment in London had it that two Americans had gone into soviet Russia. It was the subject, I think, of an interpellation in the House of Commons. At any rate, it was belittled by the Allied press. Secretary Lansing appeared to be interested, but he could give no definite information to the newspaper men. Was the trip of the two Americans an authoritative visit or just a streak of luck? Well, now, that was hard to tell.

Nevertheless, William C. Bullitt and Lincoln Steffens went into Russia to discuss plans with the soviet officials for a basis of negotiation. They were helped across the River Sestra by American officials, and were met and directed to the officials of the soviet by authorized representatives. Both Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Steffens

were men remarkably well qualified for their task. Mr. Bullitt was a friend of Colonel House, and had advocated that the United States get better reports on the Russian situation than were furnished by British and French sources, and attempt seriously to get the various Russian factions together on the basis of mutual understanding. He was interested in labor and labor organizations and was reported to favor building up the peace of the world by creating a solidarity among the laboring masses which would prevent war in the future. He went into Russia and put his shoulder to the wheel. With Mr. Steffens he tried to get an honest comprehension of the political program involved in soviet rule, and an idea of what possible basis all Russian factions could get together on, so that their civil strife might stop and Russia might find herself again. The basis for an understanding was arrived at with Tchitcherin and Lenine in Moscow, and terms were actually drawn up. There was to be an armistice between all the Russian governments, affecting also the Allied and American troops on Russian soil, to be followed by a conference of the Russian groups. The text of the agreement, which has come to us from the soviet government, sets forth that "all existing *de facto* governments set up on the territory of the former Russian empire and Finland to remain in full control of the territories they occupy at the moment the armistice becomes effective, except in so far as the conference may agree upon the territories. The soviet government and all other governments set up on the territory of the former Russian empire, as well as the Allied and associated governments

operating against the soviet government, including Finland, Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azorbaijan, and Afghanistan, agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing *de facto* governments and other governments signatory to this agreement." Furthermore the economic blockade was to be raised, and trade relations with soviet Russia and the Allied and associated governments restored, "under conditions insuring supplies on equal terms for all classes of Russian people." This was a blow at the class rule of the soviet, which had contended that only workers should be fed. Arrangements were to be made for the use of ports and railways throughout Russia by the soviet for the purpose of moving food and passengers. The exchange of official representatives was provided for both between the soviet and the great powers, and the soviet and the other Russian states.

The various Russian governments were to give amnesty to all political prisoners, and the same action was to take place with reference to Russians who might be held by the powers, or citizens of the powers held in Russia. This was to include those who had carried arms. A humane provision read: "War prisoners of non-Russian powers detained in Russia and likewise all nationals of these powers now in Russia to be given full facilities for repatriation. Russian war prisoners in foreign countries and likewise all Russian nationals, including officers and soldiers abroad serving in foreign armies, to be given full facilities for repatriation." All troops of the powers to be withdrawn when the armistice was signed, and no more help was to be

given to anti-soviet governments. The soviet and other governments were to begin reducing their armies at once to a peace footing, the conference to determine the most effective method of doing this. And finally the following clause concerned the payment of the Russian debt:

The allied and associated governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the soviet government of Russia in its note of February 4, regarding its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet and other governments set up on territory of the former Russian empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligation of the former Russian empire to the foreign state parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such state. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference. Russian gold seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany by the Allies to be regarded as a partial payment of the republics of Russia.

Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Steffens returned, and made their report direct to Secretary Lansing. An attempt was made to learn the result of their investigations, but all in vain. The foreign press continued its attacks on the Americans, but the Americans remained silent. Pressed to tell the content of the report from Russia, Secretary Lansing said one day:

"There is nothing to make public. It is to be presumed that the American Government, like other governments, has sources of information and gets reports. The other governments do not publish theirs. Why should we?"

As for the Bullitt mission, nothing came of it. "Izvestia," the official soviet organ in Moscow, said that the soviet government had stated its willingness

to accept the terms drawn up by Mr. Bullitt, but that they were never officially offered.

Here, again, publicity might have saved the day. At least it would have made clear to the world the disinterested attitude of the Government of the United States in face of the questionable attitude of the European and Japanese governments toward Russia.

In March and April the French press became especially vindictive in its criticism of the American manœuvres to bring about peace in Russia. In this it reflected the view of the Clemenceau government, which was opposed to any movement looking toward recognition of the Bolsheviki. As M. Pichon said one day, France had 18,000,000,000 francs (nominally \$3,600,000,000) invested in Russia. France was against Bolshevism in Russia, he said, and for a strong united Russian state on a federal basis, with the exclusion of Poland and Finland, a democratic federal basis built on the consent of the governed.

Some of the French critics took the view that the United States was negotiating with the soviet in order to gain immense trade concessions. M. Gauvain wrote on April 19, accusing the United States of negotiating immense concessions in Russia. The "Echo de Paris" on April 18 said: "For the last few weeks a swarm of agents has descended from America on our former ally. They treat directly with Lenine, pocketing grants of concessions." This is an example of the sort of misrepresentation to which the Americans were constantly subjected in Paris.

It is true that the investments of France in Russia

were large, and that the non-payment of interest and the danger of loss of part of them hit every French householder. On the other hand, the British investments were estimated at no less than \$3,375,000,000.

An attempt to get the Bolsheviki to cease military operations by offering them food was the next manœuvre of the Peace Conference. In this the United States again took a prominent place, for the reason that it was the only nation with resources of food at its disposal. An attempt was made through Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian explorer, to treat with the soviet government. Again the negotiations were veiled in obscurity. At the Hôtel de Crillon no official information was forthcoming. As usual the news leaked out from other sources that Dr. Nansen was to make an effort to establish communication with the soviet, so that food could be sent to relieve the starving thousands in Russian cities, especially the weak women and the poor, hungry little children. The weak women and the poor, hungry little children have frequently figured in the scheme of things at the Peace Conference, but no nation has yet approached Russia without putting military and political conditions with its offer of food, or has provided for the starving human beings when these conditions were not met.

We have the statement of Tchitcherin that Dr. Nansen communicated with him on May 4 and forwarded a letter from Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson, and M. Clemenceau, dated April 17. Tchitcherin said that the Allies had refused to submit this offer by wireless, and that it had finally come to him through the German

Government at the request of the Norwegian legation in Berlin. The proud sovereign powers whose representatives sat in judgment over the world in Paris were forced to accept favors at the hands of the German diplomatic agents! Tchitcherin replied that the soviet was ready to negotiate with the Allies, but regretted the political conditions attached to the offer of food — the cessation of all military operations by the soviet. The Bolsheviki were unwilling to stop fighting, especially when they faced armies of the Allies. Dr. Nansen might name the time and place for a conference; the soviet would meet him.

Again nothing happened. Tchitcherin complained that his answer was treated as a negative one and that the American wireless announced that the soviet had refused the offer of the Peace Conference. He accused the Americans of misrepresentation and bad faith.

Publicity would have saved the day here. The Americans in Paris frequently complained of the distorted Russian news furnished by French and British news agencies, but the Nansen affair is an instance of how our own mission connived in the bungling methods of the old diplomacy. "Keep it dark" was evidently the motto of the European chanceries in all matters affecting Russia. The Americans accepted the European view of things when they were not only predisposed to let in the light, but actually pledged to do so by the first of the Fourteen Points. American writers and observers had to get many of their "tips" on Russian news from the wireless messages of the soviet government, from soviet newspapers, or from German and Scandi-

navian newspapers, when they should have had them direct from the President of the United States and his official representatives in Paris. What America needed to know was exactly what terms had been offered and by whom, what discussions had taken place and to what end, and who had obstructed the way toward conciliation and peace, and why. That stand could have been taken by the American mission and carried out successfully, even if the other nations as punishment withdrew their support of the covenant of the League of Nations. It is a great question whether an out and out American policy of this kind would not have been better in the long run than acquiescence to the prejudices of the European powers.

It is the method employed in these attempts to reach the Russian people that I am criticizing, not the proposals themselves. That they were made will always reflect credit on the American mission. Even the Bolsheviks, who turned their wrath on the United States when all schemes failed, now and then recognized the disinterestedness of the American republic. Thus Tchitcherin, who, by the way, is one of the best little note-writers of his day, in the course of an article on foreign relations made the following comment on the powers:

In the camp of those fighting against us there are two tendencies: one of these is opposed to conciliation and the other is conciliatory. Our problem is to render the first tendency incapable of further opposition toward the other. The United States of America, of all the allied powers, was more friendly to soviet Russia. At the time when the other powers were beginning to intervene President Wilson was keeping aloof. Even when he joined in he gave in his appeal to the Russian people, as the reason

for intervention, a narrower purpose than that of England, pointing out the necessity of the aid which must be rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks, and the need for guarding the military stores. America more than any other country is interested in preserving one undivided Russian economic organization, and is by no means interested in weakening Russia.

America did not agree with the plans of the allied imperialists to divide Russia into spheres of influence and with the Anglo-French plan of exploiting Russia by means of an English or French central bank. America continued to uphold the point of view of non-intervention in Russian matters. At the present moment America is the first country from which peace messages reach us. The declarations of some of the more influential senators belonging to both leading parties demanded an end to intervention, to which the chairman of the committee on foreign relations, Senator Hitchcock, could not give a straightforward answer. Among the strongest allied powers America would be most inclined to enter into an agreement with Russia.

The next chapter in the remarkable story of the Peace Conference and Russia deals with the attempt to gain recognition for the Omsk government, at the head of which was Admiral Koltchak.

The American Government had taken the lead in virtually all the dealings with the soviet government. It was now the turn of the Russians in Paris to press for recognition of Admiral Koltchak, who was regarded as the strongest of all the anti-Bolshevist leaders in Russia. The Koltchak armies made considerable progress up to June. In replying to questions raised in the House of Commons, Winston Churchill, British secretary of state for war, said that Great Britain had called the Omsk government into existence, but that its contribution to the admiral's operations was limited to the supply of munitions sent to his armies. He said that the value of the munitions sent to Admiral Koltchak and General

Denikin reached about 20,000,000 pounds, or \$960,000,000.

General Denikin is head of the so-called volunteer army, which is coöperating with the Kuban government at Ekaterinodar, of which General Dragomirov is president and M. Sazonov minister of foreign affairs. General Denikin was an intimate friend of General Kornilov and escaped with the latter to the Don region when Kerensky indicted them. Denikin began his fight against the soviet with an army of three hundred officers, who served as privates. His army is now estimated at a strength of 300,000 bayonets and sabers in regular military units. Denikin favors a constituent assembly and recognizes Koltchak as his superior.

A strong effort to present a united front was made by the representatives of a large number of the anti-soviet Russian governments in Paris. In May they called a Russian political conference at which they discussed means for getting Allied help. They declared themselves against the restoration of the czarist régime and said that they wanted the peasant class to keep the land. They wanted the Russian people to vote on their own form of government by means of a constituent assembly, elected under legitimate conditions. The various *de facto* governments would hand their power over to the national assembly when the Bolsheviks had been driven out. This conference included Prince Lvoff as president; M. Tchaikovsky, M. Sazonov; M. Bakhmetieff, M. Giers, Maklakov, and Stakhovich, Russian ambassadors at Washington, Rome, Paris, and Madrid; M. Gulke-

vich, minister at Stockholm, and M. Efremov, minister at Bern; M. Nabokov, chargé d'affaires at London; M. Dolgoplov, member of the Kuban government; M. Ivanov and M. Titov, members of the Union for the Regeneration of Russia; M. Struve, member of the national center; General Cherbachev, representing the Russian armies, and General Golovin, his chief of staff, and a number of other leaders.

The negotiations between the Peace Conference and Admiral Koltchak were carried on at Omsk through the French chargé d'affaires, M. Martel, and in Paris through M. Sazonov. The Peace Conference made eight conditions which were to become the basis for supporting Admiral Koltchak against the other claimants in Russia: (1) the summoning of a constituent assembly, chosen as the supreme legislature for Russia through a free, secret, and democratic franchise; (2) free elections to all local bodies, such as municipalities and zemstvos; (3) a pledge that the czaristic régime will not be reëstablished, that civil and religious liberty will prevail, and that the former land system will not be restored; (4) recognition of the independence of Finland and Poland, disputes over their frontiers to be settled by the League of Nations; (5) autonomy to be extended to Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, the Caucasian, and Transcaucasian governments, the League of Nations to be consulted in the event their relations to the Russian Government are not clearly agreed upon; (6) recognition of the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Rumanian part of Bessarabia; (7) Russia to join the League of Nations and to

coöperate in the limitation of armaments and military organizations; (8) recognition of Russia's debt to foreign countries, made before and during the war. The conference further said:

Some of the allied and associated governments are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government and peace, and provided also that they receive from Admiral Koltchak and his associates definite guarantees that their policy has the same objects in view as that of the allied and associated powers.

Admiral Koltchak's reply was made public June 14. He declared that he would fix the date for elections to the constituent assembly when the Bolsheviki were definitely crushed. A commission was now at work preparing the preliminaries on a basis of universal suffrage. He considered himself responsible to the constituent assembly and would hand over all his powers to it. He objected to the reëstablishment of the assembly of 1917, which had been chosen under Bolshevist violence. He was ready to discuss disarmament and all kindred international questions, but he believed the final decision should be made by the constituent assembly. He recognized the independence of Poland, leaving discussion of frontiers to the constituent assembly. As to Finland he said, "We are disposed at once to recognize the *de facto* government of Finland, but the final solution of the Finnish questions must belong to the constituent assembly." He agreed to a solution of the questions involving Esthonia, Livonia, and the other states, "sec-

ing that the government is assuring, as from the present time, the autonomy of the various nationalities." He wished to take up each case separately, however, and agreed that his government was ready to have recourse to the "good offices of the League of Nations." The same conditions applied to Bessarabia. He repeated the declaration of November 27, 1918, by which his government accepted the burden of the Russian national debt. As the most careful scrutiny was given to the statement of his opposition to the reëstablishment of a reactionary régime I give it here in full:

As regards the question of internal politics, which can only interest the powers so far as they reflect the political tendencies of the Russian government, I make a point of repeating that there cannot be a return to the régime which existed in Russia before February, 1917. The provisional solution which my Government has adopted in regard to the agrarian question aims at satisfying the interests of the great mass of the population, and is inspired by the conviction that Russia can only be flourishing and strong when the millions of Russian peasants receive all guarantees for the possession of the land. Similarly as regards the régime to be applied to the liberated territories, the government, far from placing obstacles in the way of the free election of local assemblies, municipalities and zemstvos, regards the activities of these bodies and also the development of the principle of self-government as the necessary conditions for the reconstruction of the country, and is already actually giving them its support and help by all the means at its disposal.

In making public this reply of Admiral Koltchak the Council of Five of the Peace Conference said:

The allied and associated powers wish to acknowledge receipt of Admiral Koltchak's reply to their note of May 26. They welcome the tone of that reply, which seems to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions which they had made and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom, self-government and peace of the Russian people and their neighbors. They are,

therefore, willing to extend to Admiral Koltchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter.

This statement was signed by D. Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, G. Clemenceau, V. E. Orlando, and N. Makino.

Was this a recognition of Admiral Koltchak as the head of the legitimate *de facto* Russian government? The Allied newspapers for the most part said, "Yes." The "Tems" pointed out that the decision was a solemn covenant and a declaration of policy—"a covenant to oppose Bolshevik tyranny, which serves German interests, and a policy of reconstruction and national unity for Russia." But the "Times" of London recognized that this was not actually recognition. "The Allies have practically recognized the national government of Russia presided over by Admiral Koltchak," said the "Times." "It would have been wiser, as well as more manly, had they made the recognition formally and frankly. Why not call the step by its true name?" The "Times" went on to say that "the excessive timidity with which the recognition is made does not destroy its importance."

Important influences were at work in the United States and elsewhere to prevent out-and-out recognition of Koltchak, and it is certain that the proposed recognition was materially weakened in effect and virtually made negligible by the opposition to Koltchak among other Russian groups, which pictured him as a reactionary, surrounded by members of the old czaristic régime and by landholders who wanted their great estates back. The socialists of France in large measure also opposed

Koltchak. Avksentiev, who had been head of the Omsk directory, which was overthrown by Admiral Koltchak by force in what is commonly called the Omsk *coup d'état*, also led a formidable opposition. The charges against Koltchak varied. His troops were accused of atrocities similar to those charged against the Bolsheviks. It is known that charges of this character were brought to the attention of the Americans. The most severe blow to the prestige of Koltchak came from a group of Russian social revolutionaries and was the sequel to the Omsk *coup d'état*. An appeal to the democracy of the world was issued by the following members of the first all-Russian constituent assembly: A. Kerensky, N. Avksentiev, V. Zenzinov, A. Argunov, E. Rogovsky, O. Minor, B. Sokolov, M. Slonim; by M. Ivanov, president, and M. Delevsky, secretary of the Paris section of the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, and by M. Peskin, president, and M. Rosenfeld, secretary, for the Russian Republican League in Paris. The appeal asked the non-recognition of any government in Russia of the nature of a personal or class dictatorship, particularly a military one, which does not bow to the people's will nor establish a democratic government. No foreign intervention is to be countenanced. The powers should help with materials and food stuffs only those governments in Russia that agree to convoke an all-Russian constituent assembly "immediately after the cessation of civil war on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage." Food is to be distributed by a neutral organization and not to be used for

a political purpose. A mission is to be sent to Russia forming a united representation of the free nations, and including representatives of organized labor and democracy, to explain the democratic aims of the powers and to assure the people of Russia that the help is for their own good. The appeal brought considerable opposition from elements favorable to Koltchak, who criticized the participation of Kerensky in this movement. "La Cause Commune" of Paris wrote on May 28 that this was an attempt to serve Koltchak as Kornilov was served by Kerensky. "Beware of them!" said this paper. M. Gauvain, writing in the "Journal des Debats," said: "It contains a germ of anarchy as fatal as that of Kerensky. It proposes a mission to Russia. This means a mission of world soviets. It would simply take disturbance into Russia instead of calm, and bring back into Europe all the Leninist microbes. It would be a triumph for Lenine. One recognizes the hand of Kerensky." "Humanité," on the other hand, expressed its sympathy with the appeal. In the course of the next few weeks military reverses seriously affected the hope the Allies had placed in Koltchak and with the arrival in Paris of Frank Polk, Under-Secretary of State, to take charge of the American mission with the departure of President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, negotiations with Koltchak became little more than a discussion. In the meantime the Americans were still interested in their effort to have Dr. Nansen take charge of food distribution in Russia and were said to be working energetically with their colleagues in Paris to have

the food blockade lifted. Because the soviet government would not agree to call a constituent assembly or cease fighting, matters remained at a deadlock.

It is pertinent in this connection to direct attention to the statement regarding Russia made by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts in London in his farewell letter to the English people upon his departure for South Africa. The letter was in itself a remarkable résumé of conditions in Europe and the action of the Peace Conference, and deserves wide reading. That part relating to Russia follows:

Russia is an even more obscure and difficult problem than Germany, and one on which no dogmatic opinion would be justified. But from all the information which has come into my possession I am seriously doubtful about the sort of policy which we seem to be pursuing there. Russia can only be saved internally by the Russians themselves, working on Russian methods and ideas. She is a case of national pathology, of a people with a sick soul, and only Russian ideas could work a cure. Our military forces, our lavish contributions of tanks and other war material, may temporarily bolster up the one side, but the real magnitude of the problem is quite beyond such expedients.

Leave Russia alone, remove the blockade, adopt a friendly neutrality and Gallio-like impartiality to all fractions. It may well be that the only ultimate hope for Russia is a sobered, purified soviet system, and that may be far better than the czarism to which our present policy seems inevitably tending. If we have to appear on the Russian scene at all, let it be as impartial benevolent friends and helpers, and not as military and political partisans. Be patient with sick Russia, give her time and sympathy, and await the results of her convalescence."

One might say that General Smuts has put in a nutshell the best thought of the President and the keenest minds in the American mission. That America has not been able wholly to make her views prevail is patent to the Russians and to the world. The generations of the

future will place the blame, and, it is to be hoped, will absolve the peoples of the western European democracies from complicity in the imperialistic crimes of their leaders.

CHAPTER XIV

Walks in the Paris of the conference, and how they led to haunts of another day.

A STRANGER in Paris, walking along the Boulevard St.-Germain, would never notice it, this wide-arched doorway in an apartment-building that apparently leads to nothing but a dingy court. The boulevard is wide and inviting, a street redolent of modernity; its shops are of the eighties and nineties and later times, and the façade of the university surely has nothing in common with the days of old. But Paris is full of surprises, which you come upon in the most commonplace of modern streets, and there is a surprise awaiting you if, forgetting the boulevard that builders of a later age drew like a straight line through the very heart of the Paris of the Revolution, you turn aside from its broad pavements and seek the little dingy paths, the lanes, and byways, like the passage that lies behind this arched doorway.

For a moment I was in darkness, and then again in light, and it seemed as if I had left Paris behind me, for I stood in a narrow street that was not likely to admit more than one cart and horse at a time. The high building lay behind me and effectively shut out modern Paris, with its noise and activity; before me and on each hand were little one-and-a-half and two-storied houses, with quaint dormer-windows stuck here and

there in the roofs, and old potted chimneys — like the pictures of the city one encountered in old prints along the Rue Bonaparte and on the quays. The windows were quaint, too, long and narrow, or small, with little square panes, and here and there the glass was missing, and a yellow bit of paper kept out the elements. I picked my way carefully over the cobbled walk. I was in Revolutionary Paris.

A Y. M. C. A. man in khaki, with the red triangle on his cap, came out of an adjoining passage. He nodded.

“So you have found it, too, have you?” he asked. “Isn’t it wonderful, this little bit of old Paris! Haussmann must have forgotten about it; he tore out everything else. They are still drawing rent out of these ancient barracks. Come with me.”

I followed him down the passage and through a wide gate under a house that seemed four stories high. A tiny court lay beyond. Artists lived there now, and milliners and all sorts of laboring folk. There were sketches and pastels in the windows, and a little sign called for girls to make artificial flowers.

“Don’t trip over that iron,” he warned, pointing to a piece that stood about a foot out from the wall. “That’s the old step the horsemen used to mount by in the days when the archbishops of Rouen had their palace in this building. See that window with the iron grill? That’s where they put Charlotte Corday the day she killed Marat. Quite a long time ago it was, and I don’t suppose the old place has changed a bit since she stood with disheveled hair and looked out through those iron bars.”


The blows of a smith's hammer sounded close by, and we turned the corner of the passage to a forge, installed in one of the buildings on the narrow lane. He had been there a long time, the smith, and he was busy now, as he had been for years, repairing locks and mending old, decrepit bicycles. There was that within his little shop which had witnessed scenes in the history of old Paris even long before the days of Robespierre. It was a great round tower, with walls fully two feet thick, against which he had built his forge, and in which he stored his iron and steel.

"It's an old tower," he said. "Go inside if you wish. It's very old, but how old nobody knows, nobody knows."

Nobody, except such able students of old Paris as Georges Cain, the regretted *conservateur* of the Museum Carnavalet, whose remarkable research has opened the heart of old Paris to all the world, for the old stone tower around which this house of revolutionary days had been built was erected by Philippe-Auguste as part of the walls of another Paris — a Paris not yet become the capital of a united France.

We walked up the lane to the boulevard again, and as we surveyed the buildings on each hand the "Y" man spoke up:

"Here's No. 9. Closed up now. But you can see that until it closed it was still a circulating library. Yes, still full of books. Well, in that shop Durel had his library in 1790, and here one day came a deputy named Guillotine with the model of a strange instrument invented by an Italian physician named Albert. It



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

Villa Murat



Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A.

Hotel Bischoffsheim

THE TWO "WHITE HOUSES" OF PARIS

was here that they first tried it on a sheep — in this very building. They called it a ‘philanthropic machine for decapitation.’ Think of that for a story! And at No. 8 the widow Brissot had her collection of books on jurisprudence belonging to the Girondists who had been guillotined. And there was a printery close by; should be here. Let’s look around.”

From somewhere came the clanking of a printing-press. It was close at hand. We followed the sound. There was a door close to the court that led to the boulevard, and a sign-board with the word “Imprimerie.” We pushed open the door and stepped inside.

It was still a printing-shop. In an adjoining room was running the press that we had heard, and here another small press stood ready to receive the forms. Several men wearing long white aprons were bending over proof, and here and there lay a large lithographing stone.

“Is this the printery?” we asked uselessly.

“Yes,” said one of the workmen.

“And was this not the place where the Marshal Brune had his printery in the days of the Revolution?”

“Ah, yes, it is here.”

“The very same?”

“The very same.”

“And here was printed in 1793 ‘L’ami du Peuple’ of Marat?”

“Yes, *Messieurs*.”

“And you are printing to-day! A journal, perhaps?”

“No, *Messieurs*; documents for the Congress of the Peace.”

And thus the world of yesterday is just around the corner of a modern street in Paris.

I stopped at a book-shop in the Boulevard St.-Martin to-day and asked the dealer for *livres historiques*. The man shrugged his shoulders, and with a gesture directed me to one side of his establishment, where they were piled up to the ceiling row on row, and at times two rows to a shelf; a great wealth of historical literature, of books on armies, of discussions of military campaigns, of old diaries and memoirs, the backstair gossip of the kingly courts, the amours, the intrigues, the confessions. Trade has been slow during the war, I thought, and these books probably have stood here undisturbed since the last tourist fled in the first days of August, 1914. But I was mistaken about that. Some of the books, it is true, had broken backs and besmudged covers, but many were plainly new; they shone forth resplendent in their bright coats of canary yellow, green, and blue paper, and the dates 1917 and 1918 on their backs proved that amid the tremendous effort of fighting for life French publishers had gone quietly forward adding to their *librairies*.

For a long time I had been partial to the story of the Congress of Vienna, and the Peace Conference in Paris had only whetted my appetite. What joy, then, to find here two big *tomes* that were a monument to the industry of Commandant M. H. Weil; a transcription of the records of the secret police during the Congress of Vi-

enna, taken from the original documents in the archives of the imperial ministry of the interior at Vienna, and published now under the title, "Les Dessous du Congrès de Vienne."

Hastily I turned the pages. I almost knew what I would find in these documents of the *Polizei Hofstelle*. And mentally, as I read the lines, I compared the situation then with the situation now at the Peace Conference. Were men shadowing the delegates in Paris to-day? Were the secret police of the French Government, among the most efficient in the world, reporting daily, as these men had done, and perhaps sending their reports to M. Clemenceau, as these reports went to the Emperor Joseph and Prince von Metternich? Who shall say? Perhaps it was not for nothing that the British delegation came to Paris with its own locks and keys and its own force of locksmiths.

If so, what jolly times for the historian of the future! For instance, suppose the secret police of to-day produced the counterparts of reports such as this:

Credits opened by the sovereigns at the principal banking houses of Vienna — At the house of Fries: Emperor of Russia, 100,000 rubles; King of Prussia, no limit; dukes of Weimar, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, each 5999 florins; Prince de Wrede, 100,000 florins.

Or dealt with trivialities, like this:

Prince Troubetzkov, having a sore foot, remained home.

Or the elements of intrigue, like this:

The covered staircase of the apartments of Alexander leads not to one of the courts, but to three chambers on the first story giving upon the grand staircase and occupied by one of the aides-de-camp of the sovereign. It is probable that the Poles enter the house of the emperor by this passage when he wishes to see them.

Or the stuff of which romance is made, like this:

Alexander, invited to the home of the Princess Bagration for Saturday, went there last evening after the "at home" and supper to make a call. The porter rang four times to announce him, and the princess, who had closed her door to guests the whole day, went in negligée to the staircase. Upon hearing the voice of Alexander, she excused herself in confusion and begged him to enter the room, where Alexander perceived a man's hat. A great and amusing explanation followed. "It is that of the decorator Moreau," finally said the princess; "he is the man who is decorating the house for to-morrow's festival." The czar remained two and a half hours at the house of the princess. *Honi soit qui mal y pense!*

What opportunities the journalists missed in those good old days!

The man who first told me about it called it a congress, and said that it would be attended by men from all quarters of the earth. The Grand Hôtel was to provide the setting, he said, but all the world would be the audience, because what this congress would discuss would affect the fortunes of all the world. I thought it proper to give an indulgent ear, for my informant was from Chicago, and one is always partial, to some extent at least, to fellow-sufferers. But he was also insistent. He said that although I might consider the Peace Conference the greatest deliberative body in the world, I had not made the fullest use of my opportunities did I ignore his congress.

With something like an air of condescension I agreed to go. It was to be held in the Grand Hôtel, and that might provide a story. Anything might happen in the

Grand Hôtel, seeing that the Paris wing of the Irish republic and Samuel Gompers lived there.

The room where the congress was to be held was one of those overladen Paris salons sometimes used for French birthday celebrations, and gastronomical orgies like unto those of Rome. But there was a long green table in the room now, and here and there were blotting-pads, pens and ink, in preparation for a session. The room was already half full of men. Most of them were in the uniform of the American Army; some wore the French horizon blue, and here and there I spied the *Croix de Guerre*. Others were attired in well-fitting Prince Alberts. My guide introduced me to an American major of infantry. There was also a captain of a machine-gun company, and several men who carried the badge of the Y. M. C. A. The men were discussing the valor of various units of the American Army and their conduct under fire. I could see their eyes sparkle with enthusiasm as they developed their subject.

"Why are you meeting here in Paris?" I asked.

"It seemed the easiest manner of placing our claims before the Peace Conference," said the major of infantry. "Besides, a good many of us are here now on military business, and so could not call a congress in the States."

"Your aim —" I continued.

"Justice," he said — "justice and humanity; to build up and strengthen the forces of civilization. A code of protection for men, much like the code of protection for labor."

"Tell me all about it," I asked, and between the major and the captain and a popular lecturer this is the story they told me:

"In general, we are going to ask the Peace Conference not to permit any one nation to wipe out the traditions and customs of a people by refusing to let the original inhabitants learn their own language in the schools. We are going to ask also that the land be not exploited or farmed out to strangers, absentee landlords, and the like, but that provision be made that the original settlers, many of whom may not yet have developed capacity for self-government, be given the opportunity to own the land when they can profitably develop it. We want the conference to limit mandatory and colonizing nations so that they will not exhaust the natural wealth of the country and then turn out the peoples who have the right to live there. We want schools provided at public expense to teach populations the language they wish to be taught. We want the conference to decree that modern medicine and hygiene must always be introduced, that proper hospitals must be provided, that self-government must be extended where the people are ready for it, that no particular religion be imposed upon them, that they be given equality and justice before the courts and in industrial enterprises, according to their ability and desert."

"How does it strike you?" said the major.

"Sounds reasonable," I replied. "Do you think there is still need for drawing up such safeguards?"

"Yes," said the captain, slowly, "I still think men are not fair to their less-educated brethren. I believe

simple justice is not always meted out. I think the Peace Conference should formally recognize that."

"All over the world?" I asked.

"Yes," he replied. "Of course," he added, "I do not mean that the conference should necessarily interfere with the sovereign rights of a state. I am thinking primarily of colonies. It is true, for instance, that in the United States justice is not always meted out. There are many instances of oppression. But that is a matter between American citizens. We — you and I — will adjust that. We have our legal bill of rights; the Constitution grants the same privileges to every citizen. But there are great populations which don't have that. They are absolutely dependent upon the ruling power."

"How do you explain man's inhumanity to man?" I asked.

"Prejudice," he replied abruptly.

"We should be beyond that," I said.

He laughed at that.

"You would not believe me," he replied, "if I gave you some concrete examples that have come to my notice. For instance, I know the case of a man who is as good as any other man before the law. He wore the American Y. M. C. A. uniform. He found excellent quarters at a first-class French hotel. He moved to an American hotel in one of the back areas where troops pass. The man in charge whispered to him:

"'Sorry, old man, but I can't put you up. These men here object to you.'"

"Why?" I asked.

"Prejudice," replied the army man. "I can give you more examples. I was once in the compartment of a railway train, in conversation with a French Red Cross nurse. An American officer entered. I saluted him, and he saluted me. But he left the compartment. A little later the nurse was called to the corridor. She returned soon after. 'I have been warned,' she said, 'not to speak with you. The other officer will not share the compartment so long as you are here.'"

I remained silent.

The men about me continued to speak. A long series of anecdotes, some more wounding, others less, followed. I listened, comprehending.

"We have drawn up a resolution based upon our conception of human rights and justice," said another of the men, "and this we hope the conference will consider and perhaps adopt. But even if it does not adopt it, the world will hear of our bill of rights. Please come this afternoon at four o'clock, so that I may give you a copy of it."

I thanked him and rose to leave. "Truth, justice, human rights"—these words were whirling through my brain. From times immemorial men had used them; always their aim was the same. We had reached the twentieth century now, and men were still formulating the old, old claims.

The major offered his hand. I shook it in farewell. It was black—coal black. Outside in the corridor I looked at my hand. Nothing had happened to it.

.
Somehow official communiqués all read alike—con-

densed statements of fact, often so laconic that one does not suspect their significance. There is the one of March 10. It reads like the routine meeting of a board of aldermen, but it deserves to become historic. Here it is:

Monday.

The Supreme War Council met this afternoon at the Quai d'Orsay from three to half past five o'clock.

The Council decided that the great powers should designate representatives of the powers with special interests on the economic and financial commissions.

The discussion then turned on the report of the military experts, presented by Marshal Foch, relative to the definitive military status of Germany.

The terms of this report were fixed and its conclusions adopted. The next meeting will take place to-morrow at three o'clock.

This communiqué marks the end of the military power of Germany. The council has fixed the definitive military status of Germany. What is it?

This is the second attempt in history to limit the war-making capabilities of the German people. The first attempt was made by Napoleon with the Prussian army. He failed. The members of the Supreme War Council of our day are determined that they shall not fail.

Under the agreement reached by the council the German army will be reduced to 100,000 men; the German general staff will be abolished; only from 4000 to 4500 officers will be permitted throughout the German nation; conscription will be abolished, and Germany's new army raised by volunteer enlistment under a twelve-year enlistment plan; the great German fortifications along the Rhine will be leveled, the output of the ammunition factories will be limited to serve the needs of the army;

and, finally, Germany will not be allowed to keep any implements of war now in her possession not needed for the army.

In limiting the German army to 100,000 men the council took this figure arbitrarily. When the subject was first discussed at Spa the Americans proposed that the future Germany army be composed of 400,000 men, on the basis of twenty-five infantry and five cavalry divisions. The Americans were by no means decided that this figure should stand; they merely suggested it as a basis for discussion, and it was speedily scaled down. In the discussion the council considered 140,000 for a long time as a proper figure.

The council hovered for some time over the subject of conscription or voluntary enlistment. Neighboring populations would be affected by the situation in Germany. If Germany received an army by voluntary enlistment, it was likely that the socialists in France would agitate for a similar situation in France. A voluntary army meant higher pay to the soldier and a large outlay without the return in man power procured by conscription. Great Britain favored a voluntary army, because the British oppose a conscript army for Great Britain. France will keep a conscript army because it has colonies that need a standing army. Italy held to the French point of view. In the war of 1870 the Germans had a conscript army, the French a volunteer army. A conscript army is regarded as better trained.

In declaring that enlistments must be for twelve years the council has attempted to foil any manœuvre on the part of Germany to repeat the scheme used by Prussia

against Napoleon — of training a small army which practically changed its personnel every six months, so that in a few years Prussia had a redoubtable military force at her disposal. The council proposes a method of supervision over the German army to see that this scheme is carried out. Such supervision will be difficult after Germany has been admitted to the League of Nations as a sovereign state, but necessary.

The American point of view is that effective limitations cannot be placed so well on the training of an army as on the output of munitions. Soldiers may be trained, but unless equipped, they are useless. The council will make definite provision for the inspection of German workshops, so that there can be no covert preparation for war; an attempt also will be made to make impossible the preliminary training in athletic societies and gymnasiums which has always been a feature of German military instruction. The council will also provide regulations against the manufacture of tanks and asphyxiating gases; the number of aëroplanes will be limited and restricted to commercial and touring purposes. The navy may not have over 15,000 sailors, six armored cruisers, five cruisers of the line, twelve destroyers of 800 tons, and twenty-six torpedo boats of 300 tons.

The fangs are drawn. A great military power has passed from the face of the earth.

CHAPTER XV

"Nach Paris!" said the Germans, and how they finally got there. Also showing that the German sometimes not only gets what he wants, but also what is coming to him.

AT last the Germans! Since the armistice on November 11, 1919, the Western World had waited for the coming of the Germans, in humble submission, to Versailles. But the days dragged on. Weeks passed without a sign of them. The weeks lengthened into months, and yet no Germans. Repeatedly we asked the question of Pichon, of Tardieu, of Balfour, of Colonel House, of General Bliss, of Venizelos, of General Smuts, of the doughboy who ran the elevator in the Hôtel de Crillon, and the auburn-haired young woman who sold chocolates and cigarettes. "When, oh when, will the Germans come to Versailles?" And even these well-informed authorities could give no answer.

The Peace Conference had opened in January, and the world thought that the Germans should have arrived by February at the very latest, should have signed the treaty of peace and departed home. The Germans had even more radical ideas on the same subject, for they contended that they should have been called in the very first day to sit with the great powers at the conference table and help decide each and every question. In this the Germans erred grievously, as also did numerous other powers, some of whom had helped win the war.

Crises came and went; Allies became disgruntled, and talked of withdrawing from the conference; even the great powers intimated that they had grievances against the Council of Four — or Five. Only that astute body actually knew how much work had to be accomplished before the Germans could be called in, and even its members could not tell when the treaty would be ready for presentation. They, of all the delegates, commissioners, minor plenipotentiaries, ministers, and counselors of all sorts and ranks refused to become disturbed by the general clamor. On all sides critics shouted and bellowed. The military leaders, having from the first advocated unconditional surrender and a clear road to Berlin,— and who knows but that might have been the better part? — declared the diplomats were about to lose the victory that the armies had won. Industrial leaders and bankers, who had eked out a mere livelihood in four lean years, announced that the conference was forcing the world into Bolshevism by its procrastination. Men who were on the scene every day, and who could not have digested in years all the problems disposed of by the council in a few months, asserted that the peace commissioners accomplished nothing, and that events remained at a standstill.

Meantime Germany was plainly delighted. Once the Germans had made up their minds that they were not to be invited to Paris until the treaty of peace was ready to be signed, they began to watch the bickerings of the Allies closely, and to make political capital out of them. Their first point of attack was the vulnerability of the Fourteen Points. Under the Fourteen Points, as inter-

puted by various groups in Paris, each claimant nation would get everything it wanted. And so, when one nation presented its claims, and these claims were not accepted by the council, the Germans in glee pointed to the "betrayal" of the Fourteen Points. They reveled in the crisis that brought President Wilson into the open against Italy's claims to Fiume; they rejoiced when the council refused to decree the annexation of Dutch Limburg to Belgium; they assured Greece of their sympathy when the Americans objected to the cession of Thrace; they saw hope of Anglo-French friction in the claims of Hedjaz and Syria; they fanned the flames of discontent in Silesia and Teschen, and told the Rumanians that the great powers would never grant them all their claims in Bessarabia, the Banat, and Transylvania. Germany might well hope to profit by the discontent and dissatisfaction among the Allies.

I remembering hearing a critic and well-informed student of diplomatic affairs declare once:

My criticism against this conference is its procrastination. It is agitating every question under the sun. Consider the able manner in which a similar task was handled at Vienna. The congress met for a definite purpose; it did that work, completed its task, and dissolved. But this conference —

That was probably the first time that the dancing congress of 1815, which opened in 1814 and did not complete some of its labors until 1821, was ever called expeditious and direct in its labors. As for the Peace Conference that met in Paris, it was well described by Mr. Lloyd George when he faced the House of Commons to answer the criticism of the Northcliffe press:

We had to shorten our labors and work crowded hours, long and late, because, whilst we were trying to build, we saw in many lands the foundations of society crumbling into dust, and we had to make haste. I venture to say that no body of men have worked harder or in better harmony. I am doubtful whether any body of men with a difficult task have worked under greater difficulties — stones crackling on the roof and crashing through the windows, and sometimes wild men screaming through the keyholes.

One day a strange report passed through Paris — the Germans had arrived! Across the Seine, in the former embassy of imperial Germany they were housed, said the report. That great house, standing there cold and solemn with shuttered windows, seemed to have entered upon a long sleep. Its great gate was locked, and the ivy creepers climbed over its hinges. Meditating it was, no doubt, of days of grandeur, when glasses clinked within and men drank to "*der Tag*" here in the heart of Paris. What other secrets did it hold? There was a *cocher*, it was said, who had driven a mysterious stranger to within a few doors of the place, a man who was well muffled up in a high coat, who had given a generous tip, and then sneaked up the Quai d'Orsay to the old embassy. And there was a concierge, and who will assert that a concierge does not know a host of secrets?

Bound up with this report was one which gained currency in the neighborhood of the Hôtel Edouard VII, to the effect that Dr. Lammarsch, the eminent Austrian privy counselor, who was said to have advised Emperor Charles of Austria to make peace, if peace could be made, long before the great disaster came, had been brought to Paris by the French as part of the French plan to build a confederation of the Danube.

Here was another mystery that involved a hostile diplomat in the heart of Paris. Italy would not hear of a Danube confederation, which to her meant the resuscitation of the ancient empire of the Hapsburgs. "We are looking for Lammarsch," confided one of the members of the Italian delegation to me, significantly. "If you find him, tell us at once."

In the midst of the crisis over Fiume, when the situation was so strained that it looked as if Italy might withdraw from the Peace Conference at any moment, word went forth from the council that the Germans had been officially notified to send their plenipotentiaries to Versailles.

Germany, still calling itself a *Reich*, a word that had been translated heretofore as "empire," was now nominally a republic by the terms of a provisional constitution adopted by the national assembly at Weimar on February 10. Ostensibly a Socialist government was in the saddle, with Friedrich Ebert as president and Philipp Scheidemann as chancellor, but actually it still rested upon the sanction of those who had been the backbone of the military and industrial might of Germany. Who would Germany send? Erzberger? He had been a useful man in the armistice negotiations, but was hardly suited as a plenipotentiary now, even should the Government empower him to go; for there stood against him his famous plan of annexation, promoted in 1915 and made public recently at Augsburg by the Independent Socialist Landauer. In this Erzberger outlined the minimum demands of Germany: sovereignty over Bel-

gium and the channel ports of France to Boulogne and the Norman isles; ownership of the Lorraine mines and Belfort; the annexation of the Belgian and French Congo, English Nigeria, Dahomey, and French West Africa, not to mention other details about indemnities and payment of the cost of the war. Bernstorff? It was not likely that the former ambassador to the United States would be made welcome, even though he had prepared Germany's diplomatic case for the Peace Conference. Germany had to turn to men who had not been so intimately associated with diplomacy during the war.

For chairman of her commission Germany turned to Brockdorff-Rantzau. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau was minister of foreign affairs of the new Germany. The negotiation of the treaty of peace was properly his work. Like Bernstorff, he came from the northern duchies, both his father and his mother having belonged to the old nobility of Holstein. His career had been an interesting one. Born in 1869, he was the son of an assessor in the Prussian administration of the duchies, who also bore the title of chamberlain to the grand duke of Oldenburg. A member of his mother's family was grand mistress of the court of the empress of William II. Under her patronage he joined the first regiment of the Royal Foot Guards and later entered the diplomatic service. When war broke out he was made minister to Denmark. His service to the German cause affected both diplomatic and economic fields. He won friends in the Socialist ranks and was regarded as in favor of a peace of conciliation. Both the Majority Socialists

under Scheidemann and the Independents under Haase considered him eligible for the ministry of foreign affairs after the revolution.

The powers at Paris judged his foreign policy and his aims by an address made before the national assembly at Weimar on February 14. In substance he said that Germany did not account herself wholly responsible for the war; that she would hold strictly to the principles of President Wilson. According to the interpretation of Brockdorff-Rantzau, Germany would not need to pay one cent of indemnity nor give up any of her territory to the victors. If Germany was to rebuild the territory she had devastated, she wished to do so with free labor. The war was not won by the adversaries of Germany by military means alone, but largely because of economic pressure. The peace, therefore, must not only be a political peace, but an economic peace as well. The liberty of commerce, he continued, presupposed the liberty of the seas. And the liberty of the seas was for Germany the essential point in the Fourteen Points. Germany could not entertain the idea of having her colonies put under an international régime unless all colonies were placed under a régime of this kind, and Germany then received the mandate over what had been her own colonies. The expulsion of Germans from Alsace and Lorraine by the French he described as an imperialist plan that should be fought diplomatically by Germany. Prussian Poland he declared a part of the German Empire, but he favored adopting regulations for Polish use of the Vistula River, and railroads and port concessions in order to give Poland an easy access to the Baltic Sea.

He declared that he would not wish to annex Switzerland, Holland, or Scandinavia, but that he felt it proper for Germany to annex its German brothers of Austria, for more than ever Germany would wish to have a unified empire. Finally he declared himself in favor of regulating labor and social questions upon an international basis, and agreed to the collaboration of Germany in a league of nations, "organized in the spirit of President Wilson."

Such were the ideas of the leader of the German delegation. The Government further named Dr. Landsberg, minister of justice; Johann Giesberts, minister of posts, (postmaster-general); Herr Leinert; Professor Walther Schücking; and Dr. Carl Melchior.

Of these men Dr. Melchior was widely known as an expert on finance who had been in close touch with men of the Allied countries before the war. The views of Dr. Schücking on the League of Nations had been generally circulated, and deserve to be considered. He had a reputation as an expert on international law. Of all of the plenipotentiaries, however, Johann Giesberts was perhaps most remarkable.

Giesberts rose from baker's apprentice to a position in the cabinet of the new Germany. That he should step into places vacated by men who had never had the slightest sympathy with the commoner of the empire was a great outstanding fact in the story of the German revolution. Giesberts did not play a major rôle at Versailles, but his presence there permits this résumé of his rise.

He was a native of Straehlen, in the Rhine province,

having been born February 3, 1865, the son of a master baker. In his youth he attended merely the primary school. From fifteen to eighteen years of age he was apprenticed in a bakery. Later he worked in a tile factory, and after completing his service in the army he entered a brewery. He was employed in the large royal manufactories at Köln-Nippes in 1891, and was placed in charge of the mechanical department. His rise in public life dates from 1897, when he first took part in an international congress for the amelioration of working conditions at Zurich. Two years later he became editor of the "West Deutsche Arbeiter Zeitung." He then became secretary of the workers at München-Gladbach. In 1903 he was made municipal councilor of the village, and in 1905 was sent to the Reichstag by the electors of Essen. He became one of the speakers of the Catholic Center party on social questions.

Giesberts is president of the Christian Social Union of Metallurgists, and as such in close touch with groups led by Thyssen and Erzberger. During the war he labored successfully to promote a better understanding between the Catholic syndicates and the Socialist syndicates headed by Legien. His appointment as a member of the commission was a bold stroke to win the approbation of the workers of Germany.

Although Giesberts was not a leader in the delegation, his views may be considered fairly typical. He declared that the Entente had no need to fear militarism and kaiserism in the future. Silesia he considered indispensable to German industry. The loss of the Saar basin he declared a vital blow at Germany, one that

would result in the loss by immigration and annexation of 20,000,000 workers directly and indirectly dependent upon the products of the mines. He asserted that a strong Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine in the hands of the French precluded any ideas of conquest on the part of Germany. He favored either an entente between France and Germany as a means of avoiding economic rivalry and war, or an entente between England and the United States on the one hand and Germany on the other. He said that if the terms reported fixed by the Peace Conference were signed by Germany, the nation would cut its own throat, and that famine and unemployment would result.

The views of Professor Walther Schücking on the League of Nations are important not because they had any influence on the preparation of the covenant of the league, but because they may prove of value in the future after Germany enters the league in good standing. He is a native of Münster in Westphalia, and was born in 1875. He is known as an authority on international law, and has written a large number of books, among them works on the use of mines in war, the problem of the nationalities, the work of the Hague courts, the League of Nations, and the Hague Conference of 1912. Before the war he was an associate of the Institute of International Law and vice-president of the League for International Understanding. His views on the league were given publicity in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" on February 28, 1919, when he commented at length on the covenant read by President Wilson. He asserted that the project as outlined was greatly inferior to the Ger-

man plan. In French circles it was pointed out that his project, developed by the society for the rights of man, would give to the vanquished most of the rights and privileges won by the victor. It outlined an *approvisionnement* of raw materials to meet German industrial needs; the complete freedom of all maritime communications and straits; the open door and equal commercial rights for all nations in all foreign countries, including those of Germany's enemies; the establishment of German consuls, representing in all colonial territories an international bureau of administration of colonies, and charged with watching over German commercial interests there; finally the installation of international commissions, including German commissioners in their memberships, in all ports of mixed population. Dr. Schücking also proposed to reduce armaments to twenty-five per cent. of their force in 1909. French critics pointed out that this would still give the German Army a preponderance, for at that time it was extraordinarily strong, whereas the French Army was considerably smaller, owing to the two years' service law, while the British Army would have reached only about the size of the First Expeditionary Force, and the American Army was reduced to its small pre-war size and state militia.

On the subject of the League of Nations Dr. Schücking declared:

So long as we remain outside the League of Nations, it will appear as an imposing treaty of alliance signed by our enemies and directed against us.

The pact of the League of Nations seeks to hide with a vine-leaf the rape of the German colonies, at the same time favoring

the English and French negotiations on the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Professor Schücking was also of the opinion that "the internationalization of the high seas, advocated by President Wilson, has fallen completely under the table."

The German delegation to Versailles comprised also a great group of men known as commissioners, this term evidently being subordinated to that of delegates, as the six principal representatives with plenipotentiary powers were known. The commissioners were experts in various fields, such as finance, colonies, labor, railways, justice, commerce and industry, army and marine affairs. In addition to these came a number of technical advisers and representatives of the principal German newspapers, several of whom had formerly resided in the Entente countries.

A number of German functionaries arrived the last week in April. They included Baron von Lersner, counselor of the legation; Herr Griebler, chief of the telegraphic service, and Herr Walther, inspector of mails, who was also associated with telephone and telegraphic arrangements. Their work was to prepare quarters in the Hôtel des Reservoirs for the delegation, and to make arrangements for direct telephone and telegraphic connection with Frankfort, Spa and Cologne. Upon learning that there would be virtually two hundred persons in the German entourage, the French Government reserved three hotels in Versailles for their convenience, the Hôtel des Reservoirs, the Vatel, and

the Suisse, and decided that the park of the Trianon should be set aside for the use of the German delegates, and closed to the public.

It was on the night of April 29 that the main body of the German delegation arrived. Paris at last, without fanfares, without salutes, without the beat of drums! Not as conquering hosts, but as submissive representatives of a defeated government, come at the bidding of their conquerors. The special train entered the little station at Vaucresson at 8:35 o'clock. Colonel Henry, head of the French mission delegated to take charge of the arrangements, was present with members of the mission; a number of French local officials were also there. Baron von Lersner first entered the train and met Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and then introduced him to the French officials. The men saluted silently. M. Chaleil then said:

"Excellency, as prefect of the department of the Seine et Oise in the name of the Government of the Republic I have the mission of receiving here the delegation of the German plenipotentiaries, of which you are the chief. I have the honor of saluting you. Colonel Henry, here present, is the chief of the French mission, which will be the organ of liaison between the German plenipotentiaries and the Government of the Republic and the Allied governments."

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau saluted, and replied in a low voice:

"I thank you, *M. le préfet*, personally and in the name of my Government, and I pray you to transmit my thanks to the Government of the Republic."

The flash-lights of the photographers illumined the historic scene. The delegation entered automobiles, and was driven to Versailles. Several *camions* were needed to transport a mass of documents and papers of all kinds. It was said that the delegates carried a great amount of documentary evidence intended to cast light upon the preparations for war, the situation in July, 1914, the German information on the mobilization of the Russian and Belgian armies, and other data meant to help prove that Germany was not the sole aggressor. It was recalled at the same time that there was not a man in the German delegation who had openly stated his belief that Germany had begun the war or who had disavowed Germany's aims and practices. There were new names and new faces, but the background of German policy was the same as it had been during the war.

The coming of the Germans created scarcely a ripple in the quiet daily life of Versailles. It is true that the hotels assumed a new air of bustling activity, and that the German clerks and secretaries began moving between the three set aside for their use with the preoccupation of a family of ants. A few more automobiles rolled down the Avenue de Paris, a few more soldiers crossed the Place d'Armes, but on the whole Versailles scarcely moved an eyelid. It had a regal tradition and was stirred by great, not little, events.

If the Germans had hoped to receive the treaty on the day after their arrival they were doomed to disappointment. The Council of Four was not ready for them, and consequently it went quietly ahead, considering the causes laid before it, adjudicating disputes and award-

ing claims. The Germans fumed and fussed, and their journalists wrote long articles for the German newspapers, dilating upon the disagreements among the Council of Four and the fact that the Peace Conference might yet break up and deliver the Germans from bondage. It was a fond hope, but only that. The council, which had been unmoved by the storm of protest from its own people, was not likely to be hurried by the Germans.

On May 2 the first formal meeting between the German delegates and an official body of the Peace Conference took place at the Palace of the Trianon, when the Germans presented their credentials to the committee of the conference, headed by M. Jules Cambon and including Mr. Henry White, Lord Hardinge, and M. Matsui. The Italian delegation was not represented, ostensibly as part of its protest against the methods of President Wilson. Colonel Henry introduced Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. William Martin, director of the protocol, who in turn presented the German committee on credentials, including Herr Landsberg, minister of justice; Herr Simons, director of the section on justice for the ministry of foreign affairs; and Herr Ganss, counselor of the legation and associated as advocate with the ministry of foreign affairs. In view of the questionable status of the *de facto* German Government, considerable curiosity was shown in Allied circles as to how the German credentials would be certified. It was extremely necessary for the Peace Conference to know that it was dealing with a body that had veritable powers, and not with one of shifting responsibility.

When the credentials were presented, it was found that they were typewritten on parchment and signed by Ebert as president of the *Reich*, and Scheidemann as chancellor.

The German comment on the credentials of the Allied and Associated powers, which were handed in exchange, is interesting in view of the questions raised. The Germans found that those of Italy, Costa Rica, and Montenegro were not presented. On the other hand, the credentials of the Serbs were given as those of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which had not been seated as such by the Peace Conference. The Germans also received the credentials of Bolivia and Peru, "with whom," said the Germans, "we were not at war," and those of Hedjaz, which during the war was a part of the Ottoman Empire, and whose defection the Germans and the Turks had not recognized.

On May 7, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the Peace Conference formally handed to the German plenipotentiaries the treaty of peace, an amazing document of 440 separate articles, comprising approximately 80,000 words, covering every phase of the readjustment of the relations, political, economic, financial, military, between Germany and her neighbors in Europe, the most exhaustive and remarkable document of its kind that the world has ever seen. May 7 was the anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania* by a German submarine.

The ceremony took place in the ancient dining-room of the Palace of the Trianon, about a great table placed in the center of the room. M. Clemenceau sat at the head of the table, with President Wilson at his right and

Mr. Lloyd George at his left. The other powers were ranged at each hand. Facing the president, sat the six German delegates, pale, determined, austere. Italy's representatives, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino, came back at the last moment and shook hands cordially with President Wilson. In all sixty-four delegates were present at the formal session.

It was 3:05 o'clock when M. Bonhomme, sergeant at arms of the ministry of foreign affairs, announced to the assembly:

"The German plenipotentiaries!"

The German delegation of twelve entered, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau at its head. The Allied and Associated delegates rose formally. The Germans bowed. M. William Martin led them to their places. M. Clemenceau then announced:

"The session is opened."

The little president of the council seemed in the best of humor. His eyes twinkled. He spoke in an animated manner with President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. He wore his regular attire, a black suit, a little black tie, and gray silk gloves. It was distinctly his day. He might have been thinking of 1871, when he, too, was an actor, although in a minor part in the drama at Bordeaux, in events so different from those taking place to-day. He plunged immediately into his speech. It lacked neither force, nor emphasis, nor directness. He said:

It is neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers, united to fight together in the war that was so

cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our accounts. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present to you now a book which contains our conditions.

M. Clemenceau declared briefly that the Germans might offer their observations on the treaty, and that no oral discussion would take place, but all would be in writing. The Germans were to have fifteen days in which to present in English and French their written observations. The Peace Conference would reply as soon as they were presented. M. Clemenceau had lived too long to delude himself with fine phrases. He spoke his mind bluntly. He had always done so. He had made opponents by speaking his mind, but one thing was certain, his views were clear cut and known to friend and foe.

The reply of Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau produced a most unfavorable impression on the Allied and Associated plenipotentiaries. Even though the conference did not look for abject apologies, it had expected an attitude of deference to its wishes. The German leader, however, spoke in what seemed a harsh and defiant tone. He began speaking without rising, a fact that caused the Allies to look at one another in astonishment, for M. Clemenceau had accorded that courtesy to his enemies. Why he did not rise Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau has never explained. Even his enemies attempted to find excuses for him; they were willing to credit it to an indisposition, but hardly to rudeness. President Wilson, so the story goes, remarked on this fact to M. Clemenceau.

"We are accustomed to it," replied the French leader. "This is the sort of treatment we have had to put up with in Europe for years."

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke in German, and as he proceeded two German secretaries translated his remarks phrase by phrase into French and English. The course of his remarks may be followed by these extracts from his address:

We are under no illusion as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our want of power. We know that the power of German arms is broken. We know the power of the hatred which we encounter here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors shall make us pay as the vanquished, and shall punish those who are worthy of being punished.

It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves to be the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth will be a lie. We are far from declining any responsibility for this great world war having come to pass, and for its having been made in the way in which it was made. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague peace conference, its actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, certainly contributed to the disaster, but we energetically deny that Germany and its people, who were convinced that they were making a war of defense, were alone guilty. . . .

We repeat the declaration made in the German Reichstag at the beginning of the war; that is to say, "A wrong has been done to Belgium, and we are willing to repair it."

But in the manner of making war also Germany is not the only guilty one; every nation knows of the deeds of peoples which the best nationals only remember with regret. . . . I ask you when reparation is demanded not to forget the armistice. It took you six weeks till we got it at last, and six months till we came to know your conditions of peace. Crimes in war may be excusable, but they are committed in the struggle for victory. . . . The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since November 11 by reason of the blockade were killed with cold deliberation after our adversaries had conquered and victory had been assured to them. Think of that when you speak of guilt and of punishment. . . .

The measure of guilt of all those who have taken part can only

be stated by impartial inquest before a neutral commission before which all the principal persons of the tragedy are allowed to speak and to which all the archives are open. We have demanded such an inquest and we repeat this demand. . . .

We are not without protection. . . . The principles of President Wilson have thus become binding for both parties to the war, for you as well as for us, and also for our former allies.

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau said that Germany was ready to repair the devastated areas in Belgium and France, but that it would be disastrous if this were to be done by the labor of prisoners of war. He warned against a crisis which might bring with it the inability of the Germans to repair the damages, and result in the disorder of the whole European economical system. "The conquerors as well as the vanquished people must guard against this menacing danger, with its incalculable consequences. There is only one means of banishing it — unlimited confession of the economical and social solidarity of all peoples in a free and rising League of Nations."

He expressed the intention of the Germans to examine the document given them with good will, in the hope that it might finally be subscribed to by all.

The remarks of the count, especially those regarding Allied responsibility for lives lost in Germany by the delay in negotiations caused an unfavorable reaction, as the Allies rejected this charge. M. Clemenceau rose and said:

"Has any one any more observations to offer? Does no one wish to speak? If not the meeting is closed." It was 4:05 P. M.

The Germans withdrew, and soon thereafter the conference adjourned. A few of the delegates delayed

their departure; for the bulky volume which had given the Germans the surprise of their lives was no less a surprise to many of the members of the Peace Conference, men representing friendly powers who might have been considered in close touch with the work of the council, and yet who stood on the outside, almost as far on the outside as the Germans.

And so the treaty was given to the Germans, and by them made public, as it deserved to be, but as for the Allied and Associated governments, they still maintained an air of secrecy about certain of its provisions. A summary was presented to the press, and although it had been drawn up with care, it was hardly more than a superficial résumé of a work that dealt with infinitesimal details. That the treaty was not formally given to the world at the time it was presented to the Germans is inexplicable and inexcusable; it reached the public by devious channels, through the publications of the Germans, through violations of confidence, through garbled accounts given by commissioners and delegates. Even the members of the French Chamber of Deputies complained that they had to buy the German newspapers to get a detailed account of the treaty of peace, while the United States Senate found a new grievance in the fact that it had been again ignored. Technically, the Senate could not well receive the treaty until it had been signed; but publication of the document would have obviated this new criticism and avoided jeopardizing its ratification, a matter that was as vital to its success as its signature. Here again the American President,

technically within his rights, failed to grasp the needs of the situation.

It was a quiet and uncommunicative group of men that returned that night to the Hôtel des Reservoirs. In the dining-room scarce a word was spoken above a whisper. At the central table, where Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau presided in the midst of twelve members of the delegation, men ate their meal in silence. When he rose, the work of translation was immediately begun. Throughout the night the secretaries labored and by three a. m. a German copy was in his hands. Not until dawn did the head of the German delegation cease his labors.

To the Allied and Associated powers it was evident that Germany had sent to Versailles no chastened and humbled representatives. Leaders who had hoped for a new attitude as a result of the great débâcle, shook their heads.

“It is the same Germany,” they said sadly.

CHAPTER XVI

A pilgrimage to the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, and how it recalls the founding of an empire forty-eight years ago.

TRAMP, *tramp, tramp*, they come, like an army on parade, up the stone-paved forecourt of the Palace of Versailles, where once the Swiss Guard stood at attention; up the narrow staircase that leads to the chapel of the Bourbon kings, their heavy hobnailed shoes ringing through the corridors. Into the great Hall of Hercules they march, their heels grinding into the sawdust that now lies thick on floors once lightly touched by the dainty, slippered feet of a royalty that now lives merely in romance. Tan shoes; clay-colored puttees; khaki uniforms; bronzed, oval faces; the overseas cap — these are the doughboys of the American Army invading the palace of Versailles.

The leader is uniformed much as they are, but there are red letters and a triangle on his cap that indicate his affiliation with the Y. M. C. A. He is not a professional guide, merely an amateur; vice-president of a bank, perhaps, in his home town in York State, or owner of a cattle-ranch in sunny Texas, and has come across for the love of the work. Not a professional, but he has read history with the mind of a student and the interest of a lover of old things. He stands in the middle of this old room, with head held high, telling the story of other

days clearly and simply as if he were addressing a group of children. And so he is, for many of these men who crowd about him are children from the New World, hearing for the first time the legends of the Old, listening to these stories of kings and queens and princesses much as once they listened to the tales of knights-errant and gay cavaliers.

“The Hall of Hercules,” declaims the guide. “Observe the painting on the ceiling by Lemoyne. Here once was located the altar of the palace, before the great chapel was built by Mansart. Here preached Bourdaloue and Massillon. Here were married the Duke of Maine, son of King Louis XIV and Mme. De Montespan; the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Chartres. We will pass to the grand apartments, where the court met nightly; we will see the Salon of Diana, where Louis le Grand played at billiards; the Salon of Mars, once a concert-room; the Salon of Mercury, where, so Mme. de Sévigné tells us, the queen lost heavily at cards, and Monsieur, the king’s brother, pledged his jewels to pay his gambling debts. Here, too, for eight days stood the coffin of Louis XIV; then the Salon of Apollo; and the Salon of War —”

Tramp, tramp, tramp, onward through the rooms where once lived and moved the royalty and the nobility of France — rooms that still contain the costly tapestries, the quaint mural decorations, the gorgeous ceilings, and the sunlike emblems of the *roi soleil*. Let us follow this small army from the West — from Ohio and Oklahoma and the hill-sides of the Sierras — through these ancient rooms.

“The Salon of Apollo was once the throne-room,” says the guide. “Here was placed the great throne of pure silver on which sat Louis XIV when he wished to impress his visitors from foreign lands. Here Louis received the Doge of Genoa, who, when asked what he considered most remarkable at Versailles, replied, ‘That I should be here!’ And then the Hall of War, where Louis received the ambassadors from other lands. Observe the magnificent ceiling by Lebrun, with the painting that depicts Germany, Holland, and Spain taking alarm at the mighty conquests of the great French monarch. And from the Hall of War we pass into that most magnificent of all rooms — the *galerie des glaces* — the Hall of Mirrors!”

The Hall of Mirrors at last! Across the garden front of the palace it stretches, a continuation at one end of the Hall of War, at the other of the Hall of Peace. The incomparable salon, so truly a part of the history of France, where have been enacted scenes that recall her glory and her humiliation! And here is to be staged that culminating act of the Great War — the signing of the treaty of peace.

Let us enter this formal room. At the first glance it appears narrow. The guide tells us that it was built by Mansart in 1678, and that it is 240 feet long, 35 feet wide, and 42 feet high. These are mere details that go unnoticed. What strikes the eye is the long line of mirrors that fills every inch of the seventeen great arches rising on the wall opposite the seventeen great windows that look out over one of the most magnificent gardens of the world. There is a frieze of gold and white, odd

allegorical figures of children and trophies of war, by Coysevox, and above, on the ceiling, the allegorical paintings of Lebrun, eulogizing the career of Louis le Grand. It was a great tradition that began here, too great for the successors of Louis to carry.

These mirrors have reflected the old monarch in all his plumage. They have helped diffuse the light from the tall silver candelabra with the eight branches, chiseled to depict the labors of Hercules, that illuminated this hall. They have brought to Marie Antoinette the joy of beholding herself the most beautiful woman of a beautiful retinue. Lords of high estate, princes, generals, ambassadors, and plebeians have passed before them. Here the nobility of France paid honor to the Prince of Condé. Here smiled Mme. de Maintenon, secretly married to Louis XIV, of whom her most bitter enemy said that she never appeared old, not even at seventy. Here passed Mme. de Pompadour, "la Reinette," beloved of Louis XV; and Mme. du Barry, on the eve of her presentation. Racine was here, writing for the royal theater, where his "Athalie" was presented by the *demoiselles* of Saint-Cyr; and Voltaire, favored by Mme. de Pompadour, and writing for her "*La princesse de Navarre*," put to music by Rameau. And before these mirrors, too, passed Jean Bart, intrepid hero of the sea; the powerful Marshal Turenne; and an old man of dry wit, plain middle-class attire, flowing gray locks, and firm, compressed lips — Benjamin Franklin.

The costly furniture with which Louis le Grand once adorned this hall has vanished. Gone are the silver

chairs and tables, the silver taborets, the silver candelabra, the silver jardinières that held orange-trees laden with their golden fruit. Long since melted down are they, like the silver throne, to pay the toll of the costly wars waged by the great monarch in his failing years. Gone, too, are the heavy damask hangings of blue and gold that, we are told, decorated the seventeen great windows, and the alabaster vases encrusted with gold; and in place of the costly settees we now see low upholstered benches that serve to rest the weary limbs of wide-eyed sightseers.

And here, in this Hall of Mirrors, on January 18, 1871, was proclaimed the German Empire, which, erected on force and aggression, now lies humbled in the dust.

January 18, 1871 — it was a memorable day. It deserves to be recalled as we stand here in this hall, for we are living the sequel to the story that began here. It was President Poincaré, you will remember, who first spoke of that date at this Peace Conference, on January 18, 1919, in the hall of the clock at the ministry of foreign affairs, when he said: "This very day, forty-eight years ago, on the eighteenth of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion, in the Château at Versailles. It was consecrated by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus vitiated from its origin, and by the fault of its founders. Born in injustice, it has ended in opprobrium."

Let us go back into the twilight zone of history for this story that is so fitting an introduction to the events of which we are a part.


On December 9, 1870, the North German Confederation, organized after Sadowa, was transformed into a German Confederation by consent of all its members, with the King of Prussia as president. But Bismarck did not consider this sufficient for cementing German unity, to which most Germans had looked forward ever since the days of the Holy Roman Empire. For nearly half of the nineteenth century both Austria and Prussia had aspired to the imperial title, and Prussia had been able to block all Austrian attempts to win it until the seven weeks' war proved the turning-point that definitely put Prussia on the high road to success, and started Austria on her downward path that ended in the débâcle of 1918. Bismarck, prime minister for Prussia, who dictated the lenient terms of peace to Austria, had labored all his life at the task of achieving German unity. "Unity and centralization," he said, was all that was needed.

When Prussia entered upon the war against France in 1870, Bismarck worked harder to accomplish his object than ever before, and hand in hand with the task of fighting France went the intrigues that were to lay low all opposition among the independent and headstrong German leaders who feared and envied Prussia. Suffice it to say that the King of Bavaria undertook the mission of proposing to the heads of the members of the new German Confederation that the title of its president be changed to that of emperor, that he rule as the head of the new *Deutsches Reich*, the German Empire, a title which even to-day, after the revolution has passed over Germany, and the crown of

the Hohenzollern has rolled in the dust, is retained as the appellation of the German Republic.

The king's office was well performed. One day a deputation from the Reichstag, led by Herr Simson, who in 1848 presided at the national assembly at Frankfurt and vainly offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV, now came to Versailles to offer to William I, brother of Frederick William, the crown that Germany regarded as that of Charlemagne and of the Cæsars, of the empire of the Middle Ages. It was just 170 years after William's ancestor, then known as elector of Brandenburg, had acquired the title of King of Prussia, and just sixty-four years after William himself, as a child in arms, had fled with his royal parents from Berlin before the armies of Napoleon, seeking refuge in the fortress at Memel. William was well along in years now, at the age where most men of wealth and position would have been glad to lay down the cares of state. His career, begun in the tempestuous Napoleonic times, had included participation in the Blücher campaign against Napoleon in 1814 and the Waterloo campaign of 1815, and attendance with his father at the Congress of Vienna, and in 1858, he had become regent of Prussia in the place of his mad brother, and in 1861, king.

Before the eyes of the world the proclamation of the emperor at Versailles proceeded smoothly and harmoniously. We will gaze first upon that historic picture before we penetrate behind the scenes and behold the strings that operate the puppets. To gain a better idea of how the Hall of Mirrors looked on that day, we will walk almost to its middle. The ceiling, we will observe,



THE GREAT WINDOWS OF THE PALACE AT VERSAILLES

The first three windows on the second floor of the palace are those of the Hall of War; the next seventeen windows are those of the Hall of Mirrors, where the German Emperor was proclaimed in 1871 and the Treaty of Peace signed in 1919. The last three windows are those of the Hall of Peace

is divided into seven compartments. Each contains a picture celebrating the virtues of Louis XIV, painted by Lebrun. Beginning with the end adjacent to the Hall of War we behold, first, the passage of the Rhine in 1672 and the capture of Maestricht, 1673; second, the preparation of the land and sea forces by Louis in 1672; third, a council of war held by Louis, the Duke of Orléans, the Prince of Condé, and the Marshal Turenne before an attack on the Dutch forts; fourth, a representation of Louis XIV ruling alone, with the legend "*Le roi gouverne par lui-même*," and allegorical figures representing Germany, Spain, and Holland; fifth, the king resolves to chastise the Dutch; sixth, the reconquest of the province of Franche-Comté in 1674; seventh, the capture of the town and citadel of Ghent in 1678.

Take your place under the fourth panel, virtually in the middle of the long hall. Here stood William I of Hohenzollern on January 18, 1871.

Here also was placed an altar. It bore a red cloth with the iron cross of Prussia in black. To the left and the right of the altar stood deputations from the German troops who had come to Versailles with the banners of the troops. These banners were held by standard-bearers on a dais on the east end of the hall. They included five flags of the Guards; five flags of the Landwehr Guards; eighteen of the 5th Corps; ten of the 6th Corps; five of the 11th Corps, and others, fifty-six in all.

Near King William, grouped in a semicircle, stood the Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia, the princes Karl and Adelbert of Prussia; the Crown Prince of Saxony and Prince George; the grand dukes of

Baden, Saxony, and Oldenburg; the dukes of Coburg, Meiningen, and Altenburg; the princes Otto, Luitpold, and Leopold of Bavaria; Prince William and Prince Augustus and Duke Eugene the Elder and Eugene the Younger of Württemberg; the hereditary grand dukes of Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz; the Princes of Schaumburg-Lippe and Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt; the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern; the Landgrave of Hesse; the Duke of Augustenburg; the princes of Wied, Potous, Lynar, and Pless; the princes of Reuss, Croy, and the Baron of Courland.

These are names that history has gathered unto herself, to be stored in the musty old archives for the scholar and the student of forgotten things; they have been swept out, as Carl Sandburg would say, on God's great dust-pan.

At the side of the princes and behind them stood the generals and ministers. At the left were Count von Bismarck and Baron von Schleinitz. At the right, Minister of State Delbrück and Count von Moltke.

The king wore the uniform of the First Guards, in which he first earned field rank in 1814. He wore the cordon of the order of the Black Eagle of Prussia, the order of the Red Eagle, the full insignia of the order of the Garter, and the Russian order of St. George.

When William entered at 12:15 o'clock the choir, made up of members of three regiments, sang "*Jauchzet dem Herrn alle Welt*" ["Praise the Lord all the Earth"]. A prayer was then read by the Lutheran chaplain, Dr. Rügger. The chaplain looked up at the legend, "*Le roi gouverne par lui-même*," and used it as

the theme for his discourse. This was followed again by prayer, and the singing of the hymn "*Nun danket alle Gott*" ["Give ye all thanks unto the Lord"]. The king, followed by the princes, then walked over to the regimental flags and, stepping upon the dais, declared to the assembled body, numbering between five hundred and six hundred officers, that he accepted the title of German Emperor at the request of the people and the princes of Germany, and in order to bring about the national union of the fatherland. He then said:

"I command my chancellor to read aloud my proclamation to the German people."

Count Bismarck then read to the assembly the king's promise that he would do what the princes and the free towns had unanimously desired, add the title of imperial to the Prussian crown, and use the imperial title in all affairs of state. He spoke of a change of frontier which would guarantee Germany against future attacks by France, and the hope for lasting peace and freedom. The king closed, and the Grand Duke of Baden, stepping to the foreground, exclaimed:

"*Es lebe Seine Majestät der Deutsche Kaiser Wilhelm, hoch!*"

["Long live his Majesty the German Emperor William, hoch!"]

The band thereupon struck up "*Heil dir im Siegerkranz*," and the emperor and the crown prince embraced thrice. The ceremony was concluded.

Harmoniously enough it seemed before the world, yet several of its principal actors were to disclose in later

years that not all the felicitations had come willingly. It had been an arduous task for Bismarck to gain the consent not only of various elements of the German Confederation, but of King William himself, to have the Prussian monarch made German emperor.

“What do you wish to do, give me the title of *major caractérisé*?” declared William, when Bismarck first approached him on the subject, referring to the title which it was the custom to bestow on officers of the Prussian Army who were about to be retired.

“Your Majesty would not wish to remain eternally a neuter noun *das Präsidium*,” replied Bismarck, referring to the title of president of the German Confederation.

For a long time Bismarck was not able to convince King William that he could make the imperial office a living and vital thing. William hesitated, the crown prince demurred. Finally William consented, but hardly with the alacrity with which the more recent William II would have accepted the imperial office. Then a new obstacle presented itself, and this time it was the style of the imperial title that caused the difficulty.

William was ready to become Emperor of Germany, but Bismarck’s idea that he should be named *Deutscher Kaiser* — German Emperor — hurt his susceptibilities. For Emperor of Germany meant a sovereign over all, whereas German Emperor meant merely a leader among equals. William did not like that, and would not budge an inch in his position. Bismarck cited the instance of the old emperors, who did not term themselves emper-

ors of Rome, but Roman emperors, which led William to remark that it was immaterial to him what they did in those days; that he wanted to be styled Emperor of Germany.

The ceremony in the hall of mirrors was to take place the following day, and as the Grand Duke of Baden had already been chosen to give the "*hoch*" at the end of the imperial discourse, Bismarck found it necessary to admonish him to be careful to distinguish between the two forms, and for safety's sake to give a "*vive*" for the Emperor William, rather than for the Emperor of Germany.

And so the spectacle was staged, and the Grand Duke of Baden carried out his part, and there stepped down from the dais to receive the congratulations of the princes, dukes, generals, and men of lesser rank a man who had just been proclaimed emperor and who was boiling with rage within, almost beside himself, because he deemed that he had been used as a dupe by a crafty statesman. Bismarck has told the story of what followed. Hardly hiding his pique, the emperor affected not to see his chancellor, who through chicanery, intrigue, hidden pressure, force, and argumentative power had just wrung consent from the unwilling German princes and placed the imperial title upon the head of a Hohenzollern. His Majesty was about to pass out of the palace by the famous stairs of the princes when he encountered Bismarck standing in the open space before the steps. He passed him without recognition, and gave his hand to the generals who stood behind Bismarck. For several days William persisted in an uncompromis-

ing attitude, and it was weeks before he restored his chancellor fully into his confidence.

Now comes a curious and most unusual circumstance, which illustrates how strange are the ways of Fate, and how portentous events grow out of little things. I mean to refer to an incident that is almost responsible for the founding of the German Empire and the proclamation of William as German Emperor on the day I have just described, and to tell its story I must go again into the twilight zone of history.

In the early days of the Franco-Prussian War, when the news of the French defeats reached Paris, the personal and private correspondence of the Emperor Napoleon III and of the imperial family was gathered together and sent out of France. It reached the frontier immediately after the defeat at Sedan, and there was stopped by the prefect of police of the provisional government, which had been set up in place of the empire. A commission was named to publish the documents, with a view of determining the steps that led up to the war.

The correspondence was duly printed in an official publication, dated September 24, 1870, and disclosed that virtually none of the letters discussed anything but routine matters, and that none gave any clue to the diplomatic negotiations which the nation was certain would exonerate the French people from complicity in making war. It was evident that some of the important letters had been removed. An investigation was then made at the house of M. Rouher, former president of the senate and virtually vice-emperor, and it was discovered

that he had taken flight with his family and departed for England. Rouher had a country home at Cergy, a château near Brunoy, southeast of Paris. This house was reached on October 10, 1870, by the 17th Division of Mecklenburg infantry, of which the advance guard took quarters in this château. In making a thorough search of the premises according to the time-honored custom of the German Army, the soldiers came upon a great quantity of papers and letters. The men began to throw them to the winds, but an officer with more intelligence than the soldiers immediately recognized that they might be of value to his chiefs and called a halt. He had the find put in boxes and shipped to Count von Bismarck, then occupying the home of Mme. Jesse at No. 14 Rue de Provence in Versailles, the house that is to-day occupied by Henri Jesse, the son of Mme. Jesse.

It is certain that Bismarck opened these boxes. It is certain that he read these historic French documents, covering a number of years. What was in them? Only vague references have been made to them. No one not in the secret circle of German diplomacy, it seems, was ever permitted to read them. But that they contained matters of the greatest import to France and to Germany all historians agree. In fact, many of them dwell upon the plans, the reports, the memoranda, and correspondence that covered some of the most difficult years in European diplomacy. Only once did Bismarck see fit to publish extracts from these papers. This came in October, 1871, when Benedetti, ambassador of France to Germany, whose confidence was shame-

fully misused by Bismarck, published his book, "*Ma Mission en Prusse.*" Bismarck published a number of papers purporting to deal with various demands made by Napoleon III at the time of the readjustment of the Luxemburg question by the revision of the treaty of 1839 in 1866.

It was then that a French journal made the interesting disclosure that in addition to the papers published by Bismarck, there were included in the Cérçay documents the correspondence between the French Government and the prime ministers of Bavaria and Würtemberg of the years 1865 and 1866, the very years when those two nations were doing everything in their power to prevent Prussia from gaining the imperial title by her growing ascendancy and military victory over Austria. Appealing to the French Emperor, the southern states of Germany endeavored to gain his help against Prussia. Count von Bray, who was minister of foreign affairs of Bavaria at this time, was an intimate friend of Count von Beust, the Austrian prime minister. Bray arrived at Versailles on October 23, 1870, about the time that the heavily laden boxes of documents reached Bismarck from Cérçay. Up to this moment opposition to the idea of Prussian leadership in a German confederation and empire had been steadily growing, and not the least of the opponents were Bavaria and Würtemberg. Bray came to Versailles determined to carry out his own idea, and yet in a few days had swung round to Bismarck's view. No less sudden was the conversion of the other southern states, and the two historians who have given the greatest

thought to this odd chapter in the story of the German empire — M. Joseph Reinach, to whose research we are indebted for the details, and von Ruville, a professor of the university of Halle who wrote a history of the restoration of the empire, both pointed to the possession by Bismarck of these secret documents involving the integrity of the south German states as the reason for the collapse of all opposition. In fact von Ruville wrote: "The secret documents of the ministers of the south German states in the power of Bismarck explains the easy denouement of the negotiations of November, 1870. The idea forces itself upon me: here is the key to the foundation of the German Empire."

What is in these secret documents? What disclosures did Bismarck find that enabled him to gain the whip hand over his recalcitrant compatriots? The world has learned much of the story of the German Empire within the last few years; it is fitting that it should learn the whole story of how it was founded. That story is contained in the secret archives of Napoleon III, long since removed from Versailles and carted to Berlin, where they rest to-day among the documents that have been garnered from near and far by that amazing system which had its headquarters in the Wilhelmstrasse. And the world shall know. Thanks to M. Piccionni, director of the French archives, and M. Joseph Reinach, one of the vice-presidents of the commission of diplomatic archives, the documents are to be returned to France. For Article 245 of Section II of the treaty of peace, dealing with special provisions, reads:

Within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty

the German government must restore to the French government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870-1871 and during this last war, in accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by the French government: particularly the French flags taken in the course of the war of 1870-1871 and all the political papers taken by the German authorities on October 10, 1870, at the château of Cerçay, near Brunoy, (Seine-et-Oise) belonging at the time to M. Rouher, formerly minister of state.

CHAPTER XVII

How Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau made use of his fifteen days, which were pretty dark, and his fifteen nights, which were just as dark.

FROM the very first the diplomatic battle between the Germans and the Allied and Associated powers which followed the presentation of the treaty of peace was a fight for interpretation of the Fourteen Points.

That, as I have reiterated again and again, was the basis on which the Western powers agreed to make peace. That was the basis on which Germany signed the terms of the armistice. And between November 11, 1918, the day the armistice was signed, and May 7, 1919, the day the completed treaty was handed to the Germans, it was purely a question of interpretation. That it remains to-day.

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau had said that afternoon at the Trianon:

We are not quite without protection. You yourselves have brought us an ally; namely, the right which is guaranteed by the treaty, by the principles of the peace. The allied and associated governments forswore in the time between October 5 and November 5, 1918, a peace of violence, and wrote a "peace of justice" on their banner. On October 5, 1918, the German government proposed the principles of the President of the United States of North America as the basis of peace, and on November 5 their secretary of state, Mr. Lansing, declared that the allied and associated powers agreed to this basis with two definite deviations. The principles of President Wilson have thus become binding for

both parties to the war, you as well as for us, and also for our former allies. . . .

So it was but natural and logical that when the treaty, with its far-reaching provisions, came into the hands of the Germans, they declared it violated the principles for which the American President had pledged his word, and which had been guaranteed them in the armistice.

"It is a sentence of death," said Scheidemann; "the Entente's conditions contradict the Fourteen Points. What has become to-day of the exchange of guarantees of disarmament, pledged in the fourth? And as for the fifth, Germany gives its colonies to the Allies, as well as rights in Africa acquired by virtue of diverse international conventions."

"Down to the least detail the intention of France to humble Germany is visible," said Professor Schücking.

"This peace is a peace of violence," said Prince Lichnovsky, former ambassador to England. "It is not based upon justice; to me it seems to be dictated under the influence of Marshal Foch."

On May 8 the German cabinet met and drew up a proclamation to the German nation. It declared that the German people had loyally carried out the terms of the armistice. "The German people bore all the burdens, trusting in the promise given by the Allies in the note of November 5 that the peace would be a peace of right on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. What, instead of that, is now given us in the peace terms is in contradiction of the promise." On May 9 the Imperial Government and the Prussian State

Government issued a joint proclamation to the German East mark, deploring the demands for the cession of Upper Silesia, Posen, and Dantzic, which, they said, "are so many attacks upon the right of self-determination of the population of these territories, which have acquired by German work and German culture all that which to-day constitutes their chief excellence. These attacks are entirely incompatible with the principles announced by President Wilson. . . ."

The German stock exchange closed for three days. The German states agreed to suspend public amusements. The Government considered a day — nay a week — of mourning. But, said "Freiheit," the Berlin organ of the radical socialists:

"From the standpoint of the imperialist policy of force such as Germany pursued at Brest-Litovsk, the peace terms of the entente must be regarded as quite moderate."

Germany had forgotten Brest-Litovsk.

On May 9 Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau presented to M. Clemenceau four notes, the first of a long series of notes taking exceptions to the treaty of peace and suggesting modifications. The very first note bore an allusion to the Fourteen Points: "They (the Germans) have had to realize that on essential points the basis of the peace of right agreed upon between the belligerents has been abandoned." The Allies replied at once that "they wish to remind the German delegation that they have framed the terms of the treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the armistice and the negotiations of peace were proposed; they can admit

of no discussion of their right to insist upon the terms of the peace substantially as drafted."

How extensively Germany's boundary-lines were affected by the treaty of peace may be gleaned from an examination of the various changes it provided for. First of all, Alsace and Lorraine reverted to France, and here the German boundary went back to the Rhine, where it had been in 1870. The Saar basin is a continuation of Lorraine, and here the German line receded at least temporarily and perhaps for all time. German sovereignty had not extended over Luxemburg, but it was a member of the German customs union, and its railways were a part of the German system. This was wiped out by the treaty, and Germany agreed to abide by all arrangements which the Allied and Associated powers might conclude with this government. The boundary receded beyond Prussian Moresnet, and the circles of Eupen and Malmédy, also known as Prussian Wallonia, although the treaty stipulated that within six months after the treaty comes into force the Belgians will open registers at Eupen and Malmédy so that all who wish may record in writing their desire to have the whole or a part of the territories remain under German sovereignty. The boundary receded also in Schleswig, where the treaty attempts to right Germany's little omission to let the Danes have a plebiscite, promised by Bismarck in the Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria in 1866. The plebiscite to come covers virtually two thirds of Schleswig, the southernmost line passing a short distance to the south of Flensburg. Dantzic becomes a free city under the guaranty

of the League of Nations, and an international area is provided in order to give Poland access to the sea. A considerable recession of sovereignty is provided for in East Prussia, although plebiscites are to be held in a district between the southern frontier of East Prussia and the western and northern boundary of the *Regierungsbezirk* Allenstein to its junction with the northern boundary between the *Kreise* of Oletsko and Angerburg; thence the northern boundary of the *Kreise* of Oletsko to its junction with the old frontier of East Prussia. In the area between the Nogat and the Vistula the inhabitants also will be asked to decide whether they wish German or Polish sovereignty. A strip around Memel, at the northeasternmost part of Prussia, is also renounced, and Germany will accept the decision of the Allies regarding the final disposition of these territories. Upper Silesia receives a plebiscite at which the inhabitants will determine their preference between Poland and Germany; here are located the principal coal-mines. The new Kingdom of Poland is carved out of the heart of the former Prussia, so that the German boundaries are considerably changed here, and what was formerly Prussian Poland, or, as the Germans would say, Polish Prussia, will be joined to the Polish kingdom in Russia to form the new state. In addition Germany suffers the following modifications of sovereignty: Germany is to lease space in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin for ninety-nine years to Czecho-Slovakia, in order to give that inland state access to the sea. An international régime is provided for the Rhine, part of the Moselle, the Elbe, the Oder, the

Niemen and the Danube. There is a modification of control of the Kiel Canal, which is to be "maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality." Germany does not lose sovereignty over the Rhine provinces, but may not build forts or quarter troops west of the Rhine or west of a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine.

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau now began to attack the treaty in a series of rifle-volleys and cannon-broad-sides. He sniped at the League of Nations; he fired grape-shot and canister at the idea that one foot of German soil should pass into alien hands. His notes came almost daily. He presented substitutes for certain clauses of the treaty, urged the amelioration of others, and suggested that others be wiped out entirely. The council replied to his notes as quickly as possible. The four leaders of the conference worked at a tremendous rate of speed. Even when the German questions were answered by experts and technical advisers, the four revised and edited them and thoroughly digested their contents before sending them to Versailles. In addition they continued their routine work, and this included such difficult tasks as preparing another treaty of peace for presentation to the Austrian delegates at St. Germain-en-Laye; taking measures to deal with Bela Kun and the Bolshevik situation in Hungary; continuing consideration of the claims of Italy, Rumania, and Greece, and hearing pleas on a great variety of subjects.

The German delegation was particularly opposed to





Photo by Paul Thompson

GERMANY'S REPRESENTATIVES IN VERSAILLES

The five German delegates hear M. Clémenceau present the treaty of peace at the first session in the Grand Trianon at Versailles. From left to right, first row: Herr Leinert, Dr. Landsberg, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Herr Giesberts and Professor Schücking



cession of the Saar basin. Ignoring the fact that the League of Nations would determine the government of the basin for fifteen years at least, the Germans treated the subject as if the basin already had been turned over to France. The German proposals and the detailed reply of the Peace Conference on this subject are contained in the notes of the Germans, dated May 13 and 16, and in the reply dated May 24.

In the first of these notes Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau takes up the question of cession of German territory. He raises objection to the fact that Denmark, a neutral country, seeks adjustment of the frontier difficulties in Schleswig through the medium of the Peace Conference, and asks by what authority the conference is enabled to regulate this question. He adds, however, that if the Danish Government wishes to press its claims by way of the peace negotiations, the German Government has no intention of opposing it, a little hint which definitely alines Denmark with the Allied group. He then takes up the status of the Saar Basin, which, he says, is inhabited purely by Germans, and declares that the new régime will sever the relations of people of the Saar with the empire. The whole population is refusing energetically to leave its native land. He fears that after Germany has made reparations to the Allies it may not have the money necessary in gold after fifteen years to buy the mines from France, and if it does, the committee on reparations probably will not permit the use of the money in this manner. He remarks that Allied opinion regards the cession of the Saar mines as just com-

pensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in northern France. He believes that means of indemnification can be found other than giving up sovereignty over this territory. Germany will be ready to deliver coal to make up what France lacks, and to enter into an arrangement to study this problem and satisfy the needs of France either from the mines of the Saar or the Ruhr. In an annex appended to the note of May 16 the German economic experts suggest that in treating the question of the Saar on a new basis France and Belgium designate how much and what different kinds of coal are needed in the various regions, and propose that enterprises damaged in the north of France be given an interest in German coal-mines that deliver this coal. They declare that the measures for regulating the Saar territory suppress the liberty of Germany's economic life and paralyze the productive capacity of Germany. They propose in their place a series of guaranties for the delivery of the coal, including giving French enterprises an interest and an essential influence in the administration of the German enterprises, and providing for a commission composed of representatives of France, Germany, and Belgium to ration the delivery of coal between the three countries if this is found necessary.

The reply of May 24 is signed by M. Clemenceau. He says that the domination of the Saar that the Germans call odious is that of the League of Nations, and that the plan of control has been developed carefully with the idea not only of finding compensation for the mines destroyed in the north of France, but

of assuring the rights and well being of the population. Special rights and privileges are assured the inhabitants, he says, and at the end of fifteen years they will have the right to make their choice in complete liberty, coerced neither to the advantage of France nor of Germany. He adds:

As the greater part of your two notes is devoted to the status of the basin of the Saar, I must declare that the allied and associated governments have chosen this particular form of reparation because they regard the destruction of the mines in the north of France as having been an act of such a nature that special reparation was needed as an example: the simple delivery of a quantity of coal, determined or undetermined, was not considered adequate.

The conference, he continues, cannot accept the suggestions for the regulation of the mines. No arrangement of this character can give France the same security and certitude as when she owns the mines and is free to exploit them. To give French owners an interest in German mines would be of doubtful value to them and would create a confusion of interests. The complete and immediate transfer of the mines to France constitutes the quickest solution, solving at once the question of compensation for the mines destroyed; this solution also has the advantage of making the use of the mines help apply on the bill for reparations.

"Strategic reasons," said the secret agreement with Russia, in which France asserted her wish to regulate the Saar basin.

"Reparation for damages sustained in the mines of the north," says Clemenceau.

It will be remembered that originally President Wilson opposed the outright annexation of the Saar basin

by France, and that because of his opposition the League of Nations was made the administrator for that territory. The President and the American mission had also opposed the trial of the kaiser, a view that was carefully elucidated by Secretary Lansing, who declared that war was legal, and that laws did not exist bringing into court a ruler who made war; that it was for his own people to place him on trial, and not his enemies. It was largely through the influence of the American members of the Peace Conference that this body agreed that the kaiser could be indicted only on moral grounds. President Wilson, on the advice of his financial experts, had also been against the policy of demanding from Germany a sum in reparation so large that Germany palpably could not pay, or of making the amount to be paid indefinite. The American estimate of the total amount available in Germany for reparation was \$25,000,000,000, but France would not hear of it, as it materially reduced the amount which France expected to get from Germany. International bankers, however, sought to have a definite amount fixed in order that they might know just what Germany would pay, and thereby gage the amount of loans to be made to the various nations. When America first insisted on naming this sum, Mr. Lloyd George as well as M. Clemenceau opposed the idea, the British prime minister asserting that he had promised his countrymen that Germany should pay all damages down to the last farthing. Thus the promises of political leaders to their nations stood in the way of a sensible adjustment of a difficult situation. The German delegates were of course well in-

formed on this subject. They made all these points that had puzzled the conference leaders the object of attacks.

The time for filing objections to the treaty expired May 21, but was extended until May 29 at the request of Germany. When the final day came, it was felt in Paris that the German cause had been handled unsuccessfully. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau had sent a large number of notes and had filled 443 printed pages with protests, but had made no conciliatory impression. The Germans then presented their formal counter-proposals. Between the time of this presentation and the allied reply on June 16 a change of view appeared to take place in Allied circles, and it was freely reported that concessions were about to be made. Any one who had watched the situation develop, had followed the course of events in Germany, where the tension was growing and the agitation against eventually signing the treaty appeared to be making headway, and was aware of the jealousy with which France guarded the terms of the treaty as it stood, obtained after an extraordinary amount of pressure, could well understand how France now became perturbed at the idea that the United States and Great Britain might wish to make concessions to the Germans. But it was not so much the American attitude which France feared, but that of Mr. Lloyd George, who was supposed to favor these concessions. Mr. Lloyd George had stood with France in drawing up the treaty, and his defection now might be disastrous to the claims of France.

It was reported in British circles at this time that

pressure was being brought on Mr. Lloyd George to effect modifications of the treaty of peace to the advantage of the Germans, and that this pressure came from three sources: first, from the liberal groups and labor leaders in Great Britain, which declared the terms to be too severe; secondly, from financial circles, which wanted the amount to be paid by the Germans named in figures instead of an indefinite declaration; and, thirdly, from persons of influence who felt that Germany might not sign unless concessions were made, and who desired her signature even at the expense of concessions. These reports were brought to the attention of the prime minister by an interpellation in the House of Commons, so that Mr. Lloyd George felt impelled to issue a statement denying that pressure had been brought upon him from any source whatever. It remains true, nevertheless, that sentiment along the lines indicated was expressed in Great Britain, although no direct effort may have been made to influence the action of the prime minister.

The comment of the Labor party on the treaty is worth quoting. The views of the labor group were first expressed by Arthur Henderson, but as they represented largely his personal opinion, and had been prepared without consulting the labor leaders in Parliament, they were not regarded as necessarily representative of the Labor party as a whole. A new set of views were issued in the name of the Parliamentary Labor party and of the national executive of the Labor Party, these having been drawn up at a conference at the House of Commons, where Adamson, the parliamentary leader, was in the

chair and Henderson was present. Ramsay MacDonald was at that time in Bern. The announcement in substance emphasized the following arguments:

The treaty is defective fundamentally in that it accepts and is based upon the very political principles which were the ultimate cause of the war. It violates the understanding upon which the armistice is signed . . . and is therefore a repudiation of the spirit and letter of the declaration of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and other allied statesmen. . . . [On the question of reparation the Labor party insisted that] Germany must make full reparation for the wanton destruction in all the allied countries, and we must consider that the payment by Germany of the sum of 5,000,000,000 pounds sterling is not excessive in view of the damage done. . . .

The draft treaty cedes to France full ownership of the coal mines in the Saar basin. The terms of the armistice never so much as hinted at such a possibility. France should undoubtedly receive from Germany a sufficient supply of coal to compensate her for the temporary loss of her own mining resources. This claim can be met without handing over the population of the Saar districts even to a neutral administration. The provision in the treaty requiring the German Government at the end of fifteen years to buy out at valuation the mines in any part of the Saar valley which may be restored to Germany as the result of a plebiscite, would involve the violation of the principles of self-determination, equivalent to disguised annexation.

The statement declares that in the delimitation of the frontiers of Poland there is a contravention of the thirteenth point that the new Polish state should contain only genuinely Polish elements. It feels that the military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine for fifteen years will impose fresh burdens of building armament and compulsory military service on the people and that "it will be impossible to take full advantage of the enforced disarmament of Germany in order to secure general disarmament and demilitarization." On the league the party says:

The League of Nations, to be effective, should be an organ of international justice, inclusive of all free peoples, and not as it will be under the peace treaty, a restricted instrument of the victorious coalition. This central aim can best be attained by the admission of Germany to the League as speedily as possible after her signature to the peace treaty. The League should also be strengthened by being made more directly representative of peoples and parliaments.

I am giving this résumé of the protest of the Labor party because the attitude of this group may be of importance in the future development of English politics and of England's attitude toward the treaty in times to come. A most drastic condemnation of the treaty of peace came also from the central organ of the workers in Paris, the *Confédération Générale du Travail*; but as France is largely an agricultural country and the labor group is but thirteen per cent. of the whole, its influence is not comparable to that of the labor elements in England. The Confederation saw in the treaty the definite negation of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, disguised annexations of territory, a return to the old system of alliances and imperialisms, the impossibility of general disarmament, the lack of an international financial and economic organization, and the continuation of economic war.

The final German counter-proposals and the Allied reply make clear the issues, and deserve to be studied in connection with the treaty of peace itself. The reply of the Allies especially is an able and clarifying document, which does what the treaty could not well do — present specific arguments to clear up each point in the treaty that the Germans have contested. The German counter-proposals may be reviewed here but briefly.

Germany declared that the treaty violates the Fourteen Points. Germany seeks to enter the League of Nations on an equal footing with the Allies as soon as peace is signed. Germany agrees to the basic idea of the naval, military, and air regulations and the abolition of compulsory military service, provided that this is the beginning of a general reduction of armaments and the abolition of compulsory military service everywhere. Germany will dismantle her fortresses in the west, but declares this may be done only under the supervision of the league. The cession of upper Silesia and the Saar district "cannot be demanded at all," and in case Germany is to acquiesce in the cession of any territory, a plebiscite must precede it. The Saar scheme must be reconsidered, and a supply of coal to France is offered in exchange. Malmédy, Eupen, and Moresnet are described as purely German districts. Germany asks a plebiscite for Alsace and Lorraine. Germany cannot pledge herself to oppose the desire of Austria to unite with her. Germany objects to the cession of large districts to Poland on the ground that they are not indisputably Polish, citing the province of Posen as an example. Germany wishes to keep a "bridge" of purely German territory to East Prussia. Germany is ready to make Dantzic, Memel, and Königsberg "free ports," in order to give Poland access to the sea, but cannot cede Dantzic, which must remain within the German Empire. Germany agrees to a plebiscite in these districts, but suggests a different system of voting. She objects to the loss of her colonies and suggests an impartial hearing before a special committee. Ger-

many agrees to the renunciation of all rights in Shantung. She agrees to pay as reparation \$25,000,000,000, of which amount \$5,000,000,000 is to be paid before May 1, 1926. She will pay the damage to civil populations in the occupied parts of Belgium and France. She refuses to pay reparation for damages in the occupied areas in Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Poland. Germany opposes the wide powers of the reparations commission, and suggests a German commission to coöperate with the Allied body. Germany, "if her situation permits," will export to France coal equal to the loss in production caused by the destruction of the French mines, the maximum to be 20,000,000 tons for the first five years, and 5,000,000 tons annually thereafter. Germany also protests against control of German river systems by international commissions, and makes suggestions for other methods. She does not recognize the justification for the trial of the kaiser and the competence of the proposed tribunal. She asks that her territory be evacuated by the Allies within six months of the signing of peace. With regard to labor it is set forth that German workers can agree only to a peace which embodies the immediate aims of the international labor movement, and Germany "once more proposes the summoning of a conference of labor organizations to discuss the Allies' proposals, the German counter-proposals, and the Bern resolutions of February, the result to be embodied in the treaty of peace, and to attain thereby the force of international law."

The reply of the Peace Conference was handed to the Germans on June 16. It was to be the final nego-

tiation with the Germans. The German nation had five days in which to reply whether or not it would sign the treaty of peace, a plain "Yes" or "No." As the time was complained of as too short, forty-eight hours were added. This caused the time limit to expire on Monday, June 23. If Germany did not sign at that time, the Allied troops would move into Germany and prepare to carry out the treaty by force of arms.

I have already referred to the exhaustive nature of the reply. As this is over 20,000 words long, or about one fourth the size of the treaty, it can be quoted here only briefly. Its most important statement was probably the declaration that the treaty was based fairly and squarely upon the Fourteen Points, together with the reservations of November 5, 1918, and the other principles of President Wilson of September 27, 1918. The whole Allied case was put succinctly before the German delegates, and incidentally before the German nation, so that any German student of the war who had not been confronted by the Allied side of the conflict here found the definite charges against the German Imperial Government on which the Allied and Associated powers fought the war. The reply cited Germany's armaments, her system of espionage in foreign and friendly lands, her attempts to breed trouble in neighboring countries, her encouragement of a subservient ally to make war on Serbia, her rejection of every attempt at conciliation and conference, the violation of Belgium's neutrality, the policy of frightfulness, the introduction of poisonous gases, the bombarding of cities without a military object, the destruction of life

and property by submarines, the forcing of populations into slavery, and the wanton destruction of mines and industries to damage a competitor. As a result, says the reply, 7,000,000 men have been killed and 2,000,000 bear the scars of their wounds, and an indebtedness of \$150,000,000,000 has been settled on the nations. The responsibility of the people of Germany is not shed with the revolution. "They cannot now pretend, having changed their rulers after the war was lost, that it is justice that they should escape the consequences of their deeds."

The conference points out that it does not wish to exclude Germany from the League of Nations, but that when a state has given proofs of its stability and its intention to observe its international engagements, its candidacy will be supported. Germany's case demands a definite test, but the Allied governments see no reason why Germany should not become a member of the league in the near future. On the subject of Alsace and Lorraine the conference does not see the need of a plebiscite, for Germany has agreed to the evacuation of these provinces in signing the armistice, and the inhabitants have not asked for a plebiscite. France shall not pay for German state property there or take over that part of the German debt properly allotted to these provinces, for the reason that Germany in 1871 refused to pay for the French state property or to take over the French debt. The subject of Polish boundaries is gone into in great detail. The conference sets forth that Dantzic was annexed to Prussia against the will of the inhabitants. The population is predominantly Ger-

man, and for this reason is not made a part of the Polish state. When Dantzic was a Hansa city it lay outside German political boundaries and "in union with Poland enjoyed a large measure of local independence and great commercial prosperity." Poland shall not be compelled to have the way of communication between it and the port of Dantzic in foreign control. In Helgoland the fishing harbor will not be disturbed; only the naval harbor will be destroyed, nor will the Allies destroy works that protect the island against sea erosion. A plebiscite is offered for Upper Silesia. The plebiscite in Schleswig is to be held at the request of the Danish Government, and also at this Government's request a modification has been made in the extent of the territory where the plebiscite is to be held. The German claims affecting the colonies are rejected. The conference grants more moderate terms affecting the reduction of the army. The maximum size is to be 200,000 men at the end of three months; every three months thereafter the Allied military experts will determine the strength of the German Army for the next period, in order to reduce the army to the 100,000 called for by the end of March, 1920. The conference welcomes the German proposal to create a German commission of reparation to coöperate with the allied commission. Germany is invited to submit special reparation proposals within four months, and the Allies will reply within two months thereafter.

The conviction of the Allied and Associated powers that Germany forced the war on Europe in order to solve the European question is emphasized. The whole

German case is reviewed and disposed of. With regard to penalties, the conference repeats that it considers the war as a deliberate crime, and that punishment of those responsible "for the crimes and inhuman acts committed in connection with a war of aggression is inseparable from the establishment of that reign of law among nations which it was the agreed object of the peace to set up." The tribunal will represent the deliberate judgment of the greater part of the civilized world. The powers are ready to stand by the verdict of history as to the impartiality and justice with which the accused will be tried. "The arraignment framed against the kaiser has not a juridical character as regards its substance, but only in its form. The emperor is arraigned as a matter of high international policy as the minimum of what is demanded for a supreme offence against international morality, the sanctity of treaties and the essential rules of justice. The allied and associated powers have desired that judicial forms, a judicial procedure, and a regularly constituted tribunal should be set up in order to assure to the accused full rights and liberties in regard to his defense, and in order that the judgment should be of the most solemn judicial character."

Most pertinent is the comment of the conference on the subject of guaranties. It reads:

The German delegation observe in their remarks on the conditions of peace: "Only a return to the immutable principles of morality and civilization, to a belief in the sanctity of treaties and engagements would render it possible for mankind to continue to exist."

After four and a half years of war which was caused by the

repudiation of these principles by Germany, the allied and associated powers can only repeat the words pronounced by President Wilson on September 27, 1918: "The reason why peace must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy."

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau let it be known that he would never sign the treaty of peace. The other plenipotentiaries seemed to be of the same mind. The count is on record as saying:

A peace treaty such as was handed to me on May 7 I shall never sign. Small concessions I do not look upon as essential changes. We will sign neither our own death sentence nor a deprivation of our rights or our honor. Our national self-esteem will never permit us to abandon the German nation and its country for the sake of the material advantages of our enemies. On that point we are all agreed, both the delegation in Versailles and the government in Berlin. Nobody will retreat. What will happen if our enemies do not show any comprehension of our attitude I do not know. But one thing is certain: the decision will be taken by the delegation and the government unanimously, and the German nation will stand behind them.

As for the great powers, they were confident that Germany would sign. Mr. Lloyd George expressed the determination of the Allied and Associated representatives in an address delivered before the 38th British Division near Amiens, in which he said:

These terms are written in the blood of fallen heroes. The Germans have been reckoning on this job for years, even working out the number of spikes per yard of barbed wire. We never dreamt of being in a position like this. In order to make it impossible to occur again we have had to make these terms severe. We must carry out the edict of Providence and see that the people who inflicted this shall never be in a position to do so again. The Germans say they will not sign. Their newspapers say they will not sign. The politicians say the same and we know that all politicians speak the truth. We say: "Gentlemen, you must sign. If you don't do so in Versailles, you shall do so in Berlin."

And Germany agreed to sign, agreed after the military party had exhausted every effort to prevent the signature of a treaty that threatened the liberty of the leaders of the former German Government, its army, and navy; after they had intimidated the national assembly and brought about a cabinet crisis; after the Junker elements had threatened reprisals; after the principal members of the delegation at Versailles had withdrawn and the time limit was about to expire — Germany, through her national assembly, agreed to sign and to ratify the terms of peace. And as signatories she finally prevailed upon two men of more or less obscure names, Hermann Müller and Johann Bell, ministers in the cabinet, to perform the final act of submission to the will of the victorious powers.

CHAPTER XVIII

The story of the twenty-eighth of June, and how Germany found peace at the end of a long, long road in Versailles.

MULLER and Bell, the two German plenipotentiaries, arrived late on the evening of June 27. Their train had been seriously delayed in passing through the German occupied territory, and it was not until 11:20 o'clock that it pulled into the station at Saint Cyr, where Colonel Henry, chief of the French military mission, and his staff were awaiting them. Present were also two members of the German delegation, Haniel and Dunker. It must have been a long and tiresome journey for the two plenipotentiaries who had come to perform the final act in Germany's submission, and who in their journey from Berlin had passed from the fertile, well-cared-for fields of Germany to the bleak, devastated regions of France, laid waste as a result of Germany's disastrous aggression.

Haniel presented the two delegates to Colonel Henry, and the men saluted one another without speaking. Colonel Henry then said in French:

"Messieurs, will you follow me?"

"Willingly," replied the Germans. They entered an automobile with Colonel Henry, and were driven to Versailles and the Hôtel des Reservoirs. In addition to the plenipotentiaries there were fourteen men in the

German party, including Surrier, counselor of state, and Kreis, secretary of the embassy, as well as secretaries and interpreters.

Versailles was sleeping when the Germans arrived. A few German correspondents and members of the delegation awaited the two men, but scarcely any curious faces were to be seen. No one would have guessed that on the morrow Versailles would be the scene of one of the great events in the history of France; would know a day more glorious than any in its regal and revolutionary history unless it be the day of the oath in the tennis-court, the scene of which lay only a few minutes' walk from the spot where the Germans had made their headquarters.

A glorious day it was to be, this great day of Versailles, but a day in which the joy of victory was to be tempered by the austerity and dignity which the memory of the brave dead who had died in the war demanded. At least that was the thought in the mind of the mayor of Versailles, M. Henri Simon, when he addressed his proclamation to the inhabitants of this historic town — a proclamation the Germans might have read on the walls had they been at liberty to walk about that evening. Surely it should have a place in this story of Versailles:

The great day of Versailles has come. The victorious peace will be signed in the Hall of Mirrors Saturday, June 28. The government wishes the ceremony to have the character of austerity that goes with the memory of the grief and sufferings of the *patrie*. Nevertheless, public buildings will be decorated and illuminated. The inhabitants certainly will follow this example.

All measures to preserve order have been taken by the govern-

ment; the public is asked to conform to them for the successful outcome of the ceremony.

Inhabitants and visitors should observe the calm and the dignity which goes with this great event, and from which the city of Versailles has not departed in five years, for the incidents of June 16 can not be blamed on the local population.

The day of June 28 will come about as should such a great day in the history of the world.

Upon their arrival the delegates, Müller and Bell, gave their credentials to Colonel Henry, who transmitted them to M. Jules Cambon, chairman of the committee on verification. Of the two men an official note published in Berlin said:

The ministers of the Reich, Hermann Müller and Dr. Bell, upon the unanimous request of the government, have decided to sign the treaty of peace as plenipotentiaries at Versailles. Under the terrible impression of popular misery and the pressing need to obtain peace at last, they believe that nothing should stop them from making this last personal sacrifice.

When June 28 came, Versailles recalled other events that had fallen on this day. It was the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian archduke at Serajevo. A Paris newspaper remembered that on June 28, 1870, the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had entered its final phase, for on that day the Spanish deputy Salazar arrived at Madrid with a letter from the prince accepting the Spanish crown with the secret approval of William of Prussia. Eight days later the news became public. "The bomb has exploded," wrote William I. All France was in a turmoil of excitement. On July 12 the crisis appeared to be past. On July 13 Bismarck made public at Ems the mutilated despatch, and war became certain.

But I doubt whether Serajevo or Ems were in the minds of the crowd at Versailles when the great day came. It was January 18, 1871, and the proclamation of the German Empire that Versailles thought of oftener than anything else on this historic day. The labors of the Peace Conference had attracted Paris but superficially. The crowds had become familiar with the sight of presidents and kings and queens. Plenary sessions created hardly a ripple of interest. But the signing of the peace, the signing by Germany of the peace dictated by France, that is what awakened the crowd of Paris to a realization of the greatness of the day.

By noon a stream of automobiles coming from all directions centered on the road to Versailles over which once rolled the state carriages of Louis XIV. To expedite matters, the authorities had "canalized" traffic. Official cars followed the ancient route via Suresnes, Ville d'Avray, and Picardie. At the corner of the Avenue de Picardie and the Boulevard de la Reine all motor-cars bearing a tricolor cockade, or a yellow-and-green cockade, continued down the avenue, whereas others were directed down the boulevard. At the corner of the Avenue de St.-Cloud and of the Rue St.-Pierre the cars carrying the tricolor were directed to proceed along the Rue St.-Pierre to the Avenue de Paris and the palace. The others were directed to the Rue des Reservoirs. A double line of troops was drawn up in the streets leading to the palace. General Brécard, commander of the 6th Division of Cavalry, took position with his staff before the beautiful grill of wrought iron before the palace grounds at the Place d'Armes. Five

wide avenues lead to this *place*; all were lined with the troops in horizon blue, and by noon the avenues, the Place d'Armes, and the palace courtyard were a maze of troops in colorful uniforms, a touch of heightened color being added by the cavalry within the courtyard, who carried fluttering pennons of red and white, while farther in the foreground were massed the Garde Républicaine, brilliant in white breeches, red shakos, shining, burnished helmets, and white cross-belts. Banners, flags, and bunting flew gaily from the windows, roofs, and balconies on the hither side of the iron grills, but beyond it lay the palace buildings in somber stateliness, displaying only one bit of decoration, the tricolor of France suspended above the little balcony at the head of the *cour d'honneur*, on which Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the Dauphin appeared on October 6, 1789, the day when the insatiate mob of Paris camped in the marble court, only a short time before the Bourbons left the palace forever. For the government had decreed that this flag was to be the only decoration displayed on the palace itself, in order that it might be in keeping with "*le calme et la dignité*" of the occasion.

Few of the great men of the conference were recognized by the crowd as they rolled down the Avenue de Paris in their motor-cars between rows of steel-helmeted Poilus in horizon blue. Most of them, however, had closed cars and limousines, and they passed so quickly that the crowd could give them no greeting. But there was no mistaking M. Clemenceau, and the crowd belled out a shout that must have been a welcome sound even to one so thoroughly accustomed to acclamations.

At 1:45 o'clock the first automobile entered the forecourt and drove up to the entrance leading to the marble staircase. A regular line of cars followed. General Guillaumat was one of the first to arrive. There followed General Pershing, Admiral Lebon, Secretary Lansing, the Maharajah of Bikaner, the Marquis Saionyi and Baron Makino, General Dubail, Mlle. Déroulède, sister of Paul Déroulède, General Maistre, M. Painlevé, Louis Loucheur, and Athos Romanos. M. Clemenceau came with General Mordacq. A little later came General Maunoury, who had been blinded in the war, and who was guided by General Alby, chief of the general staff. Other notable guests included the Admiral Ronarch, M. Antoine Dubost, with the medal of 1870 on his breast; M. Alexandre Millerand, high commissioner for Alsace and Lorraine; Paul Deschanel and Mme. Deschanel; M. Leygues, minister of marine; Admiral Beatty and Ignace Paderewski. Mr. Lloyd George came at 2:45 o'clock, and immediately after him came President and Mrs. Wilson. Both the prime minister and the President were vociferously applauded by the attendants and by-standers in the marble court as they left their motor-cars.

Outside the walls of the palace the military predominated; the brilliant uniforms and the long lines of the soldiers gave a feeling of precision to the event. But once inside the palace this feeling disappeared, and there was general relaxation, with an air of easy familiarity. It was hard to conceive that this feeling could have existed in the days of the august Bourbon court; they had their play days, too, but austerity and


formal conduct were the rule at the royal ceremonies, such as those of which traditions have come down to us. Now, however, upon entering the palace, delegates and invited guests found ready for them post-cards commemorating the ceremony, which could be mailed by means of a special peace-conference stamp, and there were few who did not avail themselves of the opportunity.

The greatest attention had been given to the staging of the culminating event in the Hall of Mirrors. It is a long and narrow room, more like a corridor than a salon. The delegates ascended the marble staircase and passed through what at one time were the apartments of Marie Antoinette to the Salon de la Paix, the Hall of Peace, whence they entered the Hall of Mirrors. At this end of the hall were the chairs for the invited guests. Then came tables for secretaries of certain delegations. Beyond that stood the long horseshoe table that ran along the mirrored side of the hall. At the middle of the table, facing the high embrasured windows, was the place for M. Clemenceau, president of the conference. To his left, in the direction of the Hall of Peace, were reserved places for the delegates of Great Britain, the British dominions, and Japan. Here the angle in the table was reached, and then came the places reserved for Germany. There followed the seats of Uruguay, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Liberia, Honduras, Brazil, Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Equador. At the right hand of the President sat the commissioners from the United States. Then came France, Italy and Belgium. Beyond the turn of the

table came the places of Greece, Poland, China, Cuba, Rumania, Hedjaz, Siam, Serbia, and Czecho-Slovakia. Behind this table were tables for secretaries, and behind them, extending toward the Hall of War, came seats for the representatives of the press of the world. Inside the horseshoe table were smaller tables for secretaries, and a small one before the chairman's place was reserved for the interpreter. In the middle stood the table on which lay the treaty of peace and three other documents to be signed simultaneously with it; the protocol, to be signed also by all the delegates; the Rhine province agreement, to be signed by the five great powers and Germany; and the Polish treaty, to be signed by the five great powers, Poland, and Germany.

On the day before the ceremony Herr von Haniel sent word to the Peace Conference that the German delegates had received no formal assurance that the document they were to sign in the Hall of Mirrors was identical with the treaty handed them on June 19. M. Clemenceau immediately drafted a letter assuring them formally that the document was identical in all its parts, and this was carried to the Germans by M. Dutasta, general secretary of the conference.

Singularly, the places reserved for the delegation from China were not to be occupied. This was the one rift in the lute, for the Chinese commissioners, in protest against the clauses of the treaty agreeing to the transfer of the German leaseholds to Japan, decided not to sign the treaty. A month before the Chinese plenipotentiaries had made a formal request of the Peace Conference that the questions involved in the Shan-tung matter



Press Illustrating Service, Inc.

GERMANY SIGNS THE TREATY OF PEACE

at Versailles on June 28, 1919. M. Clémenceau is shown seated before the third panel with

be not included in the treaty, but be postponed for future consideration. This request was denied. On the morning of June 28 M. Lou Tseng Tsiang, president of the Chinese delegation, asked that China be permitted to sign with the explanatory note, "Under the reservation made at the plenary session of May 6, 1919, and relative to the question of Shan-tung (Articles 156, 157, and 158)." He pointed out that the Swedish plenipotentiary signed the act of the Congress of Vienna with a reservation. The request was not acceded to by the conference, and when the time for signature came, the Chinese did not respond. The attitude of the Chinese delegation in this matter was consistent with its point of view that Japan should have been asked by the Peace Conference to vacate Shan-tung and turn all German property over to China.

There was to be only one official treaty of peace, printed on Japanese vellum, with a large margin and held together by red tape. This copy was to be placed in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and a copy given to all the governments concerned in its signing. In order to expedite the signing, which at the best speed possible would take nearly an hour, the seals of the commissioners, which were considered necessary, had been placed on the document before the signing. These were the personal seals of the signatories, for these men signed in person and not as officials of their governments. For this reason it was not considered proper for President Wilson to use the seal that had been selected for him, one bearing the American eagle and the words, "The President of the

United States of America." President Wilson thereupon substituted a seal from a ring given him at the time of his marriage by the State of California, which bore his name in stenographic characters. Some of the commissioners did not possess personal seals, but obtained them before they were needed.

When the time came for opening the historic session, the long hall was crowded with delegates, visitors, and newspaper representatives. The commissioners had put in almost an hour passing from table to table to seek autographs of men as notable as themselves. The guests bobbed up and down in their chairs, trying to observe the great men of the conference. A score of *Gardes Municipaux* circulated among the crowd for a very good reason: they were instructed to keep a watch on the pens and ink-wells in the hall, and to prevent these articles being pilfered by souvenir-hunters.

At about 2:30 o'clock M. Clemenceau entered the room and looked about him to see that all arrangements were in perfect order. He observed a group of wounded, with their medals of valor on their breasts, in the embrasure of a window, and, walking up to them, engaged them in conversation. At 2:45 o'clock he moved up to the middle table and took the seat of the presiding officer. It was a singular fact that he sat almost immediately under the ceiling decoration that bears the legend "*Le roi gouverne par lui-même*," in other words, almost on the exact spot where William I of Prussia stood when he was proclaimed German Emperor in 1871. President Wilson entered almost immediately after M. Clemenceau and was saluted with

discreet applause. The German delegation entered by way of the Hall of Peace and slipped almost unnoticed into its seats at this end of the hall. It was led by Herr Müller, a tall man with a scrubby little mustache, wearing black, with a short black tie over his white shirt front. The Germans bowed and seated themselves.

At 3:15 o'clock M. Clemenceau rose and announced briefly that the session was opened — "*La séance est ouverte.*" He then spoke briefly in French as follows:

An agreement has been reached upon the conditions of the treaty of peace between the allied and associated powers and the German empire.

The text has been verified; the president of the conference has certified in writing that the text about to be signed conforms to the text of the 200 copies which have been sent to Messieurs the German delegates.

The signatures about to be given constitute an irrevocable engagement to carry out loyally and faithfully in their entirety all the conditions that have been decided upon.

I therefore have the honor of asking Messieurs the German plenipotentiaries to approach to affix their signatures to the treaty before me.

M. Clemenceau ceased and sat down, and Herr Müller rose as if to proceed to the table. He was interrupted, however, by Lieutenant Mantoux, official interpreter of the conference, who began to translate M. Clemenceau's words into German. In his first sentence, when Lieutenant Mantoux reached the words "the German empire," or, as M. Clemenceau had said in French: "*l'empire allemand*," he translated it "the German republic." M. Clemenceau promptly whispered, "Say German *Reich*," this being the term consistently used by the Germans.

M. Dutasta then led the way for five Germans — two plenipotentiaries and three secretaries — and they passed to the table, where two of them signed their names. Müller came first, and then Bell, virtually unknown men, performing the final act of abasement and submission for the German people — an act to which they had been condemned by the arrogance and pride of Prussian Junkers, German militarists, imperialists, and industrial barons, not one of whom was present when this great scene was enacted.

The delegation from the United States was the first to be called up after the Germans. President Wilson rose, and as he began his walk to the historic table, followed in order by Secretary Lansing, Colonel House, General Bliss, and Mr. White, other delegates stretched out their hands to congratulate him. He came forward with a broad smile, and signed his name at the spot indicated by M. William Martin, director of the protocol. Mr. Lloyd George followed the American delegation, together with Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Barnes; and when these five men had signed, the delegates from the British dominions followed, a notable array of men representing the greatest power the world has ever seen. Then came the delegation of the French Republic, in order, Messieurs Clemenceau, Pichon, Klotz, Tardieu, and Cambon, the president of the council signing his name without seating himself. Then came the delegations of Italy, Japan, and Belgium. At 3:50 o'clock all signatures had been completed, and the president of the conference announced:

“Messieurs, all the signatures have been given. The signature of the conditions of peace between the Allied and Associated powers and the German Republic is an accomplished fact. The session is adjourned.”

The official protocol verifies the fact that M. Clemenceau used the word “republic” in his final statement.

Immediately afterward the great guns began to boom from the battery near the *orangerie*. The delegates rose and congratulated one another. The notables streamed out of the palace to join the crowd, which had begun shouting in wild enthusiasm with the first sound of the guns. The great fountains of the park were turned on, and the water marvels of Lenôtre began to play in the mellow sunshine throughout one of the most impressive playgrounds of the world.

The Germans were the first to leave the Hall of Mirrors, passing out alone, and immediately taking their automobiles for the hotel. A short time later M. Clemenceau invited President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George to view the fountains with him. The moment that the three men appeared before the crowd a great wave of wildly cheering humanity rushed toward them. They locked arms, and preceded by a protecting guard of soldiers and attendants attempted to gain the terrace above the fountain of Latona, in order to look over the broad expanse of the *tapis vert* to the vista of canals and woods beyond. Even here the crowd pushed forward; men slapped them on the back in their exuberance, strangers shouted hoarse greetings into their ears, and it was a most fortunate and remarkable fact that they returned to the palace in safety. They then went

to the salon of the old senate, where they met Baron Sonnino and later Baron Makino, and indulged in the beverage of the conference — tea.

After signing the treaty of peace the German plenipotentiaries gave the following statement to the United Press:

We have signed the treaty without any mental reservation. What we have signed we will carry out. The German people will compel those in power to hold to and conform to the clauses. But we believe that the entente in its own interest will consider it necessary to modify some articles when it becomes aware that the execution of these articles is impossible.

We believe that the entente will not insist upon the delivery of the kaiser and upon that of the high officers.

The central government has not aided any attack against Poland. Germany will make every effort to prove that she is worthy of entering the League of Nations.

For the rest of that day and night Versailles and Paris, throwing aside "*le calme et la dignité*," gave themselves up to a delirium of joy, a revel that came as the logical reaction to five years of pent-up grief and suffering.

That evening the President of the United States issued the following statement:

As I look back over the eventful months I have spent in France my memory is not of conferences and hard work alone, but also of the innumerable acts of generosity and friendship which have made me feel how genuine the sentiments of France are toward the people of America, and how fortunate I have been to be the representative of our people in the midst of a nation which knows how to show its kindness with so much charm and such open manifestations of what is in its heart.

Deeply as I rejoice at the prospect of joining my own countrymen again, I leave France with genuine regret. My deep sympathy for her people and belief in her future have confirmed my thoughts, enlarged by the privilege of association with her public

men, conscious of more than one affectionate friendship formed, and profoundly grateful for the unstinted hospitality and for the countless kindnesses which have made me feel welcome and at home.

I take the liberty of bidding France Godspeed as well as good-bye, and of expressing once more my abiding interest and entire confidence in her future.

CHAPTER XIX

President Wilson leaves France with two treaties of peace, and the United States Senate gets the stage at last.

AND so it came about that Woodrow Wilson, the first President of the United States to set foot on European soil during his term of office, completed the momentous mission that had kept him for over six months in the capital of France, and embarked once more on the good ship *George Washington*, a pilgrim returning to his native land.

Six hours after signing the treaty of peace, at 9:45 on the evening of June 28, President Wilson boarded a special train awaiting him at the Gare des Invalides for Brest. With him were Mrs. Wilson; Miss Margaret Wilson; the American ambassador to France, Hugh Wallace; Admiral Grayson, and the following official representatives of the French republic: M. Pichon, minister of foreign affairs; M. Legues, minister of marine; and M. Tardieu, peace commissioner and high commissioner of the French Republic to the United States.

President Wilson had come to France on one of the most difficult missions that ever confronted an American statesman. He was leaving for the United States now to urge the ratification of the document that he had just signed. On December 13, 1918, he had arrived in

France, and save for ten days in the United States and fourteen days on the ocean he had been continuously in Europe for over six months. In that period hardly a moment of liberty had been his. Every hour was crowded with the hardest kind of work; day after day he was called on to make decisions that might commit his country to definite policies and dictate its attitude in international affairs for generations to come. When he was not in conference with other peace commissioners and subsidiary bodies of the Peace Conference, he was consulting his experts, investigators, and advisers; time and again he gave ear to unofficial delegations that came to plead their cause before him. There were formal bodies to address, and calls of state and courtesy to be made, and even on those few occasions when he enjoyed a drive over the boulevards of Paris his mind was busy. His was no eight-hour working day.

The multitude that bade him God-speed at the Gare des Invalides was far different from the howling, delirious crowd that acclaimed him when first he came to France. But its "*Au'voir!*" was no less sincere and heart-felt because it was quiet and orderly and spoken by a crowd that appraised the President at his true value. He had come to Europe the hope of all sorts and conditions of men. In France he had been a hero. In England he had aroused the enthusiasm of the conservative, the advanced liberal, the radical, and the toiler in the ranks. In Italy he had been welcomed with garlands of roses. In Germany he had been heralded as the liberator who would safeguard her from the wrath of the European nations she had outraged.

Now he was going home, and all Europe knew that he was neither demigod nor dealer in magic, but just an honest, straightforward American statesman who had faced a gigantic task without flinching and had performed a man's work in the world.

The President might well have reflected on all this as his train moved quietly out of the suburbs of Paris that night. Travel is slow in France, and on the following Sunday morning he was still on his way to the sea-coast, passing through the picturesque Breton country that had seen the coming of the American host. Out of the windows of his car he might still see contingents of the army of democracy in olive drab. Here and there, as the train bowled through quaint hamlets and villages, the peasant folk held up their babes so that they might catch his greeting and speak of it in after years.

At 11:40 o'clock on Sunday morning his train reached Brest, and amid the strains of "The Star-Spangled Banner" and the booming of cannon the President boarded the little gunboat that was to take him to the *George Washington*, lying with steam up in the roadstead. He was leaving the soil of France. Here was the end of a period, and history would speak of his sojourn as an event without precedent. What momentous consequences were bound up in it? No one could foretell, least of all he. As he had said a few evenings before at the farewell reception given by the President of the French Republic to the members of the Peace Conference in the Elysée Palace, only a part of the great work was finished; there remained another

part which had just been begun — to organize the world anew, to bring about a reign of justice between men, “a common conception of duties, a common conception of the rights of the men of all races and of all nations.”

And then the bank struck up “*La Marseillaise*,” and standing on the deck of the gunboat with bared head, President Wilson remarked at its close to one of the French statesmen:

“I hope there will be no more wars; in any case, no great war.”

At 2:15 o'clock the *George Washington* weighed anchor, and, accompanied by the cruiser *Chattanooga*, flying the flag of Admiral Knapp; the cruiser *Oklahoma*; the French cruiser, *La Marseillaise*; and three French destroyers, turned her bow toward the wide ocean. At Pierres Noires, the Land's End of France, the French escort gave the salute to the President of the United States for the last time.

He turned his face resolutely to the west. He had gone to France holding firmly to the Fourteen Points and to the principles of humanity and justice that he had enunciated in his speeches. How had these principles fared?

There was the first point, “Open covenants, openly arrived at.” The President's critics had applied that to this Peace Conference as well as to such as might follow. In Paris, the critics said, this had been a hollow mockery. There had been no open covenants, nor had they been arrived at openly. This was probably the most secret peace conference ever held, said Auguste Gauvain in the “*Journal des Debats*.” And yet the

President of the United States had drawn up that statement of principle, and the other great powers had ratified it and adopted it as their own.

My memory went back to the opening days of the conference, when we made our first fight for publicity. "Let everything be transacted in the light of day," we had said, and there will be no cry of betrayals afterward. I remember how the proposal shocked the eminent leaders of foreign chanceries, who had not been used to consulting the rabble when they embarked on matters of foreign diplomacy, who accounted to the people through staged, non-committal speeches in legislative chambers, who considered foreign affairs too intricate for the every-day toiler, save only when he was called upon to carry a gun. The British had been as frank as any of the European governments, but inherently they were not lovers of publicity for diplomatic affairs; in fact, they probably had more secret treaties to their credit than any other people on the globe. As for M. Clemenceau, the thought of publicity was heresy to him. Italy's censorship of the press had been so unreasonable and one-sided that no great love for openness might be expected there, and nothing was to be hoped for from Japan. President Wilson was temperamentally against publicity, and yet he believed in it implicitly in principle, and sought to apply it, and to a certain extent he probably considers that he has been accessible and communicative. It was to President Wilson that the world had to turn for light, and he gained the concession of public plenary sessions of

the Peace Conference. It was little enough, but it was something.

The seal of silence weighed heavily upon the other members of the American mission, and it was difficult to get an opinion even on the time of day or the state of the weather, although I remember that one of our commissioners did commit himself irrevocably one day on the disadvantages of open plumbing. But the rule began to be broken now and then by the very men who had been so solicitous that it be kept, and for a very simple reason. It happened that the Peace Conference was not a love-feast, or a meeting of a group of men holding the same views, but a serious discussion by men of the most diverse views, who advocated many different aims. It soon came to the notice of many that to gain their point they must plead their cause before the world. Thus if things went badly for France in the Council of the Four, France was sure to put emphasis upon her demands and try to gain support for her point of view by advocating it in the newspapers. As for the minor states that did or did not win their claims before the various councils, commissions, and committees, their representatives spoke freely at any and all times, giving chapter and verse, and citing tales out of school that cheered the heart of the correspondent.

Moreover, though the five members of the American mission said little, there were numbers of men round about the Crillon who told the story of their work gladly. Heads of commissions and subcommissions, technical advisers and experts — all were anxious and ready to

elucidate their point of view. Next to this group was that great army of persons interested in particular causes, such as missionaries who took definite sides in native disputes, amateur diplomats who at one time or another wrote books on history and political science, academicians who talked about "the clash of vital interests" and "the new order of things," and finally that large body of business and professional men who had been granted passports for no reason that any one ever discovered, and who were investigating everything from the wages paid to makers of pie-plates in Great Britain to the demand for ice-cream soda-fountains on the Riviera.

In time the barriers dropped still farther, and Colonel House agreed to meet the correspondents daily at 6 p. m., while the correspondents were able to keep a still better watch on the work the President was engaged in through regular conferences with Ray Stannard Baker, who consulted President Wilson every day in behalf of the press and who performed a really notable service for the Peace Conference and for the American people by the conscientious and intelligent manner in which he performed his duties.

President Wilson is not at all monosyllabic or reticent in discussion. He speaks as freely as he writes and apparently without reservation, but newspaper men have learned that his discussion is apt to be more historical than contemporary; that he is more likely to comment on events of three weeks ago than on those in the mouth of the public to-day. But there was one occasion during the Peace Conference when the Presi-

dent spoke direct and to the point to the newspaper men on affairs of vital importance. That occurred on the day preceding the plenary session at which the first draft of the covenant of the League of Nations was read to the world. The President had just finished one of the hardest tasks of the conference. He had presided at the meetings of the commission that had drawn up the league for days on end and had worked mornings, afternoons, and late into the night in the preparation of this historic document. Because he opposed the views of France for the insertion of clauses meant to build up a central military authority, he was made the target for a bitter campaign of criticism in the French press. The league covenant had been on the rocks more than once, but the President finally had steered it safely into port. This was the regular morning conference with the journalists, but instead of Secretary Lansing, the President walked into the circle of the newspaper men at the Hôtel de Crillon. He spoke for fully fifty-five minutes by the clock with hardly an interruption, and what he said covered the whole subject of the actual situation at the Peace Conference. He spoke freely about the attitude of this country and that, and disclosed many details of the negotiations that had led up to the writing of the first draft of the covenant of the league.

“But, gentlemen,” said the President, “you understand, I am not to be quoted. Not even as ‘the highest authority.’ Every one knows who is meant by ‘the highest authority.’”

The President was quoted, however, through an in-

advertence, for part of his talk, and as this part has been widely discussed since, I am violating no confidences by repeating it here. It was the statement that when the President came to examine the question of the freedom of the seas in relation to the League of Nations and future wars, it dawned on him, as he said, that the "joke was on him"; that there would be no neutrals to respect in case of war in the future, for the reason that under the league all nations would be either for or against the decision of the league, and as part of the league's action to enforce its decisions, the seas would be controlled by the powers of the league.

When President Wilson came to France he found that just as he had made up his mind that the League of Nations must be formed, so each of the other nations had certain pet objects which they wanted the Peace Conference to adopt, and in several cases the prime ministers had made definite promises to their people to this end. Prime Minister Lloyd George, for instance, was firm against conscript armies. M. Clemenceau had made definite promises of reparation, and rather than raise more money by taxes, the French cabinet looked forward to having its bills paid by Germany. Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino were pledged to get everything called for by the treaty of London, the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, and the most extreme claims to territory of the Italian nationalists. The Japanese were determined to get a confirmation of their Shantung arrangement with China, and a statement guaranteeing racial equality in international relations.

It has been pointed out frequently that America played so important a rôle at the conference because we came with clean hands, pledged to nothing except justice and fair dealing. Nothing — except the league. That we wanted, that we must have, and there they had us. President Wilson was determined that the time for the league had come. Many other men held that vision in bygone ages, and labored at it sincerely and honestly until they went down in defeat before ignorance, self-interest, and greed. The world had grown apace in one hundred years; there was to-day a fairly intelligent electorate where a century ago saw only a hope and a promise. Self-interest and greed remained, but it was likely that these would dictate the organization of the league. To get the league President Wilson determined that it must be inextricably bound up with the Treaty of Peace. That was his victory, but to win it he had to suffer casualties.

I remember one morning hearing M. Pichon say quite distinctly that the league covenant would not be a part of the treaty of peace. I remember that M. Tardieu said the same thing in my presence four days later. I remember also that President Wilson said most decidedly that it would. I do not know whether President Wilson was compelled to give on one point to win another. It is certain that France gained extraordinary concessions elsewhere and then agreed to the league. I do think that without the league we might have had a better treaty of peace, but if it proves successful, it was worth the cost. There is this one great argument for the league; should it become a vital, working force, it

would be able eventually to undo all that is harmful and unjust in the treaty of peace. That, I believe, is the President's firm hope and conviction.

Even if the idea of the league had not encumbered the negotiations, President Wilson would still have had to face those engagements entered into by the Allies before America appeared on the scene, and it must be recalled that there was nothing politically immoral in secret bargainings and secret pledges and transfer of strategic territory until President Wilson marshaled public opinion against this vicious practice. The President faced cold, practical politics as it has been played from time immemorial. He came with a new code of rules, and the players permitted some of those rules to go into effect because they felt that he had the public opinion of the world with him; but they ignored others of those rules because they were sure of their own position. President Wilson had an alternative. He could wash his hands of the whole matter, leave the Peace Conference, return to the United States, and recommend a separate peace. America would then have had the satisfaction of being true to its ideals, but the European powers and their Asiatic ally would have made peace according to the old code of bargaining, which meant a disregard of the interests of many of the little peoples who looked to the President of the United States for moral support and guidance; a division of the German colonies among the victors; the political delivery of Shan-tung to Japan; an isolated policy for the United States in the far East, by the terms of which the United States would either have to fight or subside, and the

failure of the League of Nations and the great hope for which it stood.

President Wilson remained. He knew that one thing could not fail him — the future.

France asked great sums of money in reparation for damages wrought by Germany. France had a right to those sums. Belgium asked great amounts to pay for damages done in Belgium. Belgium was morally entitled to these amounts. England asked reparation, and England was definitely entitled to that reparation. Nations near and remote presented their claims: Prime Minister Hughes of Australia, as with the enthusiasm of youth, declared that he meant to get from Germany every penny spent in Australia directly or indirectly because of the war: if a soldier had found it necessary to place a mortgage on his roof in order that his family might subsist while he went to war, that financial loss should be paid by Germany. And morally he, too, was right.

Germany shall pay all that she is able to pay, said President Wilson in effect, but beyond her ability to pay we cannot go. And he asked that the amounts to be paid be stated in figures susceptible of payment.

What an outcry arose throughout the Allied press because the American President had stated a simple economic fact! And what exorbitant sums were named when his suggestion was acted upon! There was "Le Matin," with its argument for 316,000,000,000 francs, amounting, at a normal rate of exchange, to virtually \$63,200,000,000. And this is the manner in which it was presented:

President Wilson has given his formal adherence to the principle that reparation must be made by Germany for all the damage caused the population of France and its property. This damage reaches 316,000,000,000 francs, or interest of 19,000,000,000 francs a year.

The whole American people is behind its president. The whole American people demands that Germany recognize this debt toward the French people for all the damages caused by a war which Germany wished and declared.

No American will admit that France pays all or part of 19,000,000,000 annually of the debt contracted by Germany.

When the French Government learned that Germany could not pay, it refused to name a specific sum, but demanded that reparations be fixed from time to time, a scheme full of danger to the peace of the world. The President had agreed, as announced by Secretary Lansing in his letter of November 4, 1918, that restoration by Germany of the invaded territory was understood to mean compensation for all damages caused the civil population and their property by German aggression either by land, sea, or air; but he did not agree that this should include pensions to be paid by the French state or the expenses of the war of the French Government. And these demands on the part of France he fought to the best of his ability until he was compelled to depart from his stand at last and sadly agree to a compromise.

When President Wilson came to Europe he had one interpretation for the Fourteen Points; Europe had another. For the most part the President's interpretation was accepted, but he was not always able to force his point of view. At other times, when his view prevailed, there were those elements among our associates in the

war who declared that he had not been true to his principles.

Italy declared that the President's stand making Fiume a free port was contrary to the spirit of point nine, which spoke of a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy according to clearly recognizable lines of nationality. Fiume was Italian; so why should it not be under Italian sovereignty? Why should the President favor the Croats, who had fought against Italy, or the Serbs, who for the most part were poverty-stricken peasants? But Italy did not offer to yield up the thousands of pure German-Austrians of the Tyrol and the Voralberg. Broadness of vision, too, was not in the European scheme of things.

Poland accused the President of giving only half a loaf when he declared that Poland might use, but not own, Dantzic. Point thirteen said that Poland should have a free and secure access to the sea. The President refused to give Poland sovereignty over Dantzic, because Dantzic is as German as Hamburg. Poland said the President had disregarded her legitimate historical claims. If historical claims were a basis for possession, Great Britain, France, and Mexico would to-day own the United States; Sweden would own Pomerania; Italy would own La Savoie; and no one can tell whether France, Austria, Spain, or the Netherlands would own Belgium.

As for carrying out point eleven, calling for the economic independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan States, there were as many views on what should be

done as there were nations at the conference, and each view was backed by a mass of statistics and sworn data. Even the President's advisers disagreed among themselves, and when one group declared that northern Epirus or southern Albania was Greek, another group was just as certain that it was Albanian; when one expert found that Thrace was Greek, with a sprinkling of Bulgar settlements, another was determined that it was Bulgar, with a sprinkling of Greek; and a third that it was pure Turk.

When the Americans asserted their adherence to one of the cardinal principles of American law, that men may not be tried by *ex post facto* laws, France and Great Britain got into an acrimonious debate over the kaiser. America counseled patience, saying that history could show a legend of martyrdom for every royal captive punished by physical means. "Let him rust," said the Americans. "Monstrous!" shouted Europe, which had read history, but not human nature.

When America denied to Brussels the seat of the league on the ground that all peoples should meet in a city which called up no tragic memories of international dissension, Belgium cried out that it had been robbed of its legitimate fruit. As a reward for its martyrdom Belgium demanded the seat of the league. Europe thought of the league as an instrument to punish Germany, not as a vehicle for justice to all men.

When President Wilson declared himself opposed to annexation of the Saar basin by France, the French asked why a friend was opposing their attempt to weaken an enemy. Should Germany remain in the

possession of great natural resources and use them to compete with France? Was not France to profit economically by the war?

President Wilson returned from Paris with the treaty of peace with Germany, and another treaty in his inside coat-pocket. France called it a "pact of guaranty." It was an arrangement between the United States and France, and was similar, although not identical, to an arrangement between France and Great Britain. It set forth that the United States would come to the aid of France immediately in case of any act of unprovoked aggression from Germany, in the event that certain stipulations in the Treaty of Versailles did not assure security and appropriate protection to France. These stipulations were enumerated to be the following: Article 42 of the treaty, which says that Germany may not construct fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine, or on the right bank, or west of a line fifty kilometers east of that river; Article 43, which says Germany may not assemble permanent or temporary armed forces, or engage in military manœuvres of any nature, or maintain any facilities for mobilization within the zone mentioned in Article 42; and Article 44, which says that if Germany violates these provisions, it will be considered as an hostile act toward the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and as likely to affect the peace of the world.

The effect, then, of the agreement is to make it necessary for the United States to come to the aid of France in the event Germany again menaces the latter nation. The treaty between France and Great Britain is similar

except that it says England consents to come to the aid of France. The treaties become binding when both Great Britain and the United States have ratified them. They are to be submitted to the council of the League of Nations, and may be adopted if the council approves of them by majority vote, and may be abrogated if one of the parties wishes to have this done and if the league grants sufficient protection.

This treaty, which was signed on the same day as the treaty of peace, bears the signatures of M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Lansing. The British treaty was signed by M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Balfour.

Exactly how and why this agreement came to be signed is not clear. Nor is it clear why, of all the Allied and Associated powers, only Great Britain and the United States entered into this agreement. It is practical proof that France does not think that the League of Nations will give her sufficient protection against the German danger in the future.

According to Bertillon, the population of France is now approximately 35,000,000, although it is estimated as high as 37,000,000 by other authorities. Presumably France has lost over 3,000,000 inhabitants since the war began from all causes, including killed in the war, deaths from disease and exposure, deaths from natural causes, missing, and the decline in the birth-rate. In 1915-16 it was estimated that the birth-rate was ten to one thousand. Germany, on the other hand, at the lowest estimate, still has over 64,000,000 inhabitants, and its birth-rate has not shown the large decline

that has come to France. In the years from 1901 to 1912 the average natural increase in population of France was one per cent., against Germany's fourteen per cent. This will illustrate concretely why France continues to fear the German avalanche.

In the light of these figures it would appear just that powerful nations should come to the aid of France and guarantee her against unprovoked aggression. But who shall be the judge of what is unprovoked aggression? And is it not conceivable that, taking for granted that both nations retain their present rate of growth, the time will come when Germany, strong again, and restored to good standing among the nations, supported by a united and regenerated Russia, which has learned that expediency alone dictates friendship on the part of the European neighbors, will ask that the surveillance over purely German territory be removed, and that the Saar basin, which is indubitably German, be restored to her sovereignty? Will the United States then apply the principle of self-determination of nationalities, or still be inclined to support the claims of France as against the claims of Germany?

Better than signing the treaty of guaranty with France the United States should demand that the League of Nations adopt a comprehensive program of disarmament and compulsory arbitration. Then it should ask France to relinquish all claims over the Saar basin. That would help make the possibility of war much more remote than it is.

But if American public opinion determines that the treaty with France, nevertheless, should be signed, the

United States should limit the operation of the pact to a definite number of years, not over fifteen, and as an ultimate safeguard should ask that similar agreements be entered into between France and all the nations signatory to the Treaty of Versailles except Germany, inasmuch as it is unreasonable to ask the American and the British people alone to guarantee the inviolability of a pact that directly affects most of the nations of the world.

Even before President Wilson sailed, the fight to make changes in the treaty of peace was begun in the United States Senate, which would have to ratify that document. The leaders of the opposition to the treaty as it came from the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Senator Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho and Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California. Senator Lodge, as chairman of the committee on foreign relations, was by virtue of his position the leader in the routine of ratification. As such he made the principal speeches against the treaty as it stood. Some of the opposition was due to a sincere desire to safeguard the interests of the United States and to ratify nothing that seemed prejudicial to America's place in the world and her ideals. Again, other opposition, especially that which manifested itself in flamboyant speeches to the senate galleries, was due to the desire to make political capital out of certain discontent with parts of the treaty negotiated by President Wilson, and to give the impression that the President had sinned grievously against his own professed princi-

ples, against the interests of the United States, and against the interests of foreign peoples, notably those from whom we had received large groups of immigrants, who, as naturalized citizens, exerted an un-American influence on our political life.

The objection to considering the Treaty of Versailles and the covenant of the League of Nations in one and the same instrument was one of the first to be raised in the Senate. Senator Knox introduced a resolution providing for the separation of the covenant from the treaty. It became apparent that the resolution would not carry, and so was never brought to a vote.

On the afternoon of July 10 President Wilson appeared before the Senate, and in an address presented the treaty for ratification. The President did not attempt to go into details about the treaty, but spoke in general terms of the work accomplished in Paris, and the effort of the conference to make "the final triumph of freedom and right a lasting triumph." He said:

Old entanglements of every kind stood in the way. Promises which the governments made one another in the days when might and right were confused and the power of the victor was without restraint, and engagements which contemplated any dispositions of territory and extensions of sovereignty that might seem to be to the interest of those who had power to insist upon them, had been entered into without thought of what the peoples concerned might wish or profit by, and these could not always honorably be brushed aside. It was not easy to graft the new order of ideas on the old, and some of the fruits of the grafting may, I fear, for a time be bitter, but with very few exceptions the men who sat with us at the peace table desired as sincerely as we did to get away from the bad influences, illegitimate purposes, and demoralizing ambitions of international counsels and expedients out of which the sinister designs of Germany had sprung. . . . The work of the conference squares as a whole with the principles agreed

upon as the basis of peace, as well as with the practical possibilities of the international situation, which have to be faced and dealt with as facts.

Immediate ratification, however, was out of the question. The Republicans controlled the Senate and were strong enough to defeat any motion for ratification which the Democrats might propose. Whereas in the ordinary routine of intercourse with other nations the President could carry out his own foreign policy, the provision that the Senate must consent to a treaty gave the Senate great power in determining our foreign policy on questions touched by this treaty. It became apparent instantly that although the President was thoroughly within his rights in negotiating the Treaty of Versailles, it would have been the better part of wisdom for him to name several Republican senators as members of the American mission to Paris, and to consult the Senate freely during various stages of the negotiations. With Senator Lodge on the mission, the whole course of events in Paris might have been more spectacular and exciting, but the President would have had the chairman of the senate committee on foreign relations committed to the treaty when finally it was signed. Now he had to reckon with the opposition of Senators Lodge, Johnson, Poindexter, Brandegee, Harding, Borah, Moses, Smoot, McCormick, and others, all of whom declared themselves in favor of making reservations which would materially affect the treaty.

The changes sought in the treaty of peace affected the disposition of the German leaseholds in Shan-tung, which the senators declared should revert to China.

The senators also sought a more definite reservation recognizing the Monroe Doctrine as an American policy; a more specific declaration that the tariff and immigration are questions which cannot be dealt with by an international body; and a more specific declaration asserting the constitutional right of Congress to say when, where, and for what purpose the military forces of the United States might be used, the latter reservation growing out of the opposition of the senators to Article X of the covenant of the league, which guarantees the territorial integrity of the league's members. Some of this opposition was due to the fight waged on the league by Sinn Fein sympathizers in the United States, who contended that this article would make it impossible for Ireland ever to achieve independence, or to get its independence recognized by other nations, as they were bound by this article to respect the integrity of British territory. There were many senators who felt that Article X made it necessary for the United States to send troops to guarantee the boundary-lines laid down by the Peace Conference, and who opposed any such use of the American power, especially in view of the fact that many of these boundaries were manifestly unjust.

The senate committee called before it a number of men associated with the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, including Secretary Lansing. An attempt had been made in the Senate to show that the secretary, Mr. White, and General Bliss had violently opposed the award of the German leases in Shan-tung to Japan, or, as the senators preferred to call it, the giving of Shan-

tung to Japan, which was of course misrepresentation of the facts. Secretary Lansing said in answer to a question by Senator Borah that a letter on the Shan-tung situation had been written by General Bliss to the President on behalf of himself, Mr. White, and the secretary. He said that it was a private communication.

On August 19 President Wilson discussed the treaty of peace in detail with the senate committee. At the intimation of the senators he invited them to the White House and answered their questions freely. The meeting was held in the East Room. Stenographic records were made, and given immediately to the press. These records are a fruitful source of information on the President's attitude toward certain parts of the treaty, notably the covenant of the league. The substance of much of what he said already had become known in Paris, but deserved reiteration in view of the misrepresentation to which he had been subjected by partizan opponents and misguided idealists who were holding on to the millennium for dear life.

At the beginning of the conference President Wilson read a statement in which he pointed out how changes had been made in the covenant of the league to meet American wishes, a subject I have already dealt with in Chapter V. These changes were the addition of clauses covering the Monroe Doctrine, matters of domestic jurisdiction, the right to withdraw from the league, and safeguarding the constitutional right of Congress to determine questions of peace and war. He said that the term "regional understanding" had no hidden meaning, but was a general expression "to avoid the appear-

ance of dealing in such a document with the policy of a single nation." Similarly there could be no enumeration of domestic questions, although the President felt confident that naturalization, immigration, tariffs, and naturalization were questions with which no international body could deal. A nation had the right to withdraw when it had fulfilled its international obligations, but he said that it rested entirely with the conscience of the nation whether or not its international obligations had been fulfilled.

"Article X," said the President, "is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the covenant as a whole. The council can only 'advise upon' means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to." He also said that "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league" constitutes a grave and solemn moral obligation, but not a legal obligation, and leaves our Congress free to put its own interpretation upon all cases that call for action.

In answer to questions President Wilson said he had seen a plan for a league drawn up by a British committee headed by Baron Phillimore, and that he wrote a redraft. He also examined General Smuts' paper, and was especially interested in the plan for disposing of the pieces of the dismembered empire. The draft of Article X was his own. He said that the mandatory power primarily would defend a mandate from external aggression.

A large number of questions, especially those asked

by Senators Johnson and Borah, centered on the transfer of the German leases in Shan-tung to China. President Wilson said that Japan did not retain sovereignty over anything and had promised not to. He was asked whether this promise was oral or written. He replied:

“Technically oral, and literally written and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon.” He said that there was no date set for the return of the occupied territory to China, that the Japanese had declined to fix a date because they were unable to give it at that time. He believed Japan would carry out her promise. Japan’s delegates had been instructed not to sign if a decision was not reached on Shan-tung favorable to Japan. The other powers felt bound by their agreements to Japan. He felt that the decision of the Peace Conference affecting China was a disappointment. He said that he had no doubt that should China make complaint to the council of the league about Shan-tung, the league would hear her case promptly. The league was really the body to safeguard the weaker nations, because “it brings to bear the opinion of the world and the controlling action of the world on all relationships of that hazardous sort, particularly those relationships which involve the rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come are most likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without the League of Nations they have no buttress or protection. With it they have the united protection of the world; and inasmuch as it is the universal opinion that the great tragedy through which we have just passed never would have occurred if the Central powers had dreamed that a num-

ber of nations would be combined against them, so I have the utmost confidence that this notice beforehand, that the strong nations of the world will in every case be united, will make war extremely unlikely."

And here we may well take leave of the President and the Fourteen Points. The great covenant has been drawn, and the first step in the achievement of a just and lasting peace has been accomplished. What reservations may be made, what changes may come about in the treaty of peace, are of small significance beside the great outstanding fact that the conference at Paris endeavored, for the first time in history, to adjust international affairs in the light of certain definite principles of justice and fair dealing to all men. That fact overshadows all else, even its failures; it is a message that has gone to the ends of the earth, a standard by which international intercourse in the future must inevitably be measured. And this standard America has formulated for the world.

THE END

A PEACE CONGRESS OF INTRIGUE

AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE
CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1815

Compiled by Frederick Freksa; translated, and with
an introduction and notes, by Harry Hansen

The genesis of the war of 1914-1918 goes back to the Congress of Vienna, for here Prussia laid the foundation for the military domination of Germany which made it possible for her to disturb the peace of the world. Here the rulers turned a deaf ear to the misery of Poland; crushed the rising tide of liberalism in the German Confederacy; strengthened Bourbonism in France and set Hapsburg rule over Italian States that had to bleed half a century longer before they achieved unity.

In this book the author has drawn upon the wonderful story of social and political intrigue told by the participants themselves in their memoirs; and here pass in review such figures as Hardenberg, Wellington, Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, Gentz, Dalberg, the Prince de Ligne, Count de la Garde, Frederick William of Prussia, Francis of Austria, Marie Louise and Napoleon's son, the young King of Rome, the fascinating Countess Zichy, Archduke John of Austria and most of the princes and princesses, dukes and barons and crafty statesmen of an age the influence of which survived even down to our own time.

"The Congress of Vienna" is so clearly an introduction to the Congress of 1919, and presents so many contrasts and similarities, that the reading of "A Peace Congress of Intrigue" in connection with "The Adventures of the Fourteen Points" is recommended as highly profitable and entertaining, as well as most instructive for the reader of history.

8vo, 447 pages

Price \$2.50

At All Bookstores
Published by

THE CENTURY CO.

353 Fourth Avenue
New York City

THE NEW MAP OF ASIA

By **HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS**

Author of "The New Map of Europe," "The New Map of Africa," etc.

A discussion of the working out of European Eminent Domain in the continent of Asia during the fifteen years before the war and the five years of war. The book comes up to the Treaty of Versailles, and discusses the attitude of the Peace Conference towards Asiatic subject races, and towards Persia, Afghanistan, Siam and China. The rôle of Japan and the relations between Japan and China are fully discussed. The Shantung question is explained with the endeavor to present both sides of the question of Japanese intervention in China.

The other two burning questions of the hour — the relations of Great Britain with Asia (affected now very vitally by the collapse of Russia and the rise of Bolshevism and Wilsonianism) and the disposition of the Ottoman Empire — are treated with especial reference to what happened at the Peace Conference.

By his intimate association with Asiatic questions and leaders and representatives of all the Asiatic nations at the Peace Conference during the entire period of the Conference, Dr. Gibbons was able to build a living book of intense interest upon the basis of his long years of study of these questions.

8vo, 571 pages, with maps

Price \$2.50

At All Bookstores
Published by **THE CENTURY CO.** 353 Fourth Avenue
New York City

THE COMMAND IS FORWARD

From "The Stars and Stripes"

By **SERGEANT ALEXANDER WOOLLCOTT**

This is a book that every member of the A. E. F. should hold as a prized possession. It is also a book of side-lights on the war which Americans will read with well-founded pride. It is a book of humor, of pathos that touches to tears of which no reader can be ashamed; a book of brilliant and powerful descriptions of men and things which we of this country need to know about. Outside of dry official reports, it is perhaps the most authentic report of American fighting on the Western Front that has been published.

Sergeant Woolcott saw more of the work of the American fighting on the Western Front than any other one man in the A. E. F. That was not by chance. As reporter for "The Stars and Stripes," the very own newspaper of the A. E. F., it was his business to go all up and down the line and report for every one of the millions of A. E. F. men what all the others were doing. He of course enjoyed facilities that no other writer could possibly command. One of the most brilliant of New York journalists with years of training behind him, he presented all his stories with extraordinary power and some of them with such beauty that they will undoubtedly come to be classics of war-time literature.

It is now next to impossible to buy for love or money complete files of "The Stars and Stripes," but the best of its stories are in this book, which is illustrated with the best of the remarkable drawings done for the paper by C. Leroy Baldrige.

12mo, 304 pages, illustrated

Price \$1.75

**At All Bookstores
Published by**

THE CENTURY CO.

**353 Fourth Avenue
New York City**



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.

Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide

Treatment Date: JUN 2001

PreservationTechnologies

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066
(724) 779-2111



DEC 73

N. MANCHESTER,
INDIANA 46962



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 007 693 608 0